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Abstract
Starting in the 2010-11, administrators at the Fountain Lake School District implemented
the Cobra Pride Incentive Program (CPIP), a merit pay program designed to financially reward
all school employees with year-end bonuses primarily for significant improvements in student
achievement. At the conclusion of the 2010-11 school year, over $800,000 in bonuses were
distributed to school personnel. Because of the substantial investment in this program, it was
important to determine how the CPIP impacted the school counselors, teachers, and students of
Fountain Lake, to see if any of the potential benefits of a merit pay program were realized.
The results from this evaluation provided little evidence that this program had a positive
impact at Fountain Lake. Based on interview responses, school counselors noted that they now
had less time with students because of the CPIP, and were mixed in their opinions about whether
or not this program was beneficial for students. Teachers responded to surveys at two different
time periods—before and after they received their year-end bonuses and performance ratings—
and noted that they did not support the use of merit pay in general or the CPIP specifically. The
teachers also did not think the program impacted their approach to teaching, their interactions
with their peers, or that the CPIP had a positive impact on students. Further, after they received
their bonuses, the attitudes of teachers did not change.
While Fountain Lake students did show significant growth on a national assessment, this
growth could not be directly attributed to the adoption of the CPIP. However, on the Arkansas
assessments, Fountain Lake students showed growth equal to or less than a demographically and
academically matched comparison group. Thus, a reasonable conclusion from this evaluation is
that the CPIP did not have a positive impact on student achievement, and it did not appear to
have a positive impact on the counselors and teachers at Fountain Lake.
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Chapter 1 - Introduction
In January of 2009, administrators and school board members from the Fountain Lake
School District in Hot Springs, Arkansas contacted the Office for Education Policy (OEP) to
provide them with information about the potential benefits of implementing a merit pay program.
The purpose for this meeting was to determine if the Fountain Lake School District could
capitalize on the benefits of such a program while avoiding the potential negative consequences
that are often associated with merit pay. Ultimately, Fountain Lake officials sought to emphasize
an increased focus on student achievement within the district, while also rewarding teachers and
school employees with substantial bonuses for achieving this goal. School officials also sought to
make their compensation system more competitive with surrounding school districts as a way of
attracting and retaining the best teachers in the area.
As a result of this initial meeting, Fountain Lake administrators chose to put into practice
several new programs during the 2009-10 school year to “pilot” some of the potential changes
that would be made if a merit pay program was implemented. For example, students began to
take the Northwest Evaluation Association (NWEA) computer-adaptive assessments, which
would be used in the Fountain Lake merit pay program as one of the primary means of
measuring student growth. Further, teachers were given “report cards” during the school year
that clearly outlined their goals for student learning for the duration of the school year, while also
summarizing how their students performed on the NWEA and Arkansas-specific assessments
(such as the Arkansas Benchmark and End-of-Course examinations).
Based on what was learned during this pilot period, administrators at Fountain Lake
chose to implement a full-scale merit pay program during the 2010-2011 school year, in large
part due to the strong level of teacher support for this reward system (90% of certified staff and
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96% of classified staff voted in favor of this program). This merit pay program, the Cobra Pride
Incentive Program (CPIP), provided bonuses to all school employees (not just teachers)
primarily for substantial gains in student achievement.1 At the conclusion of the 2010-11 school
year, over $860,000 in CPIP bonuses were distributed to school personnel, including over
$530,000 in bonuses for teachers of core subjects (math, science, English/language arts, and
social studies) and over $150,000 in bonuses for non-core teachers/employees (art, music, and
physical education teachers, school counselors, etc.).
Because of the substantial financial investment into this program, it seems particularly
important to determine if this program was successful at reaching its goals. Thus, the purpose of
this study is to evaluate the extent to which the CPIP impacted student achievement, to determine
if this type of compensation scheme is a potential option for school leaders looking to increase
the overall level of achievement for their students. While the primary focus of this study is the
program’s impact on student achievement, I will also assess how this program influenced its
direct participants – the teachers, counselors, and employees of Fountain Lake. In this section, I
first begin with an overview of what merit pay is, identify why administrators might consider this
type of compensation scheme, and summarize the potential positive and negative consequences
often associated with merit pay.
Problem Statement
At present, the vast majority of schools in the United States pay teachers according to a
single salary schedule, where teachers get higher salaries based on the degrees they have attained
and the number of years they have been teaching (Podgursky, 2006). The rationale for this type
of compensation scheme is straightforward; it is transparent and easy to understand, and it avoids
1

The exact details of the Cobra Pride Incentive Program, including a full description of the
manner in which merit pay bonuses were calculated, will be provided in Chapter 3.
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some of the problems of earlier compensation models where female teachers were paid less than
males, and African American teachers were paid less than Caucasian teachers (Podgursky, 2002;
Protsik, 1995). Further, Protsik (1995) suggested that the single salary schedule encourages
teachers to seek out additional education, and allows all teachers, regardless of gender, race, or
grade/subject taught, to have an equal chance at earning a pay increase. Thus, there does appear
to be a valid justification for paying teachers according to this uniform schedule.
However, in recent years, there has been a growing debate centered on whether or not the
current system is an adequate and effective way of compensating teachers. There are two basic
challenges to the single salary system that are often cited. First, researchers have suggested that
teachers should not receive higher salaries simply by attaining advanced degrees, additional
licensure/certification, or by gaining years of experience, as there is little evidence to suggest that
these characteristics are strongly related to the overall effectiveness of a teacher (Goldhaber &
Brewer, 1997; Hanushek, 1986; Harris & Sass, 2009; Jepsen, 2005; Rivkin, Hanushek, & Kain,
2005). This point is perhaps best summarized by Hanushek (1986), who stated, “The results are
startlingly consistent in finding no strong evidence that student ratios, teacher education, or
teacher experience have an expected positive effect on student achievement” (p.1162). Using a
national dataset, Goldhaber and Brewer (1997) found that years of experience and degrees
obtained were not statistically significantly related to teacher effectiveness, nor was teacher
certification. Similarly, using student-level data for 1st and 4th grade students paired with teacher,
school administrator, and principal questionnaires, Jepsen (2005) found that teacher education,
years of experience, and certification were also not associated with higher levels of student
achievement.
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Using a large, longitudinal dataset from North Carolina that included ten years of student
achievement data linked to individual teachers that also included information about the teacher
(such as degrees attained, years taught, etc.), Clotfelter, Ladd, and Vigdor (2007a) found that
several key teacher characteristics did, in fact, impact student achievement. For example, the
authors noted that there was clear evidence more years of experience contributed to higher levels
of student achievement (especially within the first few years of teaching), and that teacher
licensure also positively contributed to increases in student learning. However, the authors also
found that there did not appear to be a relationship between advanced degrees and student
achievement. In a similar paper, the authors also report findings consistent with their prior
conclusions: There did appear to be a relationship between student achievement and various
certifications and licenses, but advanced degrees did not appear to be predictive of increased
student achievement (Clotfelter, Ladd, & Vigdor, 2007b).
While the lack of consistent findings in support of providing salary increases for
additional degrees or years of experience merits further consideration, perhaps the more
important concern cited about the single salary schedule is that it does nothing to encourage
exceptional work or promote effectiveness. This is because of the constraints of the current
system: If two teachers have the same degrees and have taught for the same amount of time, then
they will receive the same salary, regardless of how good of a job they do in the classroom. As
Podgursky (2002) noted, “The current salary schedule rewards a teacher who performs poorly at
the same rate as a hard-working, highly effective teacher. Hence weak teachers have the same
financial incentives to remain employed in a district as do the effective teachers” (p. 4). Further,
for those teachers that do exceptional work in the classroom, there is no flexibility in the single
salary schedule to provide that teacher with additional compensation, as a way to both reward
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and retain that teacher. As a result, many of the best teachers—those with alternative
professional options—leave teaching altogether; an estimated one-third of all new teachers leave
the profession within the first five years (Hanushek, 2007).
The best teachers leaving the classroom is clearly the opposite of what school
administrators and policymakers want, especially because of how much the very best teachers
impact student learning. For example, Hanushek (1992) estimated that the “difference in annual
achievement growth between having a good and having a bad teacher can be more than one
grade-level equivalent in test performance” (p. 107). Rockoff (2004) reported similar findings,
noting that for every one standard deviation increase in teacher quality (as measured using a
longitudinal dataset that assessed teacher impacts on student learning over time), student
achievement increased by 0.1 standard deviations. In other words, the better the teacher, the
more students learn.
While these findings make intuitive sense—that better teachers have a greater impact on
student learning—they perhaps further reinforce how much the single salary schedule limits the
ability of school leaders to provide the best teachers with larger salaries to reward the work they
do. Further, the single salary system offers no flexibility to school leaders to allow them to use
salary as a tool to ensure that the best teachers are staying in the classroom. What options then do
school leaders have to reward and retain the top-performing teachers? Hanushek (2007)
suggested the following:
“The key to an effective teacher salary program must be funding that follows
those who improve student performance. If the objective is improving student
achievement, there is no substitute for policies that directly relate to student
outcomes” (p. 581).
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Put simply, the author contends that in order for a salary system to be effective (that is, the only
way for a compensation system to be effective), the most dollars should be given to those
teachers that have the greatest impact on student achievement.
This concept, commonly referred to as merit pay, is becoming more and more common in
education. Sparked by President Obama’s Race to the Top competition, states were (and can be)
awarded millions of dollars for, among other things, implementing some form of merit-based
compensation. In the end, the goal of the Obama administration is simple: encourage states to
implement policies that recognize and reward successes in the classroom to help raise the level
of education that children receive.
The term “merit pay” can be defined in a number of ways, but at their core, these
programs provide financial incentives, usually in the form of end-of-year bonuses, to teachers
(and in some cases, all school employees) to both reward exceptional classroom performance and
to encourage a teacher to stay in the classroom.2 In their seminal systematic review of how merit
pay programs have impacted student achievement, Podgursky and Springer (2007) established
the following definition of merit pay:
“Merit-based pay rewards individual teachers, groups of teachers, or schools on
any number of factors, including student performance, classroom observations,
and teacher portfolios. Merit-based pay is a reward system that hinges on student

2

It should be noted that while the term merit pay generally refers to a system in which teachers
and school personnel receive bonuses based on some measure of effectiveness, there is not a set
format or structure to which these programs adhere. That is, each individual merit pay program is
structured differently, and because of this, it is important to consider these differences when
evaluating the impacts of such programs. The myriad ways these programs can be structured will
be outlined in Chapter 2, when I summarize the different programs across the United States that
have been evaluated for their impacts on student achievement.
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outcomes attributed to a particular teacher or group of teachers rather than on
“inputs” such as skills or knowledge” (p.912).
The key component of this definition is that merit pay programs compensate teachers in a
manner quite different than the current single salary schedule. That is, these programs generally
do not provide rewards for additional degrees or years of experience (inputs), as does the current
system; rather, under a merit-based system, teachers earn more money based on, among other
things, how well their students perform on measures of student learning (outputs).
The support for these types of compensation programs is growing as policymakers and
school leaders begin to recognize the importance of accountability in the classroom. For
example, while they noted that the evidence is limited in terms of a prescription for the “best”
way to structure a merit pay program, Podgursky and Springer (2007) concluded that more of
these programs should be attempted and existing programs should be expanded due to their
potential impacts on student achievement. Further, based on multiple evaluations of merit pay
programs in Israel, Lavy (2002; 2009) found evidence to support the use of merit pay, as these
programs had positive impacts on student achievement and minimal negative impacts on
teachers. Muralidharan and Sundararaman (2009) also reported similar findings from their
evaluation of a merit pay program in India, where student achievement was improved through
the use of performance incentives. Thus, these programs, and many that will be discussed in
Chapter 2, appear to be a promising alternative to the current compensation scheme, as there is
reason to believe that such programs could have a positive impact on student achievement.
The guiding theory behind how merit pay might impact teachers, and as a result, impact
student achievement, is fairly straightforward. Barnett and Ritter (2008) suggested that such
programs should:
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Motivate teachers to put forth increased effort, or become more innovative in their
teaching approach;



Collaborate more with their peers to improve student learning;



Bring new people into the teaching profession who are confident in their ability to impact
student achievement (because they are entering into a system with a high level of
accountability);



Impact the types of teachers that stay in the profession: While the most effective teachers
would earn large rewards, the least effective would not, resulting in a natural selection
whereby the best teachers continue to teach (because they are being recognized and
rewarded) and the worst teachers exit the profession (because their work is not being
rewarded)
These potential outcomes can be grouped into two general categories. First, merit pay

programs can have a motivation effect on teachers and school employees. That is, the incentive to
earn extra money in the form of merit pay bonuses might motivate teachers to seek out additional
training or professional development, or collaborate more with other teachers to improve their
work in the classroom. Or, the opportunity to earn bonuses might simply motivate a teacher to
put forth more effort in his or her work. In either case, the incentives provided to teachers are
perfectly aligned with the needs of the student; the more the teacher improves, or the more effort
the teacher invests into the teaching process, the better the educational experience for the
teacher’s students.
On a broader scale, merit pay programs can also result in a composition effect, whereby
the incentives offered attract new professionals with high ability and low risk-aversion into the
teaching profession (Goldhaber, DeArmond, Player, & Choi, 2008). In other words, these new
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teachers will have minimal reservations about being held accountable for their work (since they
are entering into a system with a high level of accountability in place) because they are confident
in their abilities to impact student learning. Further, because the most effective teachers are
earning additional money, and the least effective teachers are not earning anything (in terms of
bonuses), it may be that the best teachers stay in teaching, the least effective teachers leave the
profession, and a new group of professionals enter into the classroom. Here again, as teachers
benefit, so do the students, as this type of effect will ultimately result in students only being
taught by the best and brightest teachers.
Despite these potential positive outcomes, there is still a great deal of debate about, and
opposition to, the use of merit pay. Central to this debate is the question of whether or not these
programs actually have a positive impact on student achievement, a topic that will be discussed
at length in Chapter 2. Beyond the impact on student achievement, there is also concern that
these programs can have a negative impact on teachers, students, and the overall culture of a
school. For example, Kohn (1993) argued that merit pay bonuses can actually be punishments
instead of rewards, since teachers will have to constantly worry about being “caught” for doing
something wrong. Further, the author suggested that since some teachers could earn a bonus,
while others might not, that there is the potential for the damaging of relationships between
teachers, since teachers might feel the need to compete with their peers (Kohn, 1993).
The opposition to merit pay programs can perhaps best be summarized by a statement
from the National Education Association (NEA), the largest teachers association in the United
States. On the organization’s website, the NEA states the following:
“Merit pay systems force teachers to compete, rather than cooperate. They create
a disincentive for teachers to share information and teaching techniques. This is
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especially true because there is always a limited pool of money for merit pay.
Thus, the number-one way teachers learn their craft—learning from their
colleagues—is effectively shut down. If you think we have turnover problems in
teaching now, wait until new teachers have no one to turn to.”
The concern that teachers will stop collaborating with others, and in turn compete for a
finite amount of bonus money, is a commonly cited problem of merit pay programs (Goldhaber
et al., 2008). There is also a non-trivial concern that merit pay is ill-suited for use in schools, as it
is difficult to truly measure the individual impacts of teachers on student achievement
(Goldhaber et al., 2008; Murnane & Cohen, 1986). This is because there are many factors that
could impact how a student performs on a standardized test on a given day (for example, the
child is sick, had a bad morning at home, etc.), and if a teacher’s “effectiveness” is measured
simply by measures of student achievement, then perhaps the true impact a teacher has on his or
her students is not being accurately captured.
It may also be true that scores from standardized tests are not true reflections of what a
student knows, or how much a student has learned over the course of the school year. Teachers
are expected to convey a great deal of knowledge and skills to their students, and much of this
information may not be addressed on these tests. However, if a teacher’s “merit” is based on how
students perform on such tests, then it may be true that teachers primarily focus their attention
simply on those skills addressed on these tests, commonly referred to as “teaching to the test”
(Lazear, 2006).
In addition to using test scores to capture a teacher’s effectiveness, merit pay programs
can also be designed to use other, more subjective measures, to evaluate a teacher (for example,
an evaluation by a principal). However, these measures are not without their flaws either; as
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Elam (1989) noted, teachers may be concerned that these evaluations will be unfair and will lack
objectivity. Thus, despite the potential positive impacts of merit pay, there is also the potential
for a number of negative outcomes as well.
Beyond the impact that merit pay programs have on teachers, be it positive or negative,
this type of reform strategy might also have the potential to impact the jobs of school counselors,
and as a result, the students they serve. This is because school counselors have a number of
primary responsibilities, such as designing student academic programs, interpreting
psychological testing, counseling at-risk students, meeting with parents/teachers/principals about
student needs, etc. (American School Counselor Association, 2005). However, in schools where
merit pay is used, school counselor time may shift to other areas of focus. For example, it may be
that school counselors assume the role of building or district testing coordinators because of the
increased focus on standardized assessments used in the evaluation of teachers and school
personnel (Burnham & Jackson, 2000). In fact, it appears that this is becoming more common;
Dollarhide and Lemberger (2006) found in a national survey of school counselors in schools with
an accountability system in place (such as a merit pay program), that 29.2% of respondents said
they serve as the testing coordinator for their district (though it is unclear if this number is
significantly different than what would be expected in schools without merit pay).
In schools with merit pay, there might also be lower motivation on the part of teachers to
cede class time with their students to school counseling activities, because students may lose
valuable class time learning skills or concepts that may be covered on standardized assessments
(Brown, Galassi, & Akos, 2004; Dollarhide & Lemberger, 2006). Because of this increased focus
on preparation for tests, it may be that school counselors are unable to provide other important
services to these students, such as focusing on students’ social and/or emotional needs.
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The shift in school counselor roles, coupled with the decreased emphasis on school
counseling itself, both may result in students’ failing to have their social, emotional, and
academic needs completely met. The American School Counselor Association (ASCA) (2005)
recommends that 80% of a school counselor’s time should be spent working directly with
students, including providing direct 1:1 counseling services. In a school with a merit pay
program in place where there is a greater emphasis on testing and accountability, it may be that
counselors are put in a position where they are not able to provide these services because of the
shift in their job responsibilities to more test-related activities.
The goal of this paper then is to evaluate the extent to which a merit pay program, the
Cobra Pride Incentive Program (CPIP), impacted the counselors, teachers, and students in the
Fountain Lake School District in the first year in which the program was implemented (the 201011 academic year). This study is important first and foremost because it adds timely information
to the ever-growing debate about whether or not these programs are effective at raising student
achievement, and whether these programs are effective at identifying and rewarding the best and
brightest teachers. While much of the limited research on merit pay has focused on impacts on
student achievement (as I will show in Chapter 2), this study also addresses whether or not
school counselor roles have shifted as a result of this program, and looks in-depth at how the
teachers at Fountain Lake responded to this program. Thus, this research can contribute to the
existing research on this topic as a way of better understanding the overall impact these programs
have on the schools in which they are implemented.
Research Questions
This evaluation of the impact of the CPIP was guided by the following research questions
and sub-questions:
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1) Counselor Impacts: Did the roles and responsibilities of school counselors at Fountain
Lake shift as a result of the CPIP, and if so, how?
a. Did school counselors report that they were asked to perform tasks outside the
scope of the ASCA counseling model, such as coordinating test administrations or
watching classes while teachers were occupied with test administration?
b. Did school counselors report that they spent less time providing direct counseling
services to students at Fountain Lake as a result of the CPIP?
c. Did school counselors report that teachers and administrators were less inclined to
support counseling activities as a direct result of the CPIP?
2) Teacher Impacts: How did teachers at Fountain Lake respond to the implementation of
the CPIP?
a. In general, what were teacher impressions of the program: Did teachers support
the program? Did they think it was fair? Did they think the program would
accurately capture their overall “effectiveness”?
b. Did teachers report that they were motivated to work harder, seek out additional
training, or collaborate more with their fellow teachers as a result of the CPIP?
c. How did teacher attitudes and perceptions about the program and the impact it
had at Fountain Lake change after they received a bonus?
d. Did the teachers that were rated as highly effective under the CPIP have different
attitudes and perceptions about the program then those teachers who were rated as
the least effective?
3) Student Impacts: What impact did the CPIP have on student achievement at Fountain
Lake?
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a. How did Fountain Lake students perform on a nationally administered assessment
compared to what would have been expected based on their starting score and
grade?
b. How did Fountain Lake students perform on Arkansas Comprehensive Testing,
Assessment, and Accountability Program (ACTAAP) assessments as compared to
a matched comparison group of students from neighboring districts?

The first research question and sub-questions provide insight into how school counselors
at Fountain Lake were affected by the implementation of the CPIP, and how school counselors in
other districts might also be impacted as a result of the use of merit pay. The results from these
questions can show the extent to which counselors’ roles at Fountain Lake have shifted, if at all,
and if the school counselors have less time to work with students because of the increased
emphasis on testing and accountability. If there is evidence that a shift has occurred, it might be
that administrators at Fountain Lake need to consider ways of ensuring that counselors are not
hindered in their abilities to meet the social, emotional, and educational needs of their students. I
conducted interviews with school counselors at Fountain Lake to ascertain how they were
impacted by the CPIP.
The second group of research questions and sub-questions provides valuable information
about how teachers responded to the implementation of a merit pay program, and interestingly,
how these attitudes changed after experiencing a full year of the program, including receiving an
end-of-year performance bonus. Here, I administered surveys to teachers at the conclusion of the
2010-11 school year, and again in the Fall of the 2011-12 school year (after teachers received
their bonuses at the start of the school year). The design of my survey administration, which will
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be outlined in more detail in Chapter 4, was set up such that I could match teacher responses on
each of the survey administrations, allowing me to see how individual teacher attitudes and
perceptions changed after a period of time. This design also allowed me to determine if the
teachers that view the CPIP the most favorably were also those teachers that received the highest
bonus, and vice versa. In other words, we can see if the program resulted in the aforementioned
motivation effects (i.e. motivated the teachers to work harder, collaborate more with other
teachers, seek out additional training or professional development, etc.), and if teachers
responded differently to this program based on their overall level of measured effectiveness
under the CPIP. This last point is important, because if the “best” teachers support the program
(and are thus receiving the highest bonuses), and the least effective teachers do not support the
program (and are thus receiving the lowest bonuses), then it may be true that this program could
result in the long-term composition effects that were previously discussed, where the most
effective teachers continue to teach and the least effective teachers leave the profession.
Finally, the third set of research questions and sub-questions addresses perhaps the most
important outcome of merit pay programs, the extent to which they impact student achievement.
Here, I assessed the impact of the CPIP on student achievement in two ways. First, I sought to
understand how Fountain Lake students performed on the nationally administered Northwest
Evaluation Association’s (NWEA) assessments compared to a national norming population.
Here again, more detail will be provided in Chapter 4, but very briefly, I could determine the
extent to which Fountain Lake student performance exceeded what would be expected based on
a student’s grade and starting test score. For example, if a 4th grade student started the school
year with a score of 200 in math, based on the norming population of similar students, I could
see if that student’s year-end performance met or exceeded what is typical for similar students
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(based on their grade and starting test score) across the nation. If Fountain Lake students did
consistently outperform typical levels of growth, it may be that the CPIP did positively impact
the overall focus on achievement in the district.
I also assessed how students at Fountain Lake performed on the ACTAAP assessments
using a matched comparison group of students. For this set of analyses, I matched each Fountain
Lake student to a student in a neighboring school district on such indicators as grade, gender,
race, free and reduced lunch (FRL) status, and previous levels of student achievement. In this
way, I could control for demographic variables that may influence achievement levels, creating a
comparison group that was identical to the group of Fountain Lake students on all observable
measures. Because of the similarity of students in these two groups, any differences (after the
implementation of the program) observed between the student groups can likely be attributed to
the impact of the CPIP.3
For all of the research questions, when applicable, I disaggregated these analyses by
grade level and school level (elementary, middle, or high school), to determine if the CPIP had a
differential impact on certain groups of students or teachers more so than others.
Paper Organization
This dissertation is divided into six chapters. In Chapter 2, I provide a systematic
summary of current and relevant research that addresses the impact of merit pay programs on
teachers and students. This chapter is followed by a comprehensive overview of the Cobra Pride
Incentive Program, including an in-depth description of the criteria used to calculate bonuses for
3

While the results from my analysis of student performance on the NWEA assessments will
show how Fountain Lake students performed on this national assessment relative to a national
norming sample, any significant gains in improvement cannot be directly attributed to the impact
of the CPIP; these results are merely correlational. However, because of the matching procedure
used in the ACTAAP analyses, any differences observed between Fountain Lake and comparison
students allow for inferences to be made about the causal impacts of the CPIP.
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different groups of teachers and employees. In Chapter 4, I provide a summary of the
methodology used to answer the aforementioned research questions, followed by a summary of
the results of the accompanying analyses in Chapter 5. Finally, in Chapter 6 I summarize the
findings of this evaluation, and conclude with a discussion of what the findings mean for future
merit pay programs.
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Chapter 2 – Literature Review
With the increase in prevalence of merit pay programs across the United States, there is a
growing interest in understanding what impact, if any, these programs have on teachers and
school personnel, and perhaps most importantly, the impact these programs have on the students
that attend schools utilizing this type of compensation scheme. However, one consistent theme
that emerges from a review of existing literature on merit pay is the notable lack of quality
research with a focus on evaluating the impacts of such programs.
There are a number of reasons why limited research exists on the effect that merit pay has
on schools. Murnane and Cohen (1986) noted that merit pay programs typically do not persist for
extended periods of time due to the considerable financial costs associated with providing
bonuses to teachers and school employees, and because merit pay programs typically face a great
deal of opposition from teacher groups who question the fairness of compensating personnel
based primarily on measures of student achievement. Ballou (2001) also cited financial issues as
one of the primary determining factors for terminating these programs, and stated that
administrators in unionized school systems likely face considerable difficulty making these
programs last due to the opposition from teachers, and have little incentive to even undertake
these often unpopular reform efforts in the first place.
For what reasons are merit pay programs unpopular, especially for teachers and school
employees who will be eligible to receive additional compensation in the form of year-end
bonuses? As Elam (1989) noted, much of the opposition from teachers stems from their concern
about the fairness and objectivity of evaluations about their performance used in the
determination of merit pay bonuses. If teachers are concerned that the bonus system being used
is not based on fair measures of their actual performance, then it makes intuitive sense that their
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support for this type of compensation scheme would be minimal. Additionally, teacher support
may be low due to the fact that up to this point, merit pay bonuses have not been sufficiently
large enough to outweigh the perceived risk associated with having the performance of teachers
scrutinized under a merit pay system (Eberts, 2002). In other words, teachers may not support a
system where the benefits of receiving a bonus are outweighed by the perceived negative aspects
of being subjected to rigorous evaluations of their performance, especially if the evaluation itself
is thought to be unfair.
Thus, despite the strong push by education officials and policymakers to develop and
implement merit pay programs, there are a limited number of programs that have actually been
put into practice across the country, and fewer still that have persisted long enough to evaluate
the extent to which they have affected, positively or negatively, the teachers, school personnel,
and students directly impacted by such programs. Because of this, my evaluation of the impact of
the CPIP on 1) school counselor roles and behaviors; 2) teacher attitudes, perceptions, and
behaviors; and 3) student achievement is highly important and relevant, as this evaluation can
add to the limited pool of research on this topic. With this evaluation, I aim to help fill the
existing research gap so that school leaders, teachers, parents, and policymakers have a greater
understanding of the costs and benefits associated with the implementation of a merit pay
program.
Literature Review Process
Selection Criteria
To provide context for how school personnel might respond to the implementation of the
CPIP, and to assess what types of achievement gains might (or might not) be expected as a result
of the CPIP, I sought to identify research that addressed the impact merit pay programs have on
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teachers, school personnel, and students. In order to ensure that my review of existing research
was as comprehensive as possible, I began my review by developing criteria to help focus my
search of merit pay research. The criteria used for this literature review were based on the
frameworks employed by the Campbell Collaboration, an organization that aims to prepare,
maintain, and disseminate systematic reviews in such fields as education, crime and justice, and
social welfare.4 The purpose of the Campbell Collaboration guidelines for identifying research,
and thus the guidelines used in this review, was to systematically identify all current and relevant
high-quality research on the topic of merit pay.
For these purposes then, the guidelines used to identify merit pay research adhered to the
following search criteria:


Research conducted within the previous ten years (since July of 2001);



Focused on merit pay programs that were implemented in the United States;



Focused on merit pay programs implemented in public schools (including public charter
schools), not private schools ;



Focused on merit pay in K-12 education;



Must be focused on merit pay programs in which teachers/school personnel earn year-end
bonuses based on some evaluation of their performance;



The research includes an evaluation component specifically aimed at measuring the
impact of merit pay on teachers, school personnel (including school counselors), and/or
students.
There were two reasons for limiting this review to only include research conducted

within the previous ten years. First, previous systematic reviews on merit pay, most notably the
4

More information on the Campbell Collaboration can be accessed at:
http://www.campbellcollaboration.org/
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review conducted by Podgursky and Springer (2007), identified only two research articles (that
focused on the same merit pay program) completed prior to 2001 in which the use of merit pay
was evaluated (Clotfelter & Ladd, 1996; Ladd, 1999).5
Further, K-12 education in the last ten years has become much more focused on
accountability and evaluation of teacher performance than in years prior, much of this as a direct
result of the mandates established under the No Child Left Behind (NCLB) Act of 2001. These
mandates have resulted in a greater number of merit pay programs being established, and have
also resulted in more of these programs being subjected to rigorous evaluations of their impacts
on schools. Thus, in the past ten years, the use of merit pay in schools has become much more
common across the United States.
This review was also limited to only include evaluations of programs in the United
States. There have been a number of evaluations of merit pay outside of the United States that
were not included in this review; for example, Muralidharan and Sundararaman (2009) assessed
the impact of a merit pay program in India using a rigorous experimental design, and found that
the program positively impacted student achievement. Lavy (2002; 2009) also found similar
findings in separate evaluations of merit pay programs in Israel. Further, Glewwe, Ilias, and
Kremer (2003) evaluated a large-scale merit pay program in Kenya, and found that the program
resulted in increased passage rates on district exams (though the authors cautioned that these
gains may have been the result of teachers “gaming” the system). Thus, while this international
research does provide strong evidence in support of merit pay, the education environments in
these countries are likely significantly different than that of schools in the United States. Because

5

While these articles are not formally included in this review, it should be noted that the authors
found that this particular merit pay program, implemented in Dallas schools, did have a positive
impact on student achievement.
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of this, it seems reasonable to only use research from merit pay programs in the United States to
provide context for how the CPIP might affect schools in the Fountain Lake School District.
I also chose to restrict my literature review to only include reviews of merit pay programs
implemented in public schools (including public charter schools) instead of private schools,6 and
only research focused on merit pay programs implemented in K-12 education settings. Similar to
my restriction of only including merit pay programs in the United States due to the differences in
education environments, I also did not include merit pay programs implemented in private
schools due to inherent differences between the private and public school sector.7 Further, I did
not include research focused on the use of merit pay at the college or university level, nor did I
include research focused on the use of such programs in the medical or business professions.
Again, the goal of this review was to identify research that most closely reflected the education
environment of the Fountain Lake School District in which the CPIP was implemented.
One important consideration for this review was that all research should be focused on
merit pay programs in which teachers/school personnel earned year-end bonuses based on some
annual evaluation of their performance, including (but not limited to) measures of how individual
teachers specifically impacted student achievement, school-wide achievement gains for
employees such as school counselors who do not directly impact student achievement, or end-ofyear evaluations by a principal, regular classroom observations, etc. Recall, the abbreviated
definition of merit pay used in this evaluation comes from Podgursky and Springer (2007), in

6

However, I did include research in which the analysis focused on merit pay programs in both
public and private schools at a broader level, as I will show at a later point in this chapter.
Research was not included only if the merit pay program under review was solely based in
private schools.
7
For example, private school teachers often do not receive tenure in the same manner as public
school teachers, and in many cases, private school teachers are not compensated according to the
traditional salary schedule.
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which the authors stated that, “Merit-based pay rewards individual teachers, groups of teachers,
or schools on any number of factors, including student performance, classroom observations, and
teacher portfolios.” (p.912). Evaluations of performance could vary by program for this review,
as could the exact structure of the individual merit pay programs. For example, some merit pay
programs provide rewards only to teachers of core subjects, whereas other programs financially
reward all employees in a school. In some programs, bonuses are fixed (where a teacher either
earns a bonus of $3,000, or nothing at all) or continuous (where a teacher could earn any amount
up to $3,000), and bonuses can either be distributed to individual personnel based on individual
performance, or the same bonus can be given to all teachers based on the performance of the
school as a whole. Programs might also be structured in a zero-sum fashion, such that only a
limited number of teachers earn a bonus (such as the top ten teachers in a school), whereas other
programs are specifically designed to ensure that everyone in a school could benefit financially
under the program. In all of these cases, the exact structure of the program differs, but at their
core these programs are designed to provide financial rewards to school personnel based on some
measure of their performance each year, and all would still be included in this review.
This also means that programs under which personnel can earn additional money for nonperformance based activities, such as programs in which teachers earn an annual bonus simply
for completing additional professional development activities, would not be included in this
literature review. For example, this review does not include any evaluations of career ladder
programs despite the fact that these programs are often associated with merit pay. Briefly, in
career ladder programs such as those used currently in Arizona and previously in Missouri
schools, teachers are/were able to receive supplementary pay for meeting certain performance
criteria. These criteria can include extra teaching work or participating in professional
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development activities, and often also include meeting some form of tenure requirement. Thus,
while teachers are rewarded under these programs for meeting performance criteria, the criteria
used in these programs are not inherently focused on capturing the impact these teachers have on
their students on an annual basis. Put differently, teachers in career ladder programs are doing
extra work for extra money, but their extra work is not evaluated for quality or impact on student
achievement.
Finally, one of the primary goals of this review was to identify high-quality research
specifically aimed at evaluating the impact of merit pay. Because of this, one of the key criteria
in this review process was to only include research that included an evaluation component,
where the exact impact of the use of merit pay on some outcome measure (such as student
achievement, teacher attitudes, etc.) could be directly quantified or measured relative to a
comparable alternative standard or counterfactual. This guideline was established to ensure that
the research used for this review included actual evaluations of merit pay, rather than opinions
for or against the use of this compensation strategy, or simply discussions about various aspects
of the use of merit pay.
Application of Selection Criteria
After developing my search criteria, the next step in my review was to apply these criteria
to a number of different search options to identify as much high-quality merit pay research as
possible. For the purposes of this review, I used the following search engines and alternative
search options:


University of Arkansas Library Resources:
o Ebsco Academic Search
o ProQuest Research Library
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o Education Resources Information Center (ERIC)


Hand searches of academic journals (2001-2011):
o Journal of Policy Analysis and Management
o Education Finance and Policy
o Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis
o Review of Education Research
o Journal of Public Economics



Hand searches of published, non-journal research (2001-2011):
o National Bureau of Economic Research
o National Center on Performance Incentives
o Rand Corporation
o Mathematica Policy Research
o MDRC



Podgursky/Springer (2007) systematic review references
The primary means by which research was identified was through searches of electronic

databases through the University of Arkansas library, specifically Ebsco Academic Search,
ProQuest Research Library, and ERIC. In these databases, the following search terms were used
in combination to maximize the identification of relevant merit pay journal articles: “merit pay”
OR “performance pay” OR “teacher salary” OR “teacher compensation” OR “salary scale” OR
“teacher incentives” OR “teacher bonus” OR “pay-for-performance” AND “effective*” OR
“evaluat*” AND “education” NOT “health”. The search terms with asterisks (“effective*” and
“evaluat*”) were included to identify articles in which effectiveness was measured and/or
evaluations were conducted, and the search was restricted to only include those articles focused
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on education. These search parameters resulted in the initial identification of a total of 4,106
journal articles.8
In order to ensure that relevant articles on merit pay were not overlooked in my initial
searches of the aforementioned databases, I also conducted title reviews of every article from the
previous ten years from five prominent education and economics journals, specifically the
Journal of Policy Analysis and Management (JPAM), Education Finance and Policy (EFP),
Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis (EEPA), Review of Education Research (RER), and
Journal of Public Economics (JPE). During this hand review process, my goal was to identify
any article pertaining to teacher merit pay whatsoever for initial inclusion in this review. In total,
48 articles were initially identified for inclusion in this literature review.9
I also conducted hand searches of articles from the past ten years from various education
policy research organizations and think-tanks. Organizations included in this search process were
the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), the National Center on Performance
Incentives (NCPI), the Rand Corporation, Mathematica Policy Research, and MDRC; all
relevant organizations were identified through discussions with researchers with significant
experience in the field of merit pay. The purpose of these searches was to identify research on
merit pay that had not been published in an academic journal, and thus would not have been
located in the two previous search processes. These hand reviews resulted in the initial retention
of an additional 48 articles on merit pay.10

8

Of the initial 4,106 journal articles, 2,281 were obtained from the Ebsco Academic Search
database, 1,641 from the Proquest Research Library, and 184 from the ERIC database.
9
Many of the articles identified in this search were also identified in my search of electronic
online databases. However, in this initial identification process, I chose to retain all articles that
were relevant, even if they had already been identified.
10
An example of an article identified in this process is the evaluation of the New York City merit
pay program conducted by Springer and Winters (2009), which was only identified by reviewing
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As a final step in this search process, I also initially retained all of the articles used by
Podgursky and Springer (2007) in their seminal systematic review of merit pay. Here again, the
goal was to ensure that I was identifying all relevant research on the topic of merit pay, so the
retention of this research served as a final search option to secure research that may not have
been identified in the previous search options. In total, there were 96 articles that were initially
retained for this literature review from the Podgursky and Springer systematic review.11
For each of the four search options, my review process started with numerous studies,
and I then went through a series of steps to filter out research that did not meet my
aforementioned selection criteria or was a duplicate of an article that had already been identified.
In my search of electronic academic databases, all of the studies identified based on my search
terms were initially retained, as were all of the articles from the Podgursky and Springer (2007)
review. With these articles, as well as with the studies identified in the hand reviews of
academic journals and non-journal research, I then reviewed the titles of all of the different
articles; if an article appeared to address the topic of merit pay, it was retained for further review.
After this title review, all retained articles then went through an abstract review, and then a final
review of the entire article if the review of the abstract showed that the article still fit all of the
selection criteria. In the article review, I primarily focused on the methodology employed by the
authors of each study, to ensure that retained articles were focused on an evaluation of the impact
of a merit pay program on teachers, students, or school employees, while also adhering to the
inclusion criteria of this review.

research published by the NCPI. For these types of articles, if they were subsequently published
in an academic journal, I would use the journal version of the study in my review.
11
Here again, many of the articles identified from this systematic review had already been
identified from my other searches, so there was overlap in the articles already located and those
used from Podgursky and Springer’s (2007) systematic review.
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In total, there were a total of 4,267 merit-pay-related articles that were initially identified
in this review (4,202 from electronic academic databases and the Podgursky and Springer
review, and 65 from the hand review of academic journals and non-journal research). After the
title and abstract review, that number was reduced to 24 articles that met all inclusion criteria and
were not duplicates of other articles; from those 24 articles, 10 more were removed after I
completed a full article review, primarily because these articles were not evaluations of the
impacts of merit pay programs. An example of one such article that was removed was the
evaluation of Tennessee’s Career Ladder Evaluation System conducted by Dee and Keys (2004);
while the authors consider this program a merit pay program, the structure of the career ladder
program—a teacher receives salary supplements by moving up career levels over a period of
several years based on evaluations of the teacher’s performance in multiple competency areas—
did not fit with the definition of merit pay that guided this literature review. The reviews of
teachers in this program occurred over a number of years, and were not directly linked with the
impact a teacher had on student achievement; because of this, this article was not included in the
final literature review.
As a result of the selection criteria and filtering process, there were a total of 14 articles
that met all criteria, and served as the basis for this literature review. A summary of this review
process, including the number of articles that were retained after each step of the review, is
included in Table 1.
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Table 1
Identification of Merit Pay Studies for Literature Review
Initial
Identification
of Research
Articles

Articles
Retained from
Title Review

Articles
Retained
after Abstract
Review

Articles Retained
for Full Review
(Duplicates
Removed)

Final
Articles
Retained

4,106

92

11

9

3

Hand Review of
Academic
Journals

17

3

0

0

Hand Review of
Published, NonJournal Research

48

14

13

9

96

21

5

2

2

4,202

178

33

24

14

Resource

Electronic
Academic
Databases

Podgursky &
Springer
References
Total

Literature Review Findings
General Findings
The 14 empirical evaluations of merit pay identified here represent a wide range of merit
pay program formats with regard to the magnitude of bonuses offered, the employees eligible for
bonuses, and the manner and criteria by which teachers/school personnel are able to earn these
bonuses. While these articles lack commonality in the structure of the merit pay program, in each
of these articles the authors provide sound evidence of the extent to which the use of bonuses
impacted either student achievement in the schools/districts in which the merit pay programs
were implemented, and/or how teachers reacted to the implementation of such a program. When
taken together, the conclusions from these articles, while limited in number, provide a thorough
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and substantial overview of the effects of merit pay programs on the students, teachers, and
school personnel who participated in, or were subjected to, such a program.
Counselor impacts.
One of the more notable findings of this literature review, beyond that there is simply a
limited amount of quality research on the impacts of merit pay, is the scarcity of research
considering the impacts of such programs on anyone other than students and teachers. This is
certainly true for school counselors as well; my literature review revealed no research articles
that met my selection criteria that were focused on how merit pay affects school counselors.
Further, while there are a vast number of discussion pieces and articles expressing opinions
regarding how merit pay impacts teachers and students, there are even a limited number of these
types of articles that address the role of school counselors in a school with a merit pay program
in place.
Intuitively, the lack of research regarding school counselors and merit pay makes sense;
in many instances, merit pay programs are only designed to reward teachers, and as a result,
there would likely be no direct impact on school counselors in such a system. Even in programs
where all employees receive bonuses, including school counselors, it is likely true that the direct
impact of school counselors on raising student achievement is limited, if not immeasurable, and
thus is not considered in research on merit pay. Though reasonable in this context, the view that
school counselors do not have an impact on student achievement, in both theory and practice,
seems particularly unlikely. While the impact on students may not be direct, school counselors
do still contribute a great deal to student learning, albeit in a more indirect fashion. According to
the American School Counseling Association (ASCA) national model (2005), some of the core
activities for school counselors include helping students acquire the knowledge and skills
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necessary for effective learning in the school, and assisting students with academic preparation
needed for education beyond high school. However, because the direct impact of school
counselors on student achievement is difficult to quantify, there may be little interest in
understanding how school counselors respond to and are impacted by the use of merit pay.
That is not to say that counselors do not have an impact on student achievement, nor does
it mean that counselors are not directly impacted by the implementation of a merit pay program.
For example, in a school that uses merit pay, it may be that the school places a greater emphasis
on preparing for standardized tests, as the results of these tests may figure prominently into the
calculation of end-of-year bonuses. In such a scenario, it may also be true that the roles of
school counselors shift to better align with the goal of raising student achievement. As Dahir
(2004) noted, the shift in accountability for schools has also resulted in a shift in the professional
duties of school counselors to better address the increased accountability standards.
Indeed, this emphasis on accountability not only impacts the duties of the school
counselor, but may also impact the social and emotional needs of the students with whom the
counselors work. Dollarhide and Lemberger (2006) reported that counselors did believe that
teachers were more reluctant to cede time in the classroom to school counseling activities, while
also noting that the increased focus on academics came at the expense of the social and
emotional needs of the students. The authors also found that counselors viewed the increased
pressure of testing and accountability as a deterrent to students receiving counseling services.
Thus, merit pay programs may have a direct impact on school counselors, especially if
they are asked to perform activities such as being responsible for test coordination or preparation
in a school with merit pay (which are counter to the roles of school counselors as defined by the
ASCA national model (2005)). As the level of accountability increases within schools with such
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compensation programs, the roles of school counselors may change in response to the increased
focus on student achievement. As a result, the needs of students in schools with these programs
may also be impacted by the shift in roles and activities for school counselors.
One of the clear benefits then of my evaluation of the impact of the CPIP is that I
consider how the implementation of merit pay in the Fountain Lake School District changed the
roles of school counselors in the district, if at all. Further, I also can begin to understand how
school counselors at Fountain Lake think the CPIP has impacted their work with their students,
and whether or not the CPIP has led to an increased emphasis on the academic needs of students
at the expense of their social and emotional needs. As such, this study can provide a significant
contribution to the very limited body of research that looks directly at the link between merit pay
and school counselor roles, especially as merit pay programs become more and more common in
schools across the United States.
Teacher impacts.
Of the 14 total articles identified for this literature review, four included an evaluation of
how teachers responded to the implementation of a merit pay program (in addition to an
evaluation of the impacts of merit pay on student achievement), while one was focused
exclusively on teacher impacts (Belfield & Heywood, 2007). An abbreviated summary of these
articles, including a brief overview of the size and type of bonus offered under the various merit
pay programs, as well as a description of the sample, outcome measure, and results of the
evaluation, is presented in Table 2. Additionally, a more detailed description of each of the
articles, including the evaluation methods used and the specific aspects of each merit pay
program, can be found in Appendix A.
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In Table 2, I have characterized the results of each evaluation as either positive or
negative depending on the impact the program had on teacher outcomes such as teacher turnover,
the level of collegiality and collaboration among teachers, the effect of the program on the
climate of the school, and whether or not earning a bonus encouraged teachers to work harder,
try out new strategies, seek out additional professional development, etc. Recall that merit pay
programs, in theory, may result in short-term motivation effects (such as teachers working harder,
collaborating more, approaching the classroom differently, etc.) and longer-term composition
effects, which results in a change in the teacher workforce (such as effective teachers receiving
bonuses and remaining in the classroom, whereas the least effective teachers do not receive a
bonus and exit the profession). Thus, my characterization of the results of each evaluation is a
summation of the motivational and compositional effects of the individual merit pay programs.
For these purposes, merit pay programs classified as having a ‘positive’ impact are those where
favorable outcomes, such as teachers reporting they worked harder or were more satisfied with
their salaries, were more prevalent than negative outcomes, such as teachers reporting more
competition among teachers or a degraded school environment. Conversely, a merit pay program
classified as having a ‘negative’ impact was just the opposite; the negative outcomes far
outweighed the positive ones. A program that resulted in no changes would have been classified
as having a ‘null’ impact; however, this was not the case in any of the articles reviewed.12
In total, four of the five articles that examined the impacts of merit pay on teachers
showed that the merit pay programs being evaluated resulted in positive outcomes for teachers.
For example, the Community Training and Assistance Center (2004) evaluated the impact of a

12

While this classification is certainly subjective, I have included in Table 2 all of the results on
which I based my characterization of each merit pay program, so my summarization of the
impacts of merit pay on teachers is as transparent as possible.
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merit pay program that operated in schools in Denver, Colorado, in which teachers could earn up
to $1,500 per year for reaching two ($750 each) teacher-created objectives by the end of the
school year (such as having 90% of students proficient in math). The authors found that teachers
in Denver schools with merit pay programs in place, compared to teachers in schools without
merit pay, reported better access to student testing data, an increased focus on student
achievement, and improved collegiality among teachers. However, these teachers also reported
that the merit pay program did not influence their approach to teaching in any way. Thus, in this
instance, there were several positive outcomes from the implementation of this merit pay
program, and no negative outcomes, which is why the result from this evaluation was
characterized as positive.
Similarly, the evaluations of the Texas Educator Excellence Grant program (TEEG,
Springer et al., 2009a), the Governor’s Educator Excellence Grant program (GEEG, Springer et
al., 2009b), and the District Awards for Teacher Excellence program (DATE, Springer et al.,
2010b) all showed positive impacts for teachers who participated in these programs. These three
broad programs were all similar in scope, in that schools or districts had the flexibility to design
merit pay programs that fit the educational needs of the school/district. These programs could
reward all teachers or school employees, or a limited number of school personnel. The programs
could also be designed so that some personnel could earn greater bonuses than others, or
everyone could earn the same thing. Across all three programs, each school or district received a
limited amount of funds that could be used for bonuses; as a result, the average bonus that
teachers received was approximately $2,000.
These programs did not negatively impact the level of collaboration or collegiality among
teachers, but did likely contribute to a more positive school environment. These programs also
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resulted in lower levels of teacher turnover for those teachers that earned bonuses (which, in the
case of these three programs, was a large percentage of teachers). Again, similar to the program
that operated in the Denver schools (Community Training and Assistance Center, 2004), teachers
also reported no change to their teaching approach as a result of being eligible to earn a year-end
bonus (Springer et al., 2009a; Springer et al., 2009b; Springer et al., 2010b).13
The lone evaluation to find a negative impact on teachers was not based on a single merit
pay program; rather, the research conducted by Belfield and Heywood (2007) assessed teacher
attitudes and perceptions towards merit pay from the nationally administered Schools and
Staffing Survey (SASS). The authors found that teachers participating in merit pay programs
(that likely varied across school/district) were no more likely to be satisfied with their career than
teachers in non-merit pay schools/districts. However, the authors did find that teachers in merit
pay schools were more likely to be dissatisfied with their salary than their non-merit pay
teaching peers. While it is not obvious why teachers who have the opportunity to earn bonuses
would have greater levels of salary dissatisfaction, the authors hypothesized that “merit pay may
put income at risk, involve negative comparisons, and generate peer pressure or extra effort”
(p.250); put differently, it may be that the additional effort and stress associated with these merit
pay programs were not worth the amount that could be earned in year-end bonuses. Or, these
findings might simply be a result of the types of schools that implement merit pay programs. For
example, merit pay might be used most often in those schools with the lowest teacher salaries;
because of this, teachers may have already been dissatisfied with their salaries, not necessarily as
13

It is worth noting that these three evaluations were all conducted by the same research team
who used similar research methods for each evaluation, and were all evaluations of programs in
Texas that were very similar in format and bonus structure. These programs were also all
implemented during roughly the same time period, and in some cases, the years of operation
overlapped. These commonalities may be a potential explanation for the similarity in results
across the three evaluations.
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a direct result of the use of merit pay. Because these findings were based on a national survey, it
is not possible to know such things as how large the bonuses were that these teachers could earn,
or whether teachers were forced to compete with each other for a limited bonus amount; this
information would be useful to provide context for why teachers were generally dissatisfied with
merit pay.
In general then, it seems reasonable to conclude that merit pay programs, more often than
not, have a positive impact on the teachers who participate in these programs. There does not
appear to be strong evidence supporting the idea that merit pay results in motivational effects;
that is, teachers did not report working harder, seeking out additional training, or altering their
overall approach to teaching. However, there also did not appear to be evidence of any of the
potential negative impacts of merit pay. Teachers did not report that they competed more with
each other, that the level of collaboration decreased, or that the school environment become more
negative and contentious as a result of merit pay. In fact, teachers reported no negative changes
in the level of collaboration or collegiality, and in many cases, noted that teacher collegiality
improved and the school environment become more positive as a result of being able to earn
bonuses at the end of the year. Thus, despite some data that suggests that teachers are not more
satisfied with their careers or salaries (and may in fact be more dissatisfied) (Belfield &
Heywood, 2007), it appears that merit pay programs have the potential for a large number of
positive outcomes, with limited evidence suggesting that these programs result in the
problematic issues often associated with this type of compensation strategy.

Table 2
Summary of Merit Pay Articles Focused on Teacher Impacts
Study

Size of Bonus

Sample

Outcome Measure

Result

Community
Training &
Assistance
Center
(2004)

A fixed bonus for all
teachers and specialists,
distributed as either
individual or group
bonuses

Up to $1,500 in the
second year of the
program
($750/teachercreated objective)

Teachers in Denver
schools with merit
pay (13% of all
schools) compared
to all other Denver
teachers

Teacher attitudes about
approach to teaching from
surveys and interviews

Positive; better access to
data, increased focus on
student achievement,
improved collegiality;
however, no changes in
instructional practice

Belfield &
Heywood
(2007)

Not explicitly stated
whether bonuses were
fixed or continuous,
given to individuals or
groups, or whether or
not these programs
were zero-sum

Bonuses ranged
from $1,612 to
$4,822

Responses from the
Schools and
Staffing Survey;
responses from
over 60,000
teachers

Teacher salary satisfaction,
satisfaction that work will
be rewarded, and
satisfaction with being a
teacher as a result of merit
pay

Negative; no influence on
career satisfaction, and a
negative impact on
satisfaction with salary

Springer et
al. (2009a)

Bonuses could be fixed
or continuous, and
could be distributed to
individual teachers or
groups; limited funds
per school, so not all
teachers/employees
received a bonus

The average bonus
was $1,982 in the
first year and
$2,094 in the
second year

Teachers in TEEG
schools compared
to teachers in nonTEEG schools

Survey responses from
61,000 school personnel
about teaching approach,
interactions with peers, and
impact of merit on school
climate

Positive; no decrease in
collaboration or
collegiality; teachers
believed the TEEG
contributed to a positive
school environment

Springer et
al. (2009b)

Bonuses could be fixed
or continuous, and were
distributed to individual
employees; limited
funds per school, so not
all teachers/employees
received a bonus

The average bonus
in the three years of
the program was
$2,469, $2,261, and
$2,249

Teachers in GEEG
schools compared
to teachers in nonGEEG schools

Survey responses from over
3,700 teachers about
teaching approach,
interactions with peers, and
impact of merit pay on
school climate

Positive; no decrease in
collaboration or
collegiality; positive
impact on school culture;
lower teacher turnover; no
change in teaching
approach
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Type of Bonus

Study
Springer et
al. (2010b)

Type of Bonus

Size of Bonus

Sample

Outcome Measure

Result

Fixed or continuous
bonuses for all
employees; limited
pool of funds for each
school; greater
tendency towards
individual bonuses

Average bonuses of
$1,361 to $3,344

203 schools in the
DATE program
compared to
approx. 1,000
schools that did not
participate

Survey responses from over
100,000 school personnel
about teaching approach,
school climate, and teacher
completion and
collaboration

Positive; lower teacher
turnover; improved school
climate; did not contribute
to school improvements
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Student impacts.
Of the 14 articles retained, 13 considered the impact of merit pay programs on student
achievement. In a similar manner to my summary of the articles addressing teacher impacts, I
have also briefly summarized each of these articles in Table 3. In this table, I have included
information about the individual merit pay programs (when available), as well as the student
achievement outcome measure used in each evaluation (standardized test gains, retention rates,
GPA, etc.) and the overall findings. A more in-depth summary of each of these articles can be
found in Appendix A.
My characterization of the results of each evaluation is also similar to my summary of the
results for teachers. I have characterized programs as having a ‘positive’ impact if student
achievement was positively impacted by the implementation of a merit pay program in the
majority of grades/schools/subject areas; a program that had a ‘negative’ impact is one where
student achievement was negatively affected by the use of merit pay in the majority of
grades/schools/subject areas. Further, a program characterized as ‘mixed’ is one in which there
were some instances of student achievement significantly improving as a result of the merit pay
program (such as at certain grade or school levels), but in other areas, student achievement was
significantly lower, or where there was simply an inconsistent pattern of achievement across
grades, subjects, or school levels. Finally, in instances where a program had no effect on student
achievement, be it positive or negative, I have characterized these programs as having a ‘null’
impact; student achievement was not affected by the implementation of merit pay.
In total, four of the 13 evaluations had positive findings, two had mixed findings, one had
negative findings, with the remaining six evaluations showing no impact on student achievement.
Those with positive findings assessed the impact on students in a number of different ways. For
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example, Eberts, Hollenbeck, and Stone (2002) evaluated how a merit pay program affected
retention rates in a school for students at-risk of not graduating from high school. This merit pay
program was specifically designed to promote retention rates by rewarding teachers at multiple
points throughout the year if students remained enrolled in their classes, with the maximum
bonus a teacher could receive equal to 12.5% of his or her base salary (approximately $5,000).
While the program did not have a positive impact on such things as student GPA or course
passage rates, the program did lead to significantly higher retention rates compared to a
demographically similar high school in the area. One notable weakness of this study was that this
program was only implemented in one school, and only compared to the performance of one
other school; because of this, the generalizability of these results may be limited.
Using data from the National Education Longitudinal Study (NELS), Figlio and Kenny
(2007) identified schools that used merit pay by conducting a survey of the high schools included
in the NELS 12th grade sample, and asked questions about how teachers were compensated in
each of the schools (initial response rate was approximately 40% of schools surveyed).
The authors also used responses from the Schools and Staffing Survey (SASS), on which
teachers did respond to a question about merit pay, as a way of also identifying which schools in
the NELS used merit pay. The authors found that the use of merit pay was positively associated
with higher levels of performance for 12th grade students. There were some limitations with the
research design used in this evaluation, making it difficult to specifically link higher student
performance with the use of merit pay; nonetheless, the use of merit pay was associated with a 12 point increase in student performance.
On a smaller scale, Winters, Ritter, Barnett, and Greene (2008) evaluated the impact of a
merit pay program in three schools in Little Rock, Arkansas, in which all school personnel, from
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custodians to principals, could earn a year-end bonus if student achievement improved in the
school. Under this program, teachers could earn a bonus that ranged from $0 to $12,000. The
authors measured the level of student achievement growth in math, reading, and language for
students in the 4th and 5th grade in schools with merit pay compared to students in other
demographically similar schools. The authors found that students in merit pay schools had test
score gains, expressed in Normal Curve Equivalent (NCE) points, that were 3.64 to 4.63 points
greater than the gains observed for students in demographically similar comparison schools.
Finally, in their evaluation of the impact of the DATE program in Texas, Springer et al.
(2010b) found that students in DATE schools made larger gains on the Texas state assessment
than students in non-DATE schools. Under the DATE program, schools or districts had the
freedom to design merit pay programs that rewarded teachers based largely on measures of
student achievement. Approximately 50% of teachers in the 203 DATE schools earned a bonus,
with average bonuses ranging from $1,361 for those teachers under a district-wide plan, and
$3,344 for teachers under a school-wide plan. The authors noted that while the passing rates
were lower for students in DATE schools (which was likely because these schools were selected
for participation in this program because they were significantly lower achieving than other
schools in the state), the difference in passing rates between DATE schools and non-DATE
schools decreased during the time period when the DATE was implemented.
One additional study I have chosen to characterize as having null findings, though it
could certainly be argued that the findings were in fact positive, is the evaluation of the Project
on Incentives in Teaching (POINT) program (Springer, 2010a), a merit pay program that
operated for a three-year period in the Nashville School District. Middle school math teachers in
the POINT program could earn bonuses of $5,000, $10,000, or $15,000 for having substantial
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impacts on growth levels for students in their classrooms (for example, the maximum bonus of
$15,000 could be earned if a teacher’s students performed at the 95th percentile in math). In
grades 6-8, the authors found no significant achievement differences for students assigned to
teachers eligible for merit pay compared to students taught by non-merit pay teachers. However,
they did find a significant positive effect for students in 5th grade, which the authors noted was
the only grade in this study in which teachers had a core set of students (that is, classrooms were
self-contained). Because the positive difference only occurred in one grade with a small subset of
teachers and students, and in all others areas there were no differences, it seems reasonable to
conclude that this program had a null impact; however, the positive impact on student
achievement in 5th grade is certainly worth noting, as it might be an indication that this program
could have been more effective if teachers only had to focus on a smaller group of students.
The lone evaluation to find negative impacts associated with merit pay on student
outcomes was Fryer’s (2011) study of a city-wide, randomly assigned merit pay program
implemented in New York City. In the New York system, if the students in a school achieved at
a predetermined performance level, then the school received a lump sum, equal to $3,000 per
school employee, that could be distributed evenly among all teachers or at the discretion of a
committee of teachers and school personnel. The author noted that this program resulted in no
instances of positive increases in student achievement. Further, at the middle school level, the
use of merit pay appeared to have a negative and significant impact on student achievement.
Springer and Winters (2009) conducted a similar evaluation of the same program two years
before this evaluation, and found that program had no impact on student achievement, positive or
negative. It is unclear why the findings from these two independent evaluations differed;
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nonetheless, it is clear that the New York City program was not effective at positively impacting
student achievement.
The two studies that showed mixed results were an evaluation of merit pay in Denver
Public Schools (Community Training & Assistance Center, 2004) and an evaluation of the
Teacher Advancement Program (TAP) in two unidentified states (Springer, Ballou, & Peng,
2008). In the Denver evaluation (that was described in more detail in the teacher impacts
section), the results varied by grade and school; in the middle and high school, students in merit
pay schools outperformed students in non-merit pay schools in three of the six tested areas.
However, in the elementary school, merit pay student performance was lower in five of the six
areas.
In the TAP system, teachers, principals, and other school staff earned bonuses based on
performance in three areas: Classroom observations, value-added impact of teachers on students
in their classrooms, and school-wide achievement gains.14 The TAP program was intentionally
designed so that all school personnel could earn a bonus (to minimize competition), with
recommended bonuses ranging from $0-$12,000. The evaluation of this program showed the
same inconsistent pattern in student achievement observed in the Denver program; in this case,
there were positive effects on achievement for students in TAP elementary schools, but null or
negative effects for students in TAP middle and high schools (Springer, Ballou, & Peng, 2008).
Thus, whereas the overall conclusions for how these programs impact teachers was fairly
straightforward—these programs tend to lead to positive outcomes for teachers—the research on
the impacts of merit pay on students is decidedly less clear. In some cases, student achievement
was enhanced by the use of merit pay, and in other cases, student achievement was hindered.
14

For those teachers and school personnel without a classroom of students, a larger emphasis
was placed on school-wide achievement gains.
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And, in the majority of articles, there was no impact on student achievement at all. Because of
this lack of clarity about how these programs influence student achievement, in the next section I
look at three key characteristics of individual merit pay programs, to see if there are patterns as
to what types of programs have a positive or negative impact on teacher and student outcomes.

Table 3
Summary of Merit Pay Articles Focused on Student Achievement Impacts
Study
Eberts,
Hollenbeck,
& Stone
(2002)

Community
Training &
Assistance
Center
(2004)

Type of Bonus

Size of Bonus

Sample

Outcome Measure

Result

A fixed bonus
Up to 12.5% of
Students in an
system for all base salary (approx.
alternative high school
teachers with no
$5,000) with merit pay compared
bonus cap;
to a similar high school
distributed to
without merit pay
individual
teachers

Student retention
rates was the
primary outcome
measure; also,
attendance, GPA,
and course passing
rates

Positive; retention rates
increased to 71.7%
compared to 54.5% in the
other high school

Up to $1,500 in the
second year of the
program
($750/teachercreated objective)

Students in Denver
schools with merit pay
(13% of all schools)
compared to all other
Denver students

Student
achievement gains
on the Iowa Test
of Basic Skills and
the Colorado
Student
Assessment
Program

Mixed; elementary
performance for merit pay
students was lower in 5 of 6
areas. However, middle and
high students performed
significantly higher in 3 of 6
areas each

Figlio &
Kenny
(2007)

Varied between individual
and group bonuses; not
stated whether bonuses
were fixed or continuous,
but likely varied across
school/district

Not explicitly
stated in this paper;
likely varied across
school/district

Schools in the NELS

12th grade student
test scores

Positive; incentive programs
were positively associated
with higher student
performance

Springer,
Ballou, &
Peng
(2008)

Continuous bonuses for all
teachers; bonuses given to
individual teachers, with
no cap on the number of
bonuses earned

Recommended
bonuses ranged
from $0-$12,000

TAP school students (28
schools) to non-TAP
students

Test gains on the
Northwest
Evaluation
Association
(NWEA)
assessments

Mixed; positive effects on
achievement for elementary
grades, but null or negative
impacts in middle and high
schools
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A fixed bonus for all
teachers and specialists,
distributed as either
individual or group
bonuses

Study

Size of Bonus

Sample

Outcome Measure

Result

Winters,
Ritter,
Barnett, &
Greene
(2008)

Continuous bonuses for all
school employees;
bonuses given to
individual employees,
with no cap on the number
of bonuses earned

Bonuses ranged
from $0-$11,200

Two schools in Little
Rock using merit pay
compared to three
similar schools

Math NCE gains
on the Stanford
Achievement Test,
9th Edition (SAT9)

Positive; students in merit
pay schools had gains of
3.64-4.63 NCE points
relative to non-merit pay
students

Bacolod,
DiNardo, &
Jacobson
(2009)

Fixed bonuses for all
teachers and staff; bonuses
were the same for all
employees

The average bonus
amount was $1,900

Schools directly above
and below a
performance threshold
(those above are
received bonuses, those
below did not)

Academic
Performance
Index school
growth scores

Null; there was little
measurable improvement for
schools that received
bonuses compared to those
that did not

Springer et
al. (2009a)

Bonuses could be fixed or
continuous, and could be
distributed to individual
teachers or groups; limited
funds per school, so not all
teachers/employees
received a bonus

The average bonus
was $1,982 in the
first year and
$2,094 in the
second year

TEEG schools compared
to non-TEEG schools

Student
achievement in
math and reading

Null; there did not appear to
be any significant impacts
on student achievement

Springer et
al. (2009b)

Bonuses could be fixed or
continuous, and were
distributed to individual
employees; limited funds
per school, so not all
teachers/employees
received a bonus

The average bonus
in the three years of
the program was
$2,469, $2,261, and
$2,249

GEEG schools
compared to non-GEEG
schools

Student
performance gains
on the Texas
Assessment of
Knowledge and
Skills (TAKS)

Null; depending on the
model, the GEEG had a
weakly positive, negative, or
null effect on student
achievement gains

Springer &
Winters
(2009)

Fixed bonuses for all
teachers and staff; not a
zero-sum program; bonus
amounts decided by a
committee

Schools received
funding of $3,000
for every employee

186 NYC schools
randomly assigned to
receive merit pay
compared to 137 control
schools that did not

Student math
achievement gains

Null; the program had no
discernible effect on student
achievement
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Type of Bonus

Study

Size of Bonus

Sample

Outcome Measure

Result

Glazerman
& Seifullah
(2010)

Continuous bonuses for all
employees; bonuses
distributed to individual
teachers; not a zero-sum
program

Average teacher
bonus was $2,653,
with a maximum of
$6,320

8 TAP schools
compared to 8 non-TAP
schools; TAP schools
also compared to other
similar schools

Student
achievement in
math and reading
on Illinois state
tests

Null; there were no
significant differences in
achievement

Springer et
al. (2010a)

Fixed bonuses for middle
school math teachers
distributed to individual
teachers; not a zero-sum
program

Teachers could
earn bonuses of
$5,000, $10,000, or
$15,000 for
reaching certain
thresholds (80th,
85th, and 95th
percentile); average
bonus earned in the
three years was
$9,639, $11,370,
and $9,623

296 middle school math
teachers; 143 randomly
assigned to receive merit
pay

Growth in math
achievement on
the Tennessee
Comprehensive
Assessment
Program (TCAP)

Null; no overall impacts on
student achievement in
nearly all grades, though the
authors did find positive and
significant differences for 5th
grade students

Springer et
al. (2010b)

Fixed or continuous
bonuses for all employees;
limited pool of funds for
each school; greater
tendency towards
individual bonuses

Teachers with
district plans
earned an average
bonus of $1,361;
teachers with
school plans earned
an average bonus of
$3,344

203 schools that
participated in the
DATE program
compared to approx.
1,000 schools that did
not participate

Student
performance on
the TAKS

Positive; students in DATE
schools had greater TAKS
gains than students in nonDATE schools; while
student passing rates were
lower in DATE schools, that
difference decreased

Fixed bonuses for all
teachers and staff; not a
zero-sum program; bonus
amounts decided by a
committee

Schools received
funding of $3,000
for every employee

233 NYC schools
randomly assigned to
receive merit pay,
compared to 163 schools
assigned to the control
group (no merit pay)

Student
achievement gains
in math and
language; also
used attendance,
grades, and grad
rates

Negative; the merit pay
program did not positively
impact any of the outcome
measures; the impact in
middle schools was negative

Fryer
(2011)
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Type of Bonus
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Key Characteristics of Merit Pay Programs
Bonus size.
One of main reasons for using merit pay is to provide teachers with incentives to focus
more time and effort on raising student achievement, and reward those teachers who are
especially effective at doing so. Because of this, it seems particularly plausible that the programs
in which teachers will be the most motivated are those that offer teachers the largest bonuses—
the greater the incentive, the more likely it is that teachers will try something different, work
harder, seek out new teaching strategies, collaborate more, etc.
An examination of the evaluations included in this review may in fact support this theory.
For example, there were four merit pay programs where the average bonus, or the range of
bonuses, was substantial (i.e. $5,000 or more), especially when compared to the average bonuses
distributed in the other merit pay programs (Eberts, Hollenbeck, & Stone, 2002; Springer et al.,
2010a; Springer, Ballou, & Peng, 2008; Winters, Ritter, Barnett, & Greene, 2008). Of those four
programs, two resulted in positive impacts on student achievement: The merit pay program
focused on raising retention rates for students at-risk of dropping out (Eberts, Hollenbeck, &
Stone, 2002) offered bonuses of up to 12.5% of a teacher’s salary (approximately $5,000), and
the merit pay program that was implemented in three schools in Little Rock, Arkansas (Winters,
Ritter, Barnett, & Greene, 2008) distributed bonuses that ranged up to $11,200. The bonuses
distributed in the TAP program evaluated by Springer, Ballou, and Peng (2008) ranged from $0
to $12,000; recall, the results of this evaluation were mixed, with positive impacts in the
elementary school, but null or negative impacts in the middle and high school. The other merit
pay program featuring substantial bonuses was the POINT program (Springer et al., 2010a), in
which teachers could earn bonuses of $5,000, $10,000, or $15,000 for reaching certain
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performance thresholds. The average bonus under this program was above $9,000 for all three
years of the program, and greater than $11,000 in the program’s second year. Again, the results
of this evaluation showed no impacts on student achievement, save for the positive and
significant impact that occurred on achievement levels for students in the 5th grade.
Thus, in each of the programs where the bonuses represented a substantial percentage of
a teacher’s base salary, there were at least some positive impacts on student achievements,
whether the impacts were evident for all students or a small subset of students. However, it is
worth noting that the average bonus offered in the other merit pay program with positive results
for which bonus amounts were given,15 the evaluation of the DATE program by Springer et al.
(2010b), were relatively small by comparison but still resulted in positive outcomes for students
(and for teachers). Under the DATE program, teachers in schools with plans created and
implemented at the district-level earned an average bonus of $1,361, compared to teachers in
schools with school-specific merit pay plans who earned an average bonus of $3,344.
Teachers vs. all employees.
One of the concerns associated with merit pay programs is that they might result in
counterproductive competition, or might lead to school environment that is negative and
contentious. If this were the case, it would make sense that student achievement would likely not
be positively affected, nor would it be the case that the outcomes for teachers would likely be
positive either. One potential way of avoiding this issue is by structuring a program such that all
employees, not just teachers of core subjects, are eligible for a bonus. All employees contribute
to student learning in one way or another, and as such, it is likely true that all employees should
15

The evaluation by Figlio and Kenny (2007) was an evaluation of merit pay programs across
the nation. In their study, the authors did not include any information on bonuses amounts that
were offered or earned.
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be rewarded for the contributions that they make. For example, school counselors do not work
directly with students teaching them skills test on standardized assessments; however, the work
these counselors do likely improves the ability for teachers to better work with these students. As
Dahir and Stone (2003) noted:
“School counselors can influence the school climate to ensure that high standards
are the norm in a safe and respectful environment…Viewing the world of schools
through an accountability lens helps school counselors to act on their belief
system and assume a leadership role to identify and rectify issues that impact
every student’s ability to achieve at expected levels” (p. 216).
Thus, in a system where only teachers get rewarded, the work of the school counselors
goes unrecognized and rewarded, even though they, just like all school employees, impact
student learning in some way. In this case, it makes sense that providing rewards to all
employees might encourage everyone to work together to meet the common goal of educating
students in the best manner possible.
It is possible then that the programs that reward all employees, not just teachers, would
be associated with positive outcomes for students and teachers. A review of the research on
programs that do reward all employees is largely mixed. In total, the three programs that
rewarded all employees and had an evaluation of teacher outcomes (Springer et al., 2009a;
Springer et al., 2009b; Springer et al., 2010b) showed positive outcomes for teachers. For each of
these evaluations of programs in Texas, teachers reported, among other things, that collaboration
and/or collegiality improved, and that the school environment became more positive as well. It
may be true that these outcomes were a result of the fact that all employees were rewarded for
their work.
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However, there does not appear to be a notable impact of rewarding all employees with
regard to raising student achievement. Of the seven programs with this type of reward structure,
the majority of programs (four in total) showed no impact on student achievement. The two
programs that did show positive outcomes for students were the evaluation of merit pay in Little
Rock, Arkansas (Winters, Ritter, Barnett, & Greene, 2008) and the evaluation of the Texas
DATE program (Springer et al., 2010b), with the latter evaluation showing positive impacts for
both teachers and students.
“Zero-sum” programs.
One final programmatic consideration that may influence how teachers respond to merit
pay, and as a result, how students are impacted, is whether or not the program is set up as a
“zero-sum” system. In such a system, there is generally a limited amount of money available for
bonuses, and as a result, the program is structured to only provide bonuses to a certain number of
the highest-performing teachers. With these types of merit pay programs, it is likely true that
teachers would feel the need to compete with each other, since one teacher improving his or her
teaching would necessarily make it more difficult for another teacher to qualify for a bonus. As a
result, programs structured in this manner might result in increased competition, decreased
collaboration, and a more hostile school environment, all of which have the potential to
negatively impact school employees and students.
In total, the only programs that appear to have been structured as zero-sum programs
were the three programs that operated in Texas (Springer et al., 2009a; Springer et al., 2009b;
Springer et al., 2010b); because of the large number of schools that participated in these
programs, budgetary considerations necessitated the need for this type of structure. And, as has
already been reiterated in this review, all three of the evaluations of these programs showed
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positive outcomes for teachers, and one of the three, the evaluation of the DATE program
(Springer et al., 2010b) showed positive impacts for students as well. Thus, there does not appear
to be a relationship between a zero-sum program and negative outcomes for teachers or
students.16
There are any number of other possible characteristics of merit pay programs that may
have a more pronounced impact on the responses of teachers, school employees, and students.
Or, it may be true that certain characteristics are only problematic or beneficial in association
with other structural decisions. For example, zero-sum programs may only be problematic when
the maximum bonus represents a substantial percentage of a teacher’s base salary, providing
more motivation for teachers to compete. Similarly, the opportunity for a small bonus may still
result in positive outcomes if everyone in a school is eligible for that same small bonus, since
everyone is being treated equally. In any event, perhaps the most salient conclusion that can be
reached from this discussion of program-specific characteristics is that the limited amount of

16

It seems counterintuitive that programs in which not all teachers earned rewards would still
result in positive outcomes for teachers (or students), such as teachers reporting that the climate
of their school improved because of the use of merit pay. While the reasons why this was the
case were not clear, it may be that because the size of the rewards were relatively small (around
$2,000), there was no reason for teachers to compete with each other for the opportunities for
these rewards (indeed, teachers reported there was not an increase in competition as a result of
these programs). This may also explain why collaboration did not change (for the better or
worse), and why teachers reported no change in their approach to teaching (since the rewards
may not have been large enough to motivate teachers to approach teaching differently). Despite
this, the impact of receiving these bonuses, regardless of the size, may still have resulted in the
teachers who received a bonus having a more positive outlook about the culture and climate of
their school. For example, under the DATE program, approximately 50% of teachers received a
bonus (Springer et al., 2010b); if teachers did not feel the need to compete with each other, then
it may be true that those teachers who received a bonus still viewed the program as favorable
because they received some recognition of their work. Further, if not every teacher received a
bonus, then having competition might have focused the teaching efforts for some teachers to
raise student achievement, which resulted in an overall positive impact on student achievement
as well.
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quality evaluations of merit pay programs makes it difficult to identify what aspects of these
programs, if any, will likely result in meaningful benefits for school personnel and students.
Summary of Literature Review
In sum, a review of existing literature on the impacts of merit pay reveals that, overall,
these programs often result in positive outcomes for teachers. There is limited evidence to
support the presence of many of the potential negative outcomes associated with merit pay, such
as these programs will cause teachers to compete more and collaborate less, and that the school
environment will become more contentious and degraded from implementing such a program.
The majority of the limited number of articles that address this topic showed quite the opposite;
teachers reported positive improvements to collaboration and collegiality (with no evaluations
showing a negative impact on teacher interactions), and similarly reported that merit pay did not
harm, and in many cases helped improve the school environment.
The impacts of merit pay on student achievement are decidedly less clear. There were 13
evaluations that assessed how merit pay affected various measures of student attainment or
improvement, and in four of those evaluations, the outcome was positive for students in
classrooms where teachers were eligible for merit pay. However, in the majority of studies
reviewed, there was no impact on student achievement whatsoever, or the impact differed
significantly by grade, school, or subject area, with no clear pattern of where the programs were
more or less effective at impacting student achievement. At the very least, it does appear that
student achievement is not harmed by the use of merit pay, as only one of the 14 evaluations
showed negative impacts of merit pay on student achievement.
Beyond the impact on teachers and students, this review also showed that there is a
significant lack of research evaluating how these programs affect other school employees, such
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as school counselors. This is not surprising given the overall lack of research; that said, as these
programs become more prevalent, it is important to understand how other school personnel, such
as school counselors, are impacted by these programs, beyond just how merit pay impacts the
teaching force in a given school or district. The contributions of other employees, including that
of school counselors, certainly have an effect on the overall academic performance of students;
thus, it would be pertinent and informative to discern how school counselors, for example,
respond to being rewarded for their work, and how these programs impact their perceptions of
their professional roles and responsibilities.
This literature review also showed that there is not a specific characteristic of a merit pay
program that will necessarily impact, positively or negative, student or teacher outcomes. It may
be that larger bonuses, those that represent a sizable percentage of a teacher’s base salary, prove
to be more motivating for teachers and thus result in greater student achievement gains. Of the
four programs that featured bonuses of $5,000 or greater, two showed positive outcomes for
students, and the other two evaluations had certain subsets of students with significantly positive
achievement gains. However, it did not appear that such things as rewarding all employees,
setting up zero-sum programs, rewarding individual teachers versus groups of teachers, etc. had
any clear pattern of impact on teachers or students.
Perhaps the only clear takeaway points from this review is that there is great variety in
the characteristics and design of merit pay programs across the country, and that more research is
needed to measure how these programs impact not only teachers and students, but other school
personnel as well. As such, this evaluation of the CPIP, which aims to measure improvements in
student achievement, changes in attitudes and behaviors for teachers, and changes in the roles
and responsibilities of school counselors, should provide a valuable contribution to the overall
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research base on the topic of merit pay. Because of the unique nature of the CPIP, which will be
described in detail in the next section, it is important to clearly ascertain the extent to which the
implementation of this program resulted in positive outcomes for the Fountain Lake School
District, as the district invested significant time and energy to the development and
implementation of the CPIP (including effort generating teacher/staff buy-in), as well as
considerable financial resources. Regardless of the outcomes, this evaluation will build on the
extant merit pay literature by providing data that may help guide policymakers and education
leaders looking to implement this type of compensation strategy.
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Chapter 3 – Overview of the Cobra Pride Incentive Program
In January of 2009, school board members from the Fountain Lake School District
contacted researchers at the Office for Education Policy (OEP), seeking assistance in the
development and implementation of a merit pay program. The school board was interested in
capitalizing on the potential benefits of merit pay by both rewarding teachers and school
employees that did exceptional work, as well as making the compensation that they were able to
offer to teachers competitive with surrounding school districts. Ultimately, the board decided to
postpone putting a merit pay program in place during the 2009-10 school year, to allow adequate
time to develop a program that had strong teacher support, accurately captured the impacts of
teachers and school employees on student learning, and was financially viable over an extended
period of time.
In the 2009-10 school year, the board approved the use of two new programs, both of
which would be a central component of a merit pay program if the district decided to move
forward with such a program in the following school year. First, in order to ensure that student
growth was being accurately measured, the district approved the use of the Northwest Evaluation
Association (NWEA) math, reading, and language assessments. These computer-adaptive
assessments are designed for the specific purpose of measuring student growth, as compared to
the Arkansas state assessments (such as the Arkansas Benchmark), which are simply designed to
measure whether a student is proficient (according to the Arkansas state standards) or not. These
NWEA assessments also provide teachers and principals with valuable information about how a
student is performing at multiple points throughout the school year, so that teachers can adjust
their teaching approach (if needed) to better reach students of all academic abilities.
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The Fountain Lake administration also approved the use of teacher “report cards”, on
which teachers were given detailed information about their goals and expectations for the school
year. For example, all core teachers in the elementary and middle schools were given NWEA
goals for students in their class; that is, benchmarks that their students should reach by the
conclusion of the school year. Teachers also had goals and expectations for student performance
on the Arkansas assessments, and had the components of a principal evaluation outlined on these
report cards as well. At the conclusion of the school year, teachers were given a summary of
their accomplishments in relation to their end-of-year goals, so that they could clearly see how
they performed in all of the different areas in which they were evaluated. With both the NWEA
assessments and the report cards, the goal was to not only begin to adopt a greater emphasis in
the district on goal-setting for teachers and focusing significantly on raising student achievement,
but also to help teachers become more familiar with some of the changes that might occur if a
merit pay program were put into place in the following school year.
At the conclusion of the 2009-10 school year, all school personnel received a small bonus
(maximum of $1,000) as a reward for their participation in this pilot program throughout the
school year, and for their response to some of the changes that were put into place. The
administration then asked teachers to vote on whether or not they would approve of establishing
a full-scale merit pay program in the following school year. This vote resulted in 90% of
certified staff and 96% of classified staff approving the use of merit pay in Fountain Lake in the
2010-11 school year.
As a result of this vote, administrators and principals from the Fountain Lake School
District (FLSD) again worked in collaboration with researchers at the OEP to devise and
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implement a district-wide merit pay program.17 Central to this process was the development of
key tenets or considerations that would be of high importance in the creation of any such
program. These tenets were based on the work of Ritter and Jensen (2010) from their previous
collaboration in the development of merit pay programs with other Arkansas schools. The tenets
for the FLSD program were:
1) The program should be voluntary.
2) The program should be focused on student growth (when possible).
3) The program should foster collaboration among teachers and avoid counter-productive
competition.
4) The program should reward all employees in the district, not just teachers.
5) The program should be transparent and understandable.
6) The program should feature substantial performance rewards.
7) The program should not force teachers to risk any portion of their base salaries.
Administrators at the FLSD did not want teachers or school personnel to feel like they
were being forced to participate in any type of merit pay program, so all employees were able to
not participate in this program if they were so inclined. While employees could opt out of
receiving a bonus, they could not opt out of participating in the same activities as everyone else,
such as participating in NWEA testing, having goals set for them at the start of the year, being
evaluated by a supervisor at the end of the year, etc. In other words, while this program was
optional, there was really no reason for anyone to not participate, since all employees would still

It should be noted that the author of this dissertation was one of the OEP researchers involved
in the development of this merit pay program.
17
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be held accountable, with the only difference being that those who opted out would not be
eligible for a bonus at the end of the school year.18
Administrators also wanted the program to be highly focused on student growth (where
possible), as opposed to only focusing on meeting proficiency. This was the primary reason for
adopting the NWEA assessments, as they provide clear, individualized growth goals for students
of all academic abilities. If the program had been focused on proficiency instead of growth, it is
possible that teachers may have been incentivized to only work with high-achieving students,
since these students would have shown the ability to meet the proficiency standard. However, by
evaluating teachers based on how much growth their students show on standardized assessments,
there would be no reason for teachers to shy away from working with low-achieving students,
since these students could still show growth without actually meeting proficiency (and as such,
teachers can still be recognized and rewarded for substantial growth that still did not result in a
student reaching the proficiency standard).
There were a number of steps taken to ensure that the FLSD merit pay program would
encourage collaboration among teachers, and perhaps more importantly, avoid causing teachers
to compete (in a counterproductive way) against each other. First, under the proposed program,
teachers would not have to compete for a fixed amount of money; rather, teachers would be able
to earn the maximum bonus for which they were eligible, with no negative impact to a teacher if
another teacher earned his or her maximum bonus.19 Second, all employees in the district, not

At the end of the year, only one school employee elected to not participate in the merit pay
program.
19
For example, in a system where $10,000 was going to be distributed to the top ten teachers in a
school, it is highly likely that this structure would result in substantial competition between
teachers, since there are a limited number of bonuses available. However, in a system where
every teacher is eligible for a $10,000 bonus, there is no reason for teachers to compete; this was
the structure Fountain Lake intended to employ.
18
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just teachers, would be eligible to earn a bonus; since all employees contribute to student
learning in some fashion, it seems reasonable that all employees should also have the opportunity
to have their work recognized and rewarded. The magnitude of the bonus for which school
employees were eligible varied by position, but everyone at the end of the year would at least be
eligible to earn some bonus money. Finally, a portion of every employee’s bonus would be based
on how the school as a whole performed on standardized assessments. Because of this, teachers
might be incentivized to collaborate more, since the better all students do, the greater every
employee’s bonus would be.
In order for the merit pay program to be motivating for school personnel, it was important
for the program to be easily understandable by school personnel, while also featuring substantial
bonuses to that were both motivating and rewarding. To make the program understandable,
administrators again elected to use the report cards that were a component of the pilot program in
2009-10. These report cards would be given to all school personnel, including teachers, school
counselors, and principals, at multiple points throughout the year, with goals clearly stated at the
start of the year, and a summary of how a teacher or school employee performed relative to these
goals provided at the conclusion of the school year.
To ensure that bonuses were substantial, and as a result, motivating for school personnel,
FLSD administrators sought out external philanthropic funding for a three-year period, while
also allocating a significant portion of the district’s local funds to this program. The combination
of external and local funds provided administration with the flexibility to offer significant
bonuses to all employees, including a maximum bonus for teachers of core subjects of $10,000.
Recall, all core teachers would be eligible for this maximum bonus amount, so this program
represented a significant financial investment for the district.
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Finally, because the goal of any merit pay program is to be both motivating and
rewarding, the administration decided that this program would be structured to provide bonuses
in addition to the existing salary schedule, as opposed to replacing step-raises altogether or
forcing teachers to risk a portion of their base salary. It is likely that a merit pay program would
be less motivating if a teacher was concerned about not receiving his or her full salary, so school
personnel were assured very early in the development process that this program would only be a
bonus program, not a replacement to the current step-raise system used at the FLSD.
When taken together, these tenets guided the development of the Cobra Pride Incentive
Program (CPIP), the pilot merit pay program implemented at the FLSD in the 2010-11 school
year. In the next section, I provide a general description of how the program was structured to
provide bonuses to all school employees.
General Reward Structure
Under the CPIP, the maximum bonus a teacher or school employee could receive was
based primarily on what subject(s) the employee taught (if any), whether or not the employee
worked directly with students, and whether or not the employee was in an administration or
supervisory position. Generally, the more direct impact an employee had on influencing student
learning in measurable ways, the larger the bonus for which he or she would be eligible. For
example, teachers of core subjects (math, science, reading/language arts, or social studies) were
all eligible for a maximum bonus of $10,000, which was the highest possible bonus for nonadministration personnel. Teachers of art, physical education, music, or other non-tested
subjects, by comparison, were only eligible for a maximum bonus of $6,000. The reason for this
difference was not that there was a greater value placed on core teachers compared to those
teachers classified as non-core; rather, because core teachers had the greatest responsibility for
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raising student achievement, they were also eligible for a larger maximum bonus. Put differently,
if math achievement was below average in the district, the math teacher would likely be the one
held most accountable, not the art or music teacher. In total, there were four different employee
groups and thus four maximum bonus levels used in the CPIP: $15,000 for principals and
administrators, $10,000 for teachers of core subjects, $6,000 for non-core teachers and personnel
(including school counselors, physical education teachers, foreign language teachers, etc.), and
$1,000 for classified staff (such as bus drivers, cafeteria workers, etc.).
Bonuses for all employees were based on the total number of points an employee earned
on a 100-point scale. Of those 100 points, all employees could earn up to 10 points based on how
they performed on a principal or supervisor evaluation, with an additional 10-20 points based on
individually assigned professional growth goals (such as the extent to which teachers used
NWEA testing data in making instructional decisions, or how well they incorporated writing
across the school curriculum). For all non-core teachers and non-instructional personnel, the
remaining 70-80 points was based on how well students across the district performed on
standardized assessments, including the NWEA tests, the Arkansas Benchmark, end-of-course
examinations, and the ACT. The reason these remaining points were based on school or districtwide achievement measures is because these school personnel did not work directly with
students teaching them skills tested on standardized assessments. However, these employees do
still contribute to student learning in many ways, including supporting the work of the core
teachers, and the FLSD did want to emphasize collaboration and a focus on student learning for
all employees; thus, the largest portion of the bonuses for all school personnel, other than core
teachers, was based on how well the district improved as a whole.
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Like all other school employees, teachers of core subjects had the same number of points
based on a principal evaluation and professional growth goals. However, because these teachers
worked directly with students, we could measure the extent to which these teachers directly
impacted student achievement (and provide rewards of increasing magnitude for increases in
student performance). For core teachers then, up to 50 points could be earned based on student
achievement gains for those students with whom core teachers worked directly. Consistent with
all other school employees, the remaining points that could be earned by core teacher were based
on student achievement gains throughout the school or district.
The calculation of bonuses then for all employees was fairly straightforward. The total
bonus amount was based on the percentage of points earned out of 100, multiplied by the
maximum bonus amount for which the employee was eligible. For example, if a core teacher
earned 74 out of 100 points, then his or her bonus would be $7,400 (74% of points earned
multiplied by a maximum bonus of $10,000); if a bus driver earned 85 points, then his or her
bonus would be $850 (85% of points earned multiplied by a maximum bonus of $1,000), and so
on.
Specific Employee Reward Structure
While the general structure of the bonus program was the same for all employees, there
were fairly significant differences in the individual components of the bonus plan for various
categories of employees.20 These differences were largely a result of differences in the grades of
students served in each school, and the types of standardized tests administered to those students.
For instance, the Arkansas Benchmark is only administered to students in grades 3-8 (students in
FLSD employees were assigned to one of 13 categories for bonus calculation purposes, all of
which have different bonus criteria. For example, there were four different categories (or four
different sets of bonus criteria) for teachers of core subjects: Core teachers in grades K-2, 3-8, 910 Literacy, and all other high school non-literacy teachers.
20
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the elementary and middle school), whereas the end-of-course examinations are only
administered to students in grades 8-11. Because of these differences in assessments available at
various grade levels (on which much of an employee’s bonus is based), as well as differences in
the ways in which students are assigned to teachers at different school and grade levels, the
specific manner for calculating bonuses differed fairly significantly across categories of
employees and schools. Presented in Table 4 is a summary of the distribution of points for each
of the different categories of employees under the CPIP plan. Additionally, a detailed summary
of the report cards used for each of the employee categories, including a more thorough
description of the exact manner of how each of the different bonus criteria are calculated, are
presented in Appendix B.

Table 4
Distribution of Points by CPIP Employee Categories for All Fountain Lake Employees
Supervisor
Evaluation

Prof.
Growth
Plan

Ind.
Class21
NWEA
Growth

Lowest
Quartile
NWEA
Growth

School
NWEA
Growth

School
Proficiency
Rate22

K-2 Core

10

10

30

20

10

20

3-8 Core

10

10

20

10

20

High School Core
(Lit)

10

20

25

High School Core
(Non-Lit)

10

20

Elem. & Middle NonCore

10

10

High School NonCore

10

20

Ind. Class
Proficiency
Rate23

30

District
NWEA
Growth

District
Proficiency
Rate24

30

40
40

ACT
Growth

5
25

5

25

5

50
40

Class refers to the total number of students with whom a teacher works. In some cases, such as in the elementary school, this could
be a small number of students (such as 20 per teacher) actually in a teacher’s classroom. However, in the middle and high school,
teachers can work with a much larger number of students across multiple class periods. In both cases, we would refer to both groups
of students as a teacher’s “class”.
22
School proficiency refers to the percentage of students at the school level scoring in the proficient or advanced range on the
Arkansas Benchmark assessment (elementary and middle school) or end-of-course assessments (high school)
23
Individual class proficiency refers to the percentage of students in a teacher’s classroom scoring in the proficient or advanced range
on the Arkansas Benchmark assessment (elementary and middle school) or end-of-course assessments (high school)
24
District proficiency refers to the total percentage of students in the Fountain Lake School District scoring proficient or advanced on
the Arkansas Benchmark and end-of-course examinations.
21
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Supervisor
Evaluation

Prof.
Growth
Plan

Elem. & Middle
Classified

10

High School
Classified

Ind.
Class
NWEA
Growth

Lowest
Quartile
NWEA
Growth

School
NWEA
Growth

School
Proficiency
Rate

10

30

50

10

20

25

40

District Classified

10

10

Elem. & Middle
Principals

10

10

30

50

High School
Principals

10

10

25

50

Instructional
Facilitators

10

10

District Staff

10

10

Ind. Class
Proficiency
Rate

ACT
Growth

District
NWEA
Growth

District
Proficiency
Rate

30

45

5

30

45

5

30

45

5
5

5
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Summary
At the conclusion of the 2010-11 school year, administrators distributed $874,836 in
merit pay bonuses to the teachers and school personnel at Fountain Lake, which represented a
total cost of $721 per Fountain Lake student. Table 5 shows the average bonus earned for
employees in each category, including the average percentage of points earned. Also included in
this table are the total bonus amounts distributed by category.
Table 5
Summary of CPIP Bonus Payouts
Maximum
Bonus Amount

Average Bonus

Average Points
Earned

Total Bonuses
Paid

K-2 Core

$10,000

$9,313

93%

$149,004

3-8 Core

$10,000

$8,204

82%

$270,722

High School Core (Lit)

$10,000

$6,652

67%

$26,609

High School Core (Non-Lit)

$10,000

$6,452

65%

$85,203

Elem. & Middle Non-Core

$6,000

$5,256

88%

$89,963

High School Non-Core

$6,000

$4,068

68%

$60,844

Elem. & Middle Classified

$1,000

$900

90%

$13,507

High School Classified

$1,000

$714

71%

$6,430

District Classified

$1,000

$792

79%

$34,038

Elem. & Middle Principals

$15,000

$12,981

87%

$51,922

High School Principals

$15,000

$11,292

75%

$22,583

Instructional Facilitators

$10,000

$8,020

80%

$16,040

District Staff

$15,000

$11,993

80%

$47,971

TOTAL

$874,836

If these bonuses were accurately aligned with measures of teacher and student
performance, then, based on a review of the amount of money distributed to school personnel
and the average points earned for each category of employees, it is likely that the program was
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successful at reaching its goal of raising student achievement. These numbers might also suggest
that the response to this program by the teachers, counselors, and other employees would be
favorable, since the bonuses that were distributed were quite substantial (such as an average
bonus of $9,313 for K-2 core teachers). Because of the substantial cost of this program, it was
critical that the district leaders sought to determine the extent to which the CPIP positively
impacted teacher attitudes and behaviors, and as a result, positively impacted student
achievement. Indeed, in this study, I present my analysis of the CPIP’s impact on student
achievement, as well as the response to this program by the employees of Fountain Lake. In the
next section, I describe the methods used in this evaluation of the Cobra Pride Incentive
Program.
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Chapter 4 – Methods
In this chapter, I present the methods used in my evaluation of the impact of the CPIP on
Fountain Lake school counselors, teachers, and students. For each of the three main research
questions, I describe the research sample, the instrument, and the analytic strategy I used to
determine how students and school personnel were affected by the implementation of the CPIP.
Research Question #1: Counselor Impacts
Sample.
To begin to understand how the CPIP impacted the roles and responsibilities of school
counselors at Fountain Lake, I conducted interviews in February of 2012 with all of the school
counselors in the district. These interviews were primarily conducted via email due to time
constraints and scheduling issues with the counselors (the counselors stated that it would be
easier on them to conduct the interviews in this way), though if I had any additional questions, or
if I needed clarification on any of the responses, I was able to follow up with the counselors by
phone.
In total, there were four school counselors at Fountain Lake (one in the elementary
school, one in the middle school, and two in the high school), all of whom agreed to participate
in these interviews. All four school counselors were employed at Fountain Lake during the 201011 school year when the CPIP was first implemented, as well as in the 2009-10 school year, the
year before the CPIP was fully implemented. Because of this, each of these counselors could
provide insight into how their roles and responsibilities were directly impacted by this new
compensation system, if at all, and how the support of counseling services by teachers and
administrators changed. The counselors could also provide their perceptions about how the CPIP
affected the students of Fountain Lake, such as whether or not they believed students
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experienced more anxiety and stress because of the increased focus on standardized test results in
the district.
Instrument.
I created a series of questions for the purposes of these interviews, all of which were
aimed at understanding the extent to which the CPIP impacted school counselors at Fountain
Lake, and what the counselors’ perceptions were of how the program impacted Fountain Lake
students. The questions were grouped into the following four general constructs:
1) Current vs. Previous Job Responsibilities: How has the implementation of the CPIP
impacted counselor job responsibilities, and do counselors now have more
responsibilities related to standardized test preparation and administration?
2) Time with Students: How has the implementation of the CPIP impacted the amount
of time spent with students providing direct counseling services?
3) Support from Teachers/Administrators: As a result of the CPIP, has the support for
counseling services by teachers and administrators changed?
4) Impact on Students: What impact, if any, has the CPIP had on student learning and
emotional well-being?
Within each construct, I asked school counselors a series of 2-3 questions, each of which
was aimed at addressing the theme of the construct. For example, in the first construct, Current
vs. Previous Job Responsibilities, I asked school counselors if their job responsibilities had
changed in any way as a result of the CPIP, and if they now spent more time assisting with
testing-related activities such as coordinating test administrations, helping students prepare to
take the tests, watching classes or students while teachers prepare other students for these tests,
or if they now helped to proctor test administrations. These questions and those in the other
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constructs should provide information about how the CPIP, which is primarily structured to
reward teachers for their impact on student achievement, has affected the work of the school
counselors as well. These questions will also allow me to show whether or not the work of
school counselors in a school system with merit pay program in place still adheres to the
counseling framework outlined in the American School Counseling Association (ASCA)
National Model (2005). For example, ASCA recommends that school counselors should not act
as a testing coordinator for a school; with these interviews, I can see if that recommendation is
being followed.
A complete list of the questions used in these interviews is included in Appendix C
Analytic strategy.
After all of the interview responses were collected, I coded the responses of school
counselors as positive, negative, or neutral depending upon the counselors’ perceptions of the
impact of the CPIP. For example, if a counselor reported that the CPIP resulted in extra anxiety
and stress for students, I would code that response as being negative; that is, the program had a
negative impact on the emotional well-being of students. Conversely, if the counselor believed
that the CPIP led to a greater focus on student achievement, which resulted in higher
achievement for students without any additional stress, then that response would be coded as
positive, as the counselor believed the program had a positive impact on Fountain Lake students.
If a counselor believed that students were no better and no worse because of the CPIP, then that
would be example of a neutral response; the CPIP did not result in any differences for the
students.
I employed this coding procedure for all of the questions in each construct, which
allowed me to organize and report the overall views of the school counselors at Fountain Lake.
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In the Results section, I present this overall summary of counselor responses, and characterize
the general impressions of counselors about whether the program had a positive, negative, or
neutral impact at Fountain Lake. When possible, I have also included examples of quotes from
the school counselors that are representative of their overall views of the impact of the CPIP.25
For validation purposes, I allowed the school counselors who participated in these interviews to
review my summary of their responses to ensure that my characterization of their answers to my
interview questions were as accurate as possible.
Research Question #2: Teacher Impacts
Sample.
To evaluate how teachers at Fountain Lake responded to the implementation of the CPIP,
I administered surveys to teachers, both core and non-core, at two different time periods. Surveys
were first administered to teachers in March of 2011, so that I could assess teacher attitudes and
perceptions about the CPIP during the first year of its implementation, but prior to teachers
receiving their end-of-year performance ratings or bonuses. In this way, I could gauge teachers’
thoughts about the CPIP before they knew whether or not they would benefit financially from the
program. Put differently, responses from this first survey administration likely represented their
attitudes about merit pay in general, and the CPIP in particular, without a full understanding of
how they would be directly impacted by the implementation of this program.26 Responses on this
25

In order to protect the confidentiality of the school counselors, direct quotes are only included
if they cannot be directly linked to a specific school counselor.
26
If I had only administered surveys to teachers after they received their bonuses, it is likely true
that those teachers who got the largest bonuses would have favorable things to say about merit
pay and the CPIP, and conversely, those teachers who received the smallest bonuses would have
had unfavorable views of this type of compensation system. In general, this would not have
provided any insight into the impact of the CPIP, which is the primary reason I chose to
administer surveys before and after bonuses were distributed, so I could see how attitudes and
perceptions changed.
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survey could provide information about whether or not teachers initially supported the
implementation of the CPIP, if they thought the program was fair, and if they believed that the
program would accurately capture and reward their overall “effectiveness” (in whatever way
teachers defined that term). In total, 94 core and non-core teachers participated in this first round
of surveys out of a total teacher population of 100, representing a response rate of 94%.
I also administered surveys to teachers in October of 2011 after they had participated in a
full academic year of the program, including receiving their performance ratings and end-of-year
bonuses. With this second administration, I could assess how the perceptions and attitudes of
teachers changed after experiencing a full year of the CPIP, including whether or not their
perceptions of the overall fairness of the program was significantly different. This is especially
interesting as I could ascertain whether or not the bonus or performance rating a teacher received
was related to how fair that teacher perceived the program to be. The responses from this second
administration also provided information about whether or not the CPIP encouraged teachers to
work harder, seek out additional training, collaborate more with their peers, etc. There were 109
teachers, both core and non-core, at Fountain Lake at the start of the 2011-12 year, with 66
participating in the second round of survey administration (61% of all teachers). Of the original
94 teachers who completed the survey in March, 58 also completed the survey in October (62%
of the original set of teachers).
Because of the notable decrease in teacher participation in October compared to March, it
was important to take into consideration factors that might have impacted whether or not a
teacher responded to the second survey administration. It is possible that teachers did not
complete the second survey because they were frustrated with the program, or did not believe
that the final bonus amount they received was a fair reflection of their effort or work with their
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students. Thus, to adjust for any bias that may have been introduced into these analyses as a
result of which teachers chose to respond (and not respond) to the second survey, I generated and
applied non-response weights to all teacher survey responses.
For these purposes, I predicted the likelihood that a teacher would respond to the second
survey using a logistic regression model that included the following four variables: End-of-year
bonus amount, end-of-year performance rating, Spring survey responses about teacher support
for the use of merit pay, and Spring survey responses about teacher perceptions about the
fairness of the CPIP. Then, based on the probabilities that this regression model generated for
whether a teacher responded to the second survey, I created “weights” for each teacher, with
greater weight given to the responses of teachers who were less likely to respond to the survey
(based on the regression probabilities), and less weight given to the responses of teachers who
were more likely to respond to the survey based on the aforementioned variables. This weighting
procedure does potentially reduce some of the precision of my results, but it also likely reduces
any bias that may be introduced into my results simply as a function of which teachers chose to
respond to the second survey.27
All core and non-core teachers were eligible to take these surveys and offer their opinions
and views about the CPIP, though teacher participation was completely voluntary. The surveys
were administered during the school day, with teachers able to come individually and take the
survey during their planning periods. Teachers were informed that participation was not
mandatory, but as a reward for completing the survey, four randomly selected teachers received a
$25 gift card at each administration period.

27

This weighting procedure was based on a similar procedure employed by Wolf et al. (2010) in
their evaluation of the impact of a school choice voucher program implemented in Washington
D.C. on various student outcome measures.
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Instrument.
The teacher surveys used in this analysis were designed by the Office for Education
Policy specifically for the purpose of this evaluation, and were created to assess teacher attitudes
about a wide range of topics related to merit pay in general, as well as about specifics aspects of
the CPIP, including what impact it had on how teachers approached their work with their
students and their fellow teachers. There were a total of 39 items included on the survey for core
teachers and 32 on the non-core teacher survey, with teachers able to respond to each survey
item with one of four responses: Strongly Disagree, Disagree, Agree, or Strongly Agree. A copy
of the core and non-core teacher survey used in the Spring can be found in Appendix D.28,29
Prior to administering the surveys, I randomly assigned a unique number to each teacher.
Teachers’ numbers were included on their surveys in the upper right-hand corner, and were used
to link teacher survey responses from the Spring to the Fall. In this way, I could assess how
specific teacher attitudes and perceptions changed from the first to second survey administration
instead of just comparing the average responses of teachers from Spring to Fall. I was the only
person to have access to the teacher-number list, so teachers could not be identified by anyone,
including administrators at Fountain Lake, based solely on this number
The items on the surveys assessed teacher attitudes and opinions on a wide variety of
topics related to merit pay, including whether or not the teacher considered him or herself
28

The 32 items that appeared on the non-core teacher survey were also included on the core
teacher survey. However, the survey for core teachers also included an additional seven items
that were only relevant for core teachers, such as how these teachers used data from the NWEA
assessments (non-core teachers did directly not use these assessments), and whether or not the
content covered on standardized assessments used for bonuses calculations was representative of
what students learned in the classroom.
29
The survey administered in the Fall was essentially the same survey that was administered in
the Spring. There were some items for which the tense of wording changed and teachers were
given more room to provide additional comments about the CPIP, but otherwise, the surveys
from both administrations were identical.
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“effective”, if the CPIP resulted in extra anxiety and stress for teachers, if the design of the CPIP
encouraged working with the lowest performing students, and so forth. Teachers also responded
to a number of survey items that were similar in scope, aimed at addressing broader concepts of
how teachers responded to the use of merit pay. These groups of survey items, or constructs,
were developed to assess teacher perceptions about the following:
1) Support of merit pay as a compensation strategy (Supportive Construct);
2) Fairness of the CPIP (Fairness Construct);
3) How the CPIP impacted approach to teaching (Teaching Construct);
4) How the CPIP impacted interactions with other teachers (Interactions Construct);
5) Whether students at Fountain Lake benefitted from the implementation of the CPIP
(Student Benefits Construct).
Each construct was comprised of three to six items, all of which showed high levels of
internal reliability or consistency.30 For example, the Cronbach’s alpha level for each of the
constructs, which indicates the level of internal consistency or reliability for the construct on a
scale of 0 to 1 (higher scores indicate greater internal consistency), was no lower than .65 for any
of the constructs. The Cronbach’s alpha levels for each construct from the Spring and Fall survey
administration, as well as the associated items used for each construct, were as follows:
1) Supportive Construct: (Cronbach’s alpha-Spring = .735; Cronbach’s alpha-Fall
=.571)
o 1. Teachers who are more “effective” should be paid more than teachers who
are less “effective.”

30

This means that, in general, teachers responded to items within a construct in a similar fashion.
For example, in the Fairness Construct, if a teacher responded to one question in a manner that
suggested the CPIP was fair, then for the most part, that teacher would respond similarly for all
of the other items in the Fairness Construct.
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o 9. The effectiveness of a teacher is reflected in improvements in the test scores
of his/her students.
o 12. Teachers with the same level of educational training who have worked for
the same amount of time should be paid the same. (reverse coded)31
o 13. Teachers should be financially rewarded for improving student
achievement.
2) Fairness Construct: (Cronbach’s alpha-Spring = .728; Cronbach’s alpha-Fall =.795)
o 6. The bonus I receive will be based more on my effectiveness as a teacher
than on the abilities of my students.
o 14. The current bonus amount for which I am eligible is an appropriate reward
for my work.
o 36. The CPIP is fair.
o 39. The CPIP merit rating I receive on my end-of-year report card will
accurately reflect my effectiveness as a teacher.
3) Teaching Construct: (Cronbach’s alpha-Spring = .877; Cronbach’s alpha-Fall =.875)
o 18. Because of the CPIP, I have sought out additional training (education,
professional development, etc.) to improve my teaching.
o 23. Teachers at my school have become more focused on raising student
achievement as a result of the CPIP.
o 27. Teachers at my school have investigated new teaching practices in order to
improve their CPIP bonuses.
o 30. I have witnessed other teachers working harder as a result of the CPIP.
31

Some items were intentionally formatted in a different manner than other items in a particular
construct. For example, in the Supportive Construct, items 1, 9, and 13 are all structured in the
same way; agreement on one item likely corresponds to agreement on the others. However, item
12 is worded such that if a teacher agreed with the other three items, then he or she should likely
disagree with this item. Thus, by reverse coding, I have simply reformatted the responses of
teachers on that particular item so that all responses are consistent with what the construct is
measuring. In other words, for item 12, I have essentially reformatted the item so that it would
read “Teachers with the same level of educational training who have worked for the same
amount of time should NOT be paid the same”, and because of this, if a teacher disagreed with
the item as it was previously worded, he or she would now agree with the way this item was
worded. The goal of reverse coding is simply to maintain consistency in how teachers respond to
items in a given construct.
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o 31. I have noticed an increased focus on lesson planning at my school as a
result of the CPIP.
o 33. The CPIP has encouraged teachers at my school to adopt new teaching
strategies.
4) Interactions Construct: (Cronbach’s alpha -Spring =.661; Cronbach’s alpha-Fall
=.719)
o 21. Teachers now compete with each other instead of working together as a
result of the CPIP (reverse coded).
o 22. I have noticed more teachers at my school working together because of the
CPIP.
o 29. The CPIP has encouraged me to discuss various pedagogical practices
with other teachers at my school.
o 32. I’ve noticed that teachers are not as likely to share ideas with each other as
a result of the CPIP (reverse coded).
o 34. The school-wide portion of the CPIP encourages me to help other teachers
in my school.
5) Student Benefits Construct: (Cronbach’s alpha-Spring =.657; Cronbach’s alpha-Fall
=.701)
o 16. I believe the CPIP has improved the educational outcomes for students in
my school.
o 17. Students at my school had higher levels of anxiety and stress because of
the CPIP’s focus on testing (reverse coded).
o 25. Students at my school have learned more as a result of the CPIP.

A numeric value was assigned to the four different response options for the series of
items. For these purposes, selecting Strongly Disagree corresponded to a score of one, Disagree
corresponded to a score of two, and so forth, up to a score of four for responding Strongly Agree
to an item. As a result, scores for each item, and the average composite score for each construct,
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ranged from 1-4, with higher scores indicating stronger levels of agreement with the item or the
construct being measured. If a teacher had a composite score of four in the Supportive Construct,
then that would indicate that that particular teacher was strongly in favor of the use of merit pay
(since he or she Strongly Agreed with every item in that construct, which corresponds to a score
of four for each item, resulting in an average score of four); conversely, a composite score of one
for that same construct indicated strong disagreement to the implementation and use of merit
pay.
Analytic strategy.
There were several different strategies used in my analyses of the impact of the CPIP on
Fountain Lake teachers. Simple descriptive statistics of how teachers responded to each survey
item, as well as to the series of items for each construct, are presented in the Results section and
the Appendix section, including the percent of teachers that agreed with each item or construct,
and the average score for individual items and constructs. These percentages and average scores
provide straightforward information about how supportive teachers were of merit pay in general,
whether or not they thought the CPIP was fair, and what impact the CPIP had on their approach
to teaching, their interactions with other teachers, and the impact of the CPIP on Fountain Lake
students. These simple statistics are provided for both survey administrations, so I can also show
how teacher attitudes and opinions changed from the first survey administration in March (before
bonuses were distributed) to the second survey administration in October (after bonuses were
distributed) for those teachers that participated in both rounds of survey administration.
In addition to simply showing percentages and averages, I also used paired samples ttests to determine whether teachers’ responses were significantly different after they received a
bonus. This analysis was restricted to only include those teachers that completed surveys at both
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administration periods; in this way, I can quantify how teachers’ opinions about the overall
impact of the CPIP changed after experiencing a full year of the program. This analysis is
interesting, as I am able to, for example, show whether or not teachers thought the CPIP was fair
before they knew how they would be rated and rewarded, and then see how teacher perceptions
of the fairness of the CPIP were affected by receiving a bonus.
Finally, and perhaps most interestingly, I can also compare the survey responses for those
teachers that received the highest CPIP performance ratings and bonuses to those of the teachers
with the lowest CPIP ratings and bonuses (again, using only those teachers with responses from
both administration periods). Similar to the previous approach, I will use independent samples ttests to show whether or not there were significant differences in these teachers’ responses. It
may be true that the teachers that are the most supportive of merit pay in general and the CPIP
specifically are those teachers that benefit the most from such a program (which intuitively
makes sense), and that the teachers most opposed to this type of reform are those teachers that
receive the lowest ratings or bonuses; with this analysis, I will be able to determine if that is in
fact the case.
Research Question #3: Student Impacts
Sample.
For the third research question, “What impact did the CPIP have on student achievement
at Fountain Lake”, I evaluated how students at Fountain Lake performed on both nationally
administered and Arkansas-specific assessments, as a way of capturing the overall effect of the
introduction of merit pay in the district on improvements in student learning. First, I assessed
how students at Fountain Lake performed on the nationally administered Northwest Evaluation
Association (NWEA) Measures of Academic Progress (MAP) assessments. These assessments
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were administered to students in grades K-10, and assessed student performance in the areas of
math, reading, and language. The reading MAP assessment was administered in all grades in K10, while the math MAP assessment was given to students in grades K-8 and the language
assessment was given to students in grades 2-10.
The MAP assessments were administered at Fountain Lake at three different time periods
during the 2010-2011 school year: October 2010, January 2011, and April 2011. This enabled
teachers and administrators to assess students’ baseline level of performance in the Fall and
measure student growth from Fall to Spring, while also being able to address any deficits in
student learning observed during the Winter MAP administration.
For this evaluation, I compared the amount of growth observed for Fountain Lake
students over the course of the 2010-11 school year to the level of growth that might be “typical”
for similar students during an academic year. This typical level of growth is derived from
NWEA’s nationally representative norming population, and is based on two key student factors:
a student’s grade, and his or her starting score from the Fall MAP administration. For example, if
a 4th grade student had a starting score of 200 on the math assessment, then the typical amount of
growth for that particular student is based on the actual amount of growth observed for students
in the same grade with the same starting score from across the United States. Because I could
quantify the level of growth that might be typical for Fountain Lake students, I could determine
if Fountain Lake student performance on the MAP assessments was notably different than what
might be expected by comparing observed Fountain Lake student growth to the level of typical
growth (across grade, school, and subject) for an academic year.
For the purposes of this evaluation, I only examined student performance on the MAP
assessments for those students that had test scores from both the Fall and Spring administration
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(i.e. those students for whom growth could be measured). As a result, the total sample for this
analysis included the test scores for 726 students in math, 852 students in reading, and 721
students in language. A summary of the number of students included in this analysis,
disaggregated by grade, is presented in Table 6.
Table 6
Number of Students by Subject with Fall and Spring NWEA MAP Scores, 2010-11
Grade

N of Students: N of Students: N of Students:
Math
Reading
Language

K

70

70

1st

74

74

2nd

78

78

77

3rd

85

85

82

4th

87

87

85

5th

82

82

82

6th

78

79

78

7th

79

82

82

8th

93

93

93

9th

70

73

10th

52

69

852

721

Overall

726

The analysis of NWEA performance is interesting, as it provides general information
about the academic performance of students at Fountain Lake. Because a large percentage of
individual teacher/employee bonuses was based on the amount of growth observed on the MAP
assessments, it might be hypothesized that the motivation of earning bonuses under the CPIP
resulted in significant gains on these assessments. Thus, this evaluation of how Fountain Lake
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students performed on the MAP gives valuable information about their overall performance
during the first year of the implementation of the CPIP.
However, a student showing significantly greater gains on the MAP assessments than
typical growth, while useful, does not really tell us anything about how that student’s
performance changed as a result of the CPIP. In other words, the MAP assessments give us a
general understanding of student performance in the district, but without an appropriate
counterfactual standard, we cannot say with any certainty how performance on the MAP
assessments was different as a direct result of the CPIP. It is also true that while it is important to
track student performance on the MAP assessments, ultimately, the district is held accountable
for performance on the Arkansas Comprehensive Testing, Assessment, and Accountability
(ACTAAP) assessments, not the MAP assessments.
Because of this, I also assessed how Fountain Lake students performed on the criterionreferenced Arkansas Benchmark examination and the norm-referenced Iowa Test of Basic Skills
(ITBS) as compared to a group of demographically and academically similar students in other
local school districts. This Fountain Lake comparison group (FLCG) was comprised of one
student in one of the seven school districts within a 25-mile radius matched to one student at
Fountain Lake. Presented in Table 7 is a list of these seven school districts, including a summary
of the demographic characteristics of each district.
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Table 7
Demographic Characteristics of the Seven Districts Used in the Creation of the FLCG, 2010-11
District

Number of
Students

%
White

Bismarck SD

961

90.2%

1.1%

7.2%

60.2%

Cutter-Morning Star SD

640

83.6%

3.8%

6.6%

61.7%

Glenn Rose SD

943

97.6%

0.5%

1.1%

51.9%

Hot Springs SD

3,658

44.8%

39.1%

11.6%

77.6%

890

90.6%

2.1%

4.9%

59.7%

Lake Hamilton SD

4,128

84.8%

1.9%

7.5%

55.5%

Lakeside SD

3,037

81.0%

8.4%

6.9%

39.3%

Fountain Lake SD

1,213

85.8%

1.7%

6.3%

50.0%

Jessieville SD

% African
%
American Hispanic

% FRL

Fountain Lake students were matched to comparison students on a number of observable
measures, though the matching process was based primarily on identifying students with
identical test scores from the Spring of 2009 and Spring of 2010, the two years of test scores
prior to the implementation of the CPIP.32 By using this as my base criteria for matching
purposes, I ensured that the academic performance of both Fountain Lake and FLCG students
was as similar as possible. Because of this, if there were no differences in test performance
between students in both groups in 2009 and 2010 (which there were not), it is reasonable to
conclude that any differences in performance in 2011 is a direct result of the impact of the CPIP.

32

The state started to use the ITBS in the spring of 2011. Prior to this, the state used the Stanford
Achievement Test, 10th Edition (SAT-10) as its norm-referenced assessment. As a result, the
creation of the FLCG was based on matching students on their SAT-10 scores from two years
prior to the implementation of the CPIP, while the norm-referenced outcome measure used in
this analysis was performance on the ITBS.
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Beyond simply matching on test scores, I also sought to create a comparison group that
was as similar as possible on observable demographic characteristics such as student grade,
eligibility for free and reduced lunch (FRL), minority status, and gender. This was important
because differences in these characteristics can have an impact on student performance on
standardized assessments, and I wanted to ensure that my counterfactual condition was as similar
to the group of Fountain Lake students as possible. Every Fountain Lake student was matched to
a student in his or her grade; however, because I chose to prioritize accuracy on academic
variables in my matching, the resulting FLCG was not identical to the group of Fountain Lake
students on some of these other demographic characteristics.
For example, I generated two FLCGs, one matched on math performance and one
matched on literacy performance. In both cases, there were no observed statistical differences in
2010 test scores, the difference in test performance from 2009 to 2010, or the percentage of
males or females in each group (see Tables 8 and 9). However, for both the math and literacy
FLCG, there were statistical differences in the percentage of students eligible for free and
reduced lunch, and the percentage of students that were classified as minority (AfricanAmerican, Hispanic, or Native American). The percentage of FRL eligible and minority students
in the math FLCG was 59% and 16% respectively, compared to 53% and 9% for Fountain Lake
students; these percentages are nearly identical for the literacy FLCG and group of Fountain
Lake students. Because differences did exist between students in both groups, I controlled for
differences in these matching characteristics in all of my estimations of the impact of the CPIP
on student achievement.33

33

Despite the differences observed in the demographic characteristics of the two student groups,
the decision to place a greater emphasis on ensuring similarity on academic variables appears
justified based on a simple review of the impact each of these variables have on predicting
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Table 8
Baseline Descriptive Statistics (Math) for Fountain Lake and Comparison Students, 2008-09 and
2009-1034
N of
Students35

Avg.
Math
NCE,
‘10

Avg.
Math
NCE,
‘09

Avg. Math
CRT Scale
Score, ‘10

Avg. Math
CRT Scale
Score, ‘09

%
FRL

%
Minority

%
Female

Fountain Lake
Students

499

60.5

60.7

697.4

677.8

53%

9%

48%

Comparison
Students

499

60.5

60.8

695.6

676.8

59%

16%

45%

Table 9
Baseline Descriptive Statistics (Lit.) for Fountain Lake and Comparison Students, 2008-09 and
2009-1036
N of
Students37

Avg.
Lit
NCE,
‘10

Avg.
Lit
NCE,
‘09

Avg. Lit
CRT Scale
Score, ‘10

Avg. Lit
CRT Scale
Score, ‘09

%
FRL

%
Minority

%
Female

Fountain Lake
Students

499

51.6

49.8

716.7

680.0

53%

9%

48%

Comparison
Students

499

51.6

49.6

714.7

673.2

59%

18%

47%

achievement in 2011. For example, using a state-wide student-level dataset for Arkansas students
in grades 4-9, a regression model controlling for student grade and 2010 math score accounted
for 57% of the variance in 2011 math scores, and including 2009 math scores in this model
increased that percentage to 63%. Beyond these variables, the addition of FRL status, minority
status, and gender to the regression model only accounted for 64% of the variance in 2011 math
scores, or an additional 1% of the variance beyond grade and test scores.
34
The differences in percentage of FRL and minority students are significant at the p < .05 level
35
N of students refers to the number of students with test scores on the SAT-10 examination.
36
The differences in percentage of FRL and minority students are significant at the p < .05 level
37
N of students refers to the number of students with test scores on the SAT-10 examination.
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For these analyses, there were 499 Fountain Lake students and 499 FLCG students, for a
total sample size of 998 students. Students in both groups were included in this analysis if they
had valid test scores from both the 2011 year (the outcome measure in my analyses) and the
2010 year (baseline measure prior to the implementation of the CPIP); it was not necessary for a
student to have a test score from the 2009 year, though if they did, I also included this score in
my FLCG matching procedure.38
The norm-referenced measures used in these analyses are administered to students in
grades 1-9. By restricting my sample to only include those students with test scores in 2010 and
2011 (and ideally 2009 as well), I could only include students in grades 4-9 during the 2010-11
school year for this evaluation. So, for example, a student in the 4th grade in 2010-11 would be in
the 3rd grade in 2009-10 (baseline year) and the 2nd grade in 2008-09, or a 9th grade student in
2010-11 would have been in the 7th grade in 2008-09. In other words, 4th-9th graders were the
only students for whom test scores from the two prior years were available.39 In total, there were
593 students at Fountain Lake in grades 4-9 during the 2010-11 school year, while the sample for
these analyses includes 499 Fountain Lake students with at least two years of testing data; thus,
the analytic sample represents 84% of the actual number of students in grades 4-9 at Fountain
Lake.

38

Ideally, students would have valid test scores from all three test periods; however, to avoid
restricting the sample of students further, I chose to include students in both groups even if they
did not have a test score from 2009. If a Fountain Lake student did not have a test score in 2009,
then when possible, I attempted to match that student to a comparison student that also did not
have a test score in 2009. Of the 499 Fountain Lake students included in these analyses, 18
students did not have a 2009 math or literacy score.
39
Testing data were also not available for students in grades 1 or 2 in 2010, which is why I could
not include students in the 3rd grade in 2011 (since they would not have baseline testing data).
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Instrument.
The NWEA MAP assessments are computer-adaptive tests that provide students with
questions of increasing or decreasing difficulty based on whether or not a student responds
correctly to a question. All test results are reported in RIT scores, which are units of measure that
use individual item difficulty to estimate student achievement and create an equal-interval scale.
This scale allows for comparisons of student performance across all grade and age levels, and is
useful in measuring student growth over time.
NWEA has an extensive testing database and responses to test items collected over more
than 13 years, which allows for a high level of stability and interpretation of the testing data. All
NWEA tests are aligned with individual state standards to ensure that achievement gains on the
NWEA reflect state-specific learning goals. The NWEA assessments have consistently yielded
statistically valid correlations in test and re-test studies, and the items on the test have a high
level of internal reliability.40
MAP data were obtained directly from NWEA, as Fountain Lake permitted the OEP to
access all data, including student demographic information and test scores. MAP data were
gathered for students in grades K-10 in the subject areas of math, reading, and language. These
data were collected after each test administration (Fall, Winter, and Spring), and included test
scores for all students, even those students who did not test at every administration period.
I also obtained student-level testing data for the ITBS, SAT-10 and Arkansas Benchmark
assessments. These data were obtained from the Arkansas Department of Education, and
included student demographic information such as student grade, school/district attended, FRL
status, race, etc. These data were de-identified when obtained, so there were no variables
For more information on RIT scores and the NWEA examinations, see
www.nwea.org/support/article/532
40
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included that could be directly linked to a specific student (such as student name or social
security number).
The norm-referenced ITBS was administered in the Spring to students in grades 1-9
starting in 2011; prior to that, the SAT-10 was the norm-referenced assessment used by the State,
and was also given during the Spring to 1st-9th grade students. Recall, for this evaluation, ITBS
scores will serve as the outcome measure, and SAT-10 scores were used for matching purposes
in 2009 and 2010 and to establish baseline equivalency between students at Fountain Lake and in
the FLCG. Both the ITBS and SAT-10 assess student performance in math, reading, and
language/literacy. Results from the ITBS and SAT-10 are reported in Normal Curve Equivalent
(NCE) points, which range from 1-99 with a mean of 50.41 NCEs are on an equal-interval scale,
which allowed me to compare student performance on the ITBS and SAT-10 across grades and
school levels. Items on these assessments are presented in multiple-choice and extended response
format.
I also evaluated Fountain Lake student performance on the criterion-referenced Arkansas
Benchmark examination. This examination is administered in the Spring to students in grades 38, and includes open-response and multiple-choice items to assess student performance in math
and literacy. All results reported for the Arkansas Benchmark are presented in scaled scores,
which range from 0-999. In addition to scaled scores, student performance on the Arkansas
Benchmark is reported in four categorical levels of performance: Below Basic, Basic, Proficient,
and Advanced.

It should be noted that in a normal distribution of test scores (such as in Arkansas), an NCE
score of 50 in one year followed by a NCE score of 50 the next year would be the equivalent of
one year’s worth of learning. Thus, scores higher than 50 in the subsequent year indicate greater
than a year’s worth of learning, and vice versa.
41
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Analytic strategy.
In my analysis of Fountain Lake MAP performance, I compared observed levels of
growth for Fountain Lake students to the level of growth that would be typical for these students
based on their grade and Fall test score. These growth norms provide reasonable estimates for the
amount of growth that we might expect to observe in Fountain Lake students based on their
grade and achievement level in the Fall. The difference between observed growth and the growth
norms is referred to as a growth norm index, which simply indicates how actual student
performance differed from typical growth levels. A positive growth norm index score indicates
that Fountain Lake student performance exceeded that of the growth norm, whereas a negative
index score indicates performance below the growth norms. A growth norm index score of zero
means that Fountain Lake student performance was equivalent to typical growth levels. For this
comparison, observed and typical levels of growth are presented in the Results section, as well as
the corresponding growth norm index score, disaggregated by grade and subject.
For my analysis of the Fountain Lake student performance on the ACTAAP
examinations, I used multiple regression analyses to assess the extent to which the
implementation of the CPIP impacted student achievement (relative to the performance of
students in the FLCG). In my regression analyses, I controlled for student grade, student
achievement from the Spring of 2010 and 2009, and demographic variables such as student FRL
status, race, and gender. Also included in these regression models was a binary variable that
indicated whether a student was a Fountain Lake or FLCG student; the coefficient for this
variable is the key coefficient of interest in these regression models, as it provides an estimate of
how much of an impact the CPIP had on student achievement (and whether that impact was
positive or negative), and whether or not that impact was statistically significant.
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For these purposes then, the unstandardized equation for the regression model used in
these analyses can be expressed in the following way:

Υi = β0 + β1Xtreat + β2Xgrade + β3Xtest09 + β4Xtest10 + β5Xfrl + β6Xfemale + β7Xminority + ei
where:


Υi is the 2010-11 test score (either NCE for the ITBS or scale score for the Arkansas
Benchmark) for student i



β0 is the intercept



β1 is the slope for predictor Xtreat, a binary variable indicating whether a student was a
Fountain Lake or FLCG student (1 = Fountain Lake, 0 = FLCG)



β2 is the slope for predictor Xgrade, a series of binary dummy variables indicating a
student’s particular grade level



β3 is the slope for predictor Xtest09, a continuous variable representing the test score for
student i from the 2008-09 school year



β4 is the slope for predictor Xtest10, a continuous variable representing the test score for
student i from the 2009-10 school year



β5 is the slope for predictor Xfrl, a binary variable indicating whether a student was
eligible for free or reduced lunch (1 = FRL eligible, 0 = non-FRL eligible)



β6 is the slope for predictor Xfemale, a binary variable indicating a student’s gender (1 =
female, 0 = male)



β7 is the slope for predictor Xminority, a binary variable indicating a student’s ethnicity (1
= minority (African-American, Native American, or Hispanic), 0 = non-minority
(Caucasian or Asian))
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ei is the residual for student i.
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Chapter 5 – Results
Research Question #1: Counselor Impacts
One finding from my review of merit pay literature was the lack of research focused on
how such programs impact school employees other than teachers, including no relevant articles
that addressed how merit pay programs affect school counselors. Thus, for this evaluation, I
chose to evaluate the extent to which the implementation of the CPIP impacted the roles and
responsibilities of school counselors, and from their perspective, determine whether or not the
CPIP was beneficial for the students of Fountain Lake.
I assessed school counselor attitudes and perceptions through a brief interview that I
administered in February 2012 to the school counselors at Fountain Lake. These interviews were
conducted via email so as to not interfere with the counselors’ schedules, and were brief enough
that the interviews took approximately 20-30 minutes to complete. The school counselors made
themselves available for follow-up interviews if needed, but for these purposes, the initial
responses were sufficient enough to gain a general understanding of the counselors’ views of the
CPIP. In total, I received interview responses to all of my questions from all four of the Fountain
Lake school counselors (one in the elementary school, one in the middle school, and two in the
high school).
One of the benefits of these interviews is that because all four of the counselors worked at
Fountain Lake in the year prior to the implementation of the CPIP, they could all provide
valuable insight into how their roles and responsibilities changed as a result of the increased
focus on raising student achievement inherent in merit pay programs such as the CPIP.42 In this

42

It should be noted that one of the school counselors was employed at Fountain Lake as a
teacher in the year prior to the implementation of the CPIP, not as a school counselor. However,
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way, I could begin to understand what counselors roles were with no individual-level
accountability or evaluation processes in place, and then contrast those roles with the counselors’
views of the nature of their jobs in a school environment with an established merit pay program.
The interviews were structured to gauge counselor thoughts and perceptions in four key
areas. First, I asked the counselors questions about what their current job responsibilities were
compared to their previous responsibilities. Here, I wanted to determine if the counselors were
asked to do anything different in response to the increased focus on raising student achievement,
including assisting with more testing-related activities than in years prior (such as serving as
testing coordinator, assisting with test preparation, proctoring test administrations, etc.). These
questions allowed me to determine if counselors were being asked to take on responsibilities
outside of what is recommended in the American School Counselor Association National Model
(2005).
I also asked the school counselors to respond to questions pertaining to the amount of
time they spent with Fountain Lake students engaged in school counseling activities, with a
specific focus on determining if this amount of time had decreased since the CPIP was
introduced. It may be that in a school with a merit pay program like the CPIP in place, teachers
are less willing to cede instructional time to school counseling activities, since a portion of a
teacher’s bonus is based on how well his or her students perform on standardized assessments.
And if students are not in the classroom learning the skills they need to do well on these
assessments, and are instead spending time with the school counselors, then the teacher might be
concerned that his or her bonus would be negatively affected. Thus, these questions provide
information about whether or not counselors’ time with students has decreased since the CPIP

that particular counselor was still able to provide information about how the use of merit pay
affected the work of school counselors in the district.
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was implemented, and if that is a result of teachers becoming more protective of their time with
their students.
Along those lines, it may also be true that because the entire school/district is more
heavily focused on raising student achievement, that the value of school counseling is minimized
in the eyes of teachers and administrators. Because of this, I sought to understand if counselors
believed teachers, principals, and administrators were less supportive of the services that school
counselors provide, or were generally just less supportive of the counselors themselves. The
work that school counselors do likely fills a necessary and important need for the Fountain Lake
students, so I asked the school counselors a series of questions regarding whether or not their
work was valued and supported by their colleagues and supervisors.
Finally, since the school counselors likely work much more closely with the students than
perhaps teachers do (especially due to the nature of the counselor-student relationship), I wanted
to ascertain from the counselors what their perceptions were of the impact the CPIP had on the
students of Fountain Lake. I wanted to know if the counselors believed that the CPIP caused the
students to experience higher levels of anxiety or stress, as counselors might be in a better
position than teachers to say whether or not that was the case. I also asked the counselors if they
believed the CPIP had led to positive outcomes for the students, such as increased learning, and
if there were any other changes that the counselors had observed in the students with whom they
worked.
After I received all of the counselors’ answers to my interview questions, I coded their
responses as positive, negative, or neutral as a way of characterizing counselor viewpoints
regarding the impact of the CPIP. For example, if a counselor reported that she felt less support
from her principal since the CPIP was implemented, I would code that response as negative,
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since the CPIP negative impacted her perceived level of support. Conversely, if the counselor
stated that her principal was now more supportive of school-counseling activities, then that
response would be characterized as positive. In general, this process allowed me to summarize
all of the views of the counselors to see what impact, if any, the CPIP had on their roles and
responsibilities in the Fountain Lake School District.
Current vs. previous job responsibilities.
The first set of questions I asked the school counselors at Fountain Lake dealt with if
their job responsibilities had changed as a result of the CPIP, and if so, in what ways. The
primary focus of these questions was to see if the counselors were being asked to take a more
prominent role in standardized testing process, or were spending more time engaged in noncounselor activities. Based on their responses to these questions, the overall impact of the CPIP
in this area was neutral; that is, the implementation of the CPIP did not result in any changes to
the roles and responsibilities of the school counselors, especially with regard to taking a more
prominent role in the testing process.43
For example, the majority of the responses indicated that the counselors did not have any
additional job responsibilities in 2010-11 beyond what they had in 2009-10, with all of the
counselors noting that there were no new testing-related responsibilities that came with the
introduction of the CPIP. One counselor stated that “there have been no additional
responsibilities involving testing placed on me…,” while another counselor, when asked whether

43

In this case, these responses could be characterized as positive, since the CPIP did not result in
the counselors being asked to assume new roles or responsibilities under this new accountability
system. However, I have chosen to characterize these responses as null since there was no
impact, but for these purposes a null should also be interpreted as a positive finding of this
evaluation.
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he/she44 was asked to participate in more testing-related activities, stated “I do not spend more
time assisting with testing-related activities than previously due to the CPIP.”
That is not to say that the counselors did not report some changes in their day-to-day
work activities, or did not play a prominent role in the testing process. One counselor reported
that he/she now spends more time completing paperwork and documenting the students with
whom he/she works, and attributed this increase in paperwork to the adoption of the CPIP. And
based on the responses of one of the counselors, it does appear that the responsibility for
coordinating test administration is held by at least one of the counselors. However, this
responsibility was not one that came to fruition as a direct result of the CPIP; this counselor was
already serving as the testing coordinator before the program was implemented. Thus, the only
negative change in responsibilities was an increase in paperwork, though that was only reported
by one school counselor.
There were also some positive changes in responsibilities and counseling approach that
were noted by the school counselors. When asked if his/her job responsibilities had changed in
any way, one counselor had the following comment: “No, although I am more aware of the
responsibility of enrolling kids in appropriate classes and encouraging them to do their best in
academics.” Another counselor noted that he/she now works much more closely with specialty
teachers (such as art, music, or physical education), because “the school as a whole is more
focused on the curriculum they are implementing.” These comments do suggest a more focused
approach towards raising student achievement that spans the entire district. Overall then, the
majority of the counselor’s responses indicated no real substantial changes in their roles and
44

To protect the confidentiality of the school counselors, I have chosen to use “he/she” when
referring to the interview responses of a specific counselor, to avoid revealing the gender of the
counselor making the statement (since there was only one male school counselor at Fountain
Lake).
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responsibilities, though the implementation of the CPIP may have resulted in more time and
effort spent to meet the academic needs of Fountain Lake students.
Time with students.
For the next set of questions, I asked the school counselors whether or not their time with
students was affected by the CPIP. It is possible that in a system with a greater emphasis on
standardized test performance, that there may be a greater reluctance on the part of teachers to
relinquish time in the classroom where students are learning the skills necessary to perform well
on these assessments. Put differently, it may be that the increased focus on student achievement
comes at the expense of other academic, career, or personal/social developmental needs that
would be addressed by the school counselors. A review of counselor responses does in fact
support this theory; it appears that the implementation of the CPIP did have a negative impact on
counselors’ opportunities to work with Fountain Lake students.
One prominent theme that emerged from the counselors’ responses is that teachers
became more protective of their instructional time because of the emphasis on testing under the
CPIP. In nearly all of their answers to these questions, the counselors noted that it became harder
to take students out of the classroom during lessons because the teachers did not want students to
miss out on the content that was being taught. For example, one counselor stated that “the core
teachers are keeping a tighter rein on their students than before CPIP.” Another counselor
confirmed this statement, saying, “I do not spend less time than before (with students), but it is
harder to find time to pull kids from classes because teachers are much more protective of
instructional time.” One counselor was quite direct in his/her comments on this topic, stating that
teachers “are also very covetous of their time with the students and would prefer I not take them
during class time.”
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Beyond simply having difficulty finding time to meet with students, or teachers
preferring to have students avoid missing class, the focus of the CPIP may have impacted the
response teachers have to allowing their students to participate in counseling activities. One of
the counselors said that he/she has received complaints from teachers because the counselor took
students out during instruction time. Specifically, when asked if teachers were less willing to
allow students to be removed from class time, the counselor stated: “Numerous times this year I
have received complaints when counseling activities or student informational assemblies have
interrupted instructional time.”
Even if teachers are supportive, it is also possible that counselors are simply too busy
with other CPIP activities to fully devote the necessary time to working with their students. For
the counselor who previously stated that he/she now spends more time in collaboration with
other teachers because of the focus of the CPIP, that same counselor also noted that he/she
spends “less time with students because I am involved in the cross-curriculum project which
takes time: meeting, planning, carrying out (the) project.”
Thus, it does appear that the amount of time spent with students has been affected by the
CPIP, as teachers are less willing to relinquish class time to the school counselors. Further, based
on the comment of one counselor about receiving complaints, it may be that the importance of
counseling, in the eyes of both teachers and principals, has been impacted since the CPIP was
adopted. 45

45

This finding is particularly interesting, because while school counselors expressed they had
less time with students, it was because teachers were more protective of their class time. Thus,
this system encouraged teachers to be more protective of their time with their students, which
could be interpreted as a positive finding of this evaluation. Obviously, being protective at the
expense of other activities, such as school counseling, is not ideal; nonetheless, the fact that
teachers were more aware of students needing to be in the classroom learning may be a positive
outcome associated with the use of merit pay.
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Support from teachers/administrators.
My next line of questions focused on whether or not counselors believed that teachers
and principals were less supportive of their work since the CPIP was adopted. Some of the
counselors’ responses from the previous section suggest that teachers may view the work that
school counselors do as less important than the work that is done is the classroom. In general, the
responses of counselors suggest that the level of support from teachers and principals has not
changed as a result of the CPIP (characterized as a neutral impact). However, while the level of
support has not changed, the need for counselors to be more cognizant of not taking students out
of class has changed, as the counselors’ comments suggest that their work is still supported so
long as the counselors recognize the importance of class time.
This point may be best summarized by the following counselor response of whether or
not teachers are less supportive now because of the CPIP: “I would say somewhat. We have had
some serious issues with students that teachers have recognized student need for counseling, but
generally teachers have been very protective with instructional time.” That counselor went on to
note that he/she believes “the level of support has remained about the same, but I have been
asked to respect instructional time as much as possible.”
Another counselor made this point when asked if teachers were less supportive of
counseling as a result of the CPIP: “My opinion is that overall they (the teachers) are not
supportive of anything that takes away from their normal teaching day. I don’t see them singling
out counseling activities to support less due to the CPIP.” Another counselor had a similar
perspective, noting that his/her “administrators are very supportive of school counseling
activities as long as it does not interfere with teach (sic) time.” This theme is consistent
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throughout the interview responses; the level of support has not changed, but the counselors are
put in a position where they need to find alternate times to work with students.
Because of this, the reasons for the issues noted in the previous section, that counselors
now have less time to work with their students since the CPIP was implemented, becomes more
apparent: Teachers simply do not want to give up class time with their students. So while
teachers are more focused on ensuring that students are learning testable skills, it may come at
the detriment of the school counselors’ work with the students. This point might be best
summarized by the following interview response: “CPIP, teaching strategies, pacing guides, etc.
demand more time and counseling time has diminished. I have no set time for counseling like I
had before CPIP. I have to hunt for time to do guidance lessons.”
Impact on students.
The final set of interviews questions dealt with what impact, if any, the CPIP had on
Fountain Lake students. I divided these interview questions into two categories; questions that
addressed whether or not students were learning more as a result of the CPIP, and if the CPIP
had resulted in extra anxiety, stress, or any other negative changes for students at Fountain Lake.
Because of how closely school counselors work with students, it may be that they are better able
to observe how students have responded to the implementation of the CPIP.
The responses for both sets of questions are not easily characterized, as counselor
responses varied. Half of the counselors believed that the CPIP did not impact student learning,
and the other half did. Further, while most of the counselors stated that the program had not
resulted in extra anxiety and stress for the students, one counselor did believe that the CPIP had
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caused the students to be more anxious and stressed.46 Because of these mixed responses, the
interpretation of how the CPIP impacted students is not particularly straightforward.
Regarding student learning, there were some counselors who felt strongly about the
positive impact of the CPIP on the students. For example, one counselor stated that he/she had
observed “students more focused on long term goals such as career preparation. I think this may
be in relation from teachers modeling this focus on goal oriented activities.” Another counselor
stated that he/she believed that students benefitted because the “CPIP has made teachers focus
more on where the students are and what needs to be done to bring them up.” This statement was
supported by another counselor who noted that he/she thinks “the impact has been positive
because teachers have become more focused on student learning and results.”
However, as was just noted, not all of the counselors agreed that the CPIP had a positive
impact on student learning. One counselor stated that he/she was not certain if students were
benefitting as a result of the CPIP, but he/she did confirm that he/she had observed teachers
putting extra effort into teaching, as a way of “trying to do what is required in order to gain some
additional income.” Another counselor was decidedly more clear on his/her perceptions of the
impact of the CPIP, noting that he/she did not “think that the CPIP effected (sic) student learning
at Fountain Lake at all.” That counselor went on to state that the program was not impacting
student learning because it was not impacting the teachers, since the teachers “are here for the
kids and they teach because they want the kids to learn not because they can get more money.”
For the most part, the school counselors reported that they did not think the CPIP resulted
in additional anxiety or stress for the students (though there was agreement that teachers were
now more anxious and stressed). Several counselors stated they had not observed any such issues
46

Several counselors did report that the CPIP caused more anxiety and stress for Fountain Lake
teachers as well.
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in the students with whom they worked, and certainly had not seen increases since the start of the
2010-11 school year. One counselor stated that he/she had seen more anxiety for teachers and
students, but was not sure if it was a direct result of the CPIP, or whether it was a combination of
other factors. There was one counselor who offered a different perspective about the impact of
the program, noting that the CPIP “sets high expectations for our students and some are unable to
rise to the occasion. I feel that some students are affected by the feeling of failure, too much
work, teacher pressure, and sometimes they just want to quit. Learning seems not to be as much
fun as it once was.”
Based on the inconsistent responses of counselors for this set of questions, it is unclear
how students are affected by the CPIP. Some counselors saw positive impacts for student
learning, and others did not. And while the majority of counselors did not think Fountain Lake
students were more anxious or stress, one counselor did suggest that the program had resulted in
increased pressure and stress placed on the students.
Summary of counselor results.
The interviews with school counselors at Fountain Lake revealed some aspects of the
adoption of a merit pay program that could be viewed as positive findings (those findings that I
have characterized as neutral). For example, it does not appear that the adoption of the CPIP
resulted in school counselors assuming additional responsibilities, including no reports of
counselors being asked to assume a role in the standardized testing process (beyond what the
counselors were already doing). Further, the amount of support from teachers and administrators
has gone relatively unchanged, save for the fact that teachers are now more protective of
classroom time.
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However, with teachers placing greater value on the time they have with their students, it
appears that this is having a negative impact on the time that counselors get with the students.
Counselors were nearly unanimous in noting that they now have less time to provide counselingrelated services to Fountain Lake students, and struggle to find opportunities during the day with
meet with the students. And while the majority of counselors stated that the CPIP did have a
positive impact on student learning, there was not agreement among the counselors about
whether or not the program led to more anxiety and stress for the students.
The overall patterns for the counselor responses are presented in Table 10. Based on
these responses, it is unclear whether, from the counselors’ perspective, the implementation of
the CPIP was beneficial for the students at Fountain Lake. It also certainly merits further
consideration about whether or not this program, with its increased focus on accountability, is
having a detrimental impact on the responsibilities that school counselors have with their
students.
Table 10
Summary of Counselor Interview Responses
Construct

Finding

Summary

Counselor roles and
responsibilities

Neutral

No changes in counselor roles and responsibilities

Negative

Decrease in time with students; difficulty making time
during the school day to meet with students

Support from teachers and
administrators

Neutral

No changes in teacher and administrator support

Impact on the students of
Fountain Lake

Mixed

Mixed reports on the impacts on student learning;
inconsistency about whether the program led to more
anxiety and stress

Time spent with students
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Research Question #2: Teacher Impacts
One of the central questions I sought to address in this evaluation of the CPIP was how
teachers responded to the implementation of this type of compensation strategy. Because the
teachers are the ones most directly impacted by a merit pay program—their work comes under
greater scrutiny, and they have the potential to have their work recognized and financial
rewarded—it seems important to understand whether or not teachers are supportive of this type
of program, whether they believe the structure of this particular program is fair, and if the
adoption of this type of program incentivized the teachers to alter their teaching approach.
Ultimately, if teachers support this type of system, and if the opportunity to earn a bonus
motivates teachers to work harder, seek out new training, collaborate more, etc., then the use of
merit pay may be a sound reform strategy. This is because if teachers are more focused on
raising student achievement and feel their hard work is being recognized and rewarded, then
everyone benefits; student achievement will likely increase, teachers will be more satisfied, and
in the end, the best teachers will likely stay in the classroom because of this reward system.
Conversely, if teachers are not supportive of the use of merit pay, think the approach is unfair, or
do not alter their approach to teaching in any way, then the opposite might occur (or simply
nothing will occur at all); student achievement will not be impacted, and teachers may become
frustrated with teaching. Further, if this type of program does not provide incentives for the best
teachers to continue teaching, then one of the ultimate goals of this type of strategy, rewarding
and retaining the best teachers, may not be realized. And if that is the case, then student
achievement will likely suffer as a result, since the students are no longer being taught by the
very best teachers.

106
Because of the significant costs associated with the implementation of the CPIP, both in
terms of time spent developing and implementing the program, and the actual financial costs
associated with providing bonuses to all employees, understanding how teachers responded to
this particular merit pay program is of the utmost importance. For these purposes then, I chose to
gauge teacher attitudes and perceptions about the CPIP by administering surveys to all teachers
in March of the 2010-11 school year, and then again in October of the 2011-12 school year. The
goal of these survey administrations was twofold; first, I wanted to understand teachers’ views of
the CPIP, including their level of support for this type of program, their thoughts on the fairness
of the CPIP, and whether or not the program had encouraged them to approach teaching
differently, before the teachers received their year-end performance ratings or their bonuses (in
March). At this point, teachers did not know how much of a bonus they would receive, so this
survey administration provides baseline information about teacher attitudes and perceptions of
the program.
The second goal of the survey administration was to understand how teachers’
perceptions changed after they had received their ratings and bonuses (in October). This may be
particularly interesting, as it could be that teachers are less receptive to a merit pay program
simply because they do not understand the process, or because they are unsure whether or not
they will be rewarded. Thus, after the second round of survey administration, I can see if
teachers were now more or less supportive of merit pay in general and the CPIP in particular, and
whether or not they believed the program had resulted in positive changes for teachers (among
other things).
One of the additional benefits of these surveys is that I could link individual teacher
responses to their overall performance rating and bonus amount. Included on every teacher’s
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survey was a unique identification number, to which only I had access, which allowed me to
match survey responses to CPIP performance rating. This allowed me to see if a particular group
of teachers, specifically those teachers who earned the highest ratings and thus benefitted the
most from the program, were more receptive and responsive to the program than their colleagues
who performed less well under the program. If such differences in attitudes did exist, then it may
be that the intended goal of the program is occurring; those teachers who are rated the highest
and receive the largest bonuses are more satisfied (and more likely to stay in the classroom), and
those teachers who receive the lowest ratings are less satisfied and ultimately might choose to
seek out alternative employment opportunities.47
On the surveys, I assessed the attitudes and perceptions of teachers in five key areas, or
constructs. For example, I asked teachers whether or not they were supportive of using merit pay
as a way of rewarding teacher effectiveness, and if teachers who are more “effective” should be
compensated differently than those teachers who are less “effective” (Supportive Construct). I
also asked teachers questions regarding their views of the fairness of the structure of the CPIP
(Fairness Construct), so I could determine how support for merit pay in general and the CPIP
specifically differed (if at all).
Since one of the goals of a merit pay program is to motivate teachers to alter their
teaching approach in some way (referred to as motivational effects), it seemed important to
determine if teachers perceived that this occurred. To accomplish this, I asked teachers if they
had sought out additional training as a result of the CPIP, focused more on raising student
achievement, adopted new teaching strategies, and so on (Teaching Construct). I also asked
47

Of course, this would only be beneficial if the program was accurate in the identification of the
highest performing teachers. The stability of these performance ratings would need to be
observed over multiple years to ensure that there was consistency in which teachers received the
highest ratings, and which teachers received the lowest.
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teachers if they collaborated more with other teachers, including sharing ideas about classroom
strategies, and if teachers were now more willing to help each other as a result of the CPIP
(Interactions Construct). For both of these constructs, my goal was to assess whether the CPIP
was resulting in motivational effects for teachers, and if so, to what extent.
Finally, I also gauged teachers’ attitudes about the impact the CPIP had on the students at
Fountain Lake, included whether or not students were learning more because of the emphasis on
student achievement in the CPIP (Student Benefits Construct). Ideally, teachers would be
motivated to approach teaching differently (and be rewarded for their hard work), and as a result,
student achievement would improve across the district. I will evaluate later in this chapter
whether or not student achievement was in fact affected by the adoption of the CPIP, but here I
wanted to see if teachers believed that students benefitted from this program, or if they believed
the use of merit pay had a negative effect on students, such as causing them to experience higher
levels of anxiety and/or stress.
The teacher surveys used in this evaluation can be found in Appendix E. In the following
sections, I present my findings from the initial survey administration, show how teacher
perceptions changed after receiving a bonus, and then compare the responses of those teachers
who received the highest ratings/bonuses to those teachers with the lowest ratings/bonuses.
Spring survey responses.
Presented in Table 11 are the mean construct scores for teachers who responded to the
survey in March of 2011 (before receiving a bonus). These average construct scores are weighted
to account for factors that might have impacted whether or not a teacher responded to the survey
in October as well (giving greater weight to teacher responses with characteristics more typical
of teachers who did not respond to the second survey).
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Recall, construct scores ranged from 1-4, with higher scores indicating a greater level of
agreement with the items included in each construct. For example, a construct score of four
would indicate that a teacher strongly agreed with all of the items in that particular construct, and
a construct score of one would indicate strong disagreement with each of the items. The midpoint
for these constructs is a score of 2.5, with scores above indicating general agreement with the
focus of that particular construct, and scores below indicating general disagreement.
The results from the Spring survey show a fairly consistent pattern; all of the mean
construct scores were at or below 2.5. Scores around 2.5, in general, represent areas where most
teachers responded near the mean, with some teachers agreeing with the focus of the construct (a
score of 3) and others expressing disagreement (a score of 2). For example, the mean score for
the Interactions Construct was 2.5; since items in this construct deal with whether or not teachers
believed the CPIP led to increased collaboration and decreased competition among teachers, it is
likely that some teachers believed this did occur as a result of the CPIP, and other teachers
believed it did not. For this specific construct, the standard deviation was 0.5, indicating that the
majority (68%) of teacher scores were between 2.0 and 3.0 (i.e. most responses by teachers were
either disagree or agree).
The mean construct scores for the remaining four constructs show that, in general,
teachers neither overwhelmingly agreed nor overwhelmingly disagreed with the construct being
measured. Teachers were slightly less supportive of the use of merit pay as a compensation
strategy (Supportive Construct=2.4), and expressed that they did not believe the CPIP was fair
(Fairness Construct=2.2). Teachers were also slightly more likely to respond that the CPIP had
not impacted their teaching approach (Teaching Construct=2.4), and that the CPIP was not
beneficial for the students at Fountain Lake (Student Benefits Construct=2.3).
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Table 11
Summary of Mean Construct Scores, Teacher Survey, Spring 2011
Construct

N

Mean Construct Score:
Spring (SD)

Supportive Construct

94

2.4 (0.7)

Fairness Construct

94

2.2 (0.6)

Teaching Construct

94

2.4 (0.6)

Interactions Construct

94

2.5 (0.5)

Student Benefits Construct

94

2.3 (0.6)

To provide some context for what these mean construct scores represent, I have included
in Table 12 the percentage of teachers that agreed or strongly agreed with each of the items
included in the surveys analyses, as well as the overall percent agreement (agree plus strongly
agree), with all of the items organized by construct. These individual item percentages provide
additional information about the overall perceptions and attitudes of Fountain Lake teachers. For
example, based on the mean construct score of 2.2, it appears that teachers did not believe the
CPIP was fair, and the percent agreement for items in this construct reflects that general attitude.
Of the 94 teachers who responded to the survey, only 19% believed that the bonus they received
would be based on their own effectiveness (instead of on the abilities of their students), and only
15% thought the rating they received at the end of the year would accurately reflect their
effectiveness as a teacher. There were also only 37% of teachers that responded in agreement to
the straightforward survey item about whether teachers believed the CPIP was fair. Interestingly,
63% of teachers did believe that the bonus amount for which they were eligible was an
appropriate reward for their work.
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There was a fairly even split in whether or not teachers were in agreement with items in
the Teaching Construct, which included items related to how the CPIP impacted approaches to
teaching. For most of the items, the percent agreement was near 50%, indicating, for example,
that approximately half of the Fountain Lake teachers believed the CPIP had resulted in more
teachers working harder, with the other half believing there had been no impact on how hard
teachers worked. There was strong agreement among teachers that the CPIP had resulted in a
greater focus on raising student achievement (73%), though teachers did not agree that the CPIP
had resulted in more teachers seeking out additional training (27%).
Regarding their interactions with other teachers, most teachers (63%) agreed that the
CPIP did not result in competition with other teachers (37% thought there was more
competition), and most teachers (83%) thought the CPIP did not result in teachers withholding
ideas from other teachers (though 17% of teachers did). However, only 38% of teachers thought
that the CPIP resulted in teachers collaborating more, and only 42% expressed that the CPIP
encouraged teachers to share pedagogical strategies or practices. In other words, most teachers
agreed that the CPIP did not result in competition, but most teachers also agreed that it did not
result in increased collaboration either.
When asked whether or not the CPIP had improved student learning across the district,
less than half of the teachers agreed that the CPIP had been positive for students (46%), and only
42% believed that students had learned more as a result of the CPIP. Forty-seven percent of
teachers also reported that the CPIP had led to increased levels of anxiety and/or stress for
Fountain Lake students. Based on these responses, it seems that the perceptions of how
beneficial this program was for students were mixed.
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Table 12
Summary of Teacher Survey Item Percent Agreement, Spring 2011
Overall
Percent
Agreement
(Spring)

Perc.
Agree

Perc.
Strongly
Agree

1. Teachers who are more “effective” should be paid more than
teachers who are less “effective.”

72%

44%

27%

9. The effectiveness of a teacher is reflected in improvements in the
test scores of his/her students

32%

30%

2%

12. Teachers with the same level of educational training who have
worked the same amount of time should be paid the same (R). 48

52%

40%

13%

13. Teachers should be financially rewarded for improving student
achievement.

75%

56%

19%

6. The bonus I receive will be based more on my effectiveness as a
teacher than on the abilities of my students.

19%

15%

4%

14. The current bonus amount for which I am eligible is an
appropriate reward for my work.

63%

45%

18%

36. The CPIP is fair.

37%

33%

4%

39. The CPIP merit rating I receive on my end-of-year report card
will accurately reflect my effectiveness as a teacher.

15%

15%

0%

18. Because of the CPIP, I have sought out additional training
(education, professional development, etc.) to improve my teaching.

27%

22%

4%

23. Teachers at my school have become more focused on raising
student achievement as a result of the CPIP.

73%

58%

15%

27. Teachers at my school have investigated new teaching practices
in order to improve their CPIP bonuses.

47%

44%

2%

30. I have witnessed other teachers working harder as a result of the
CPIP.

52%

44%

8%

31. I have noticed an increased focus on lesson planning at my
school as a result of the CPIP.

45%

42%

3%

Construct/Questions

Supportive Construct (Chronbach’s alpha = .735)

Fairness Construct (Chronbach’s alpha = .728)

Teaching Construct (Chronbach’s alpha = .877)

48

Indicates that an item has been reverse coded.
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Overall
Percent
Agreement
(Spring)

Perc.
Agree

Perc.
Strongly
Agree

51%

49%

2%

21. Teachers now compete with each other instead of working
together as a result of the CPIP (R).

37%

32%

5%

22. I have noticed more teachers at my school working together
because of the CPIP.

38%

33%

5%

29. The CPIP has encouraged me to discuss various pedagogical
practices with other teachers at my school.

42%

38%

3%

32. I’ve noticed that teachers are not as likely to share ideas with
each other as a result of the CPIP (R)

17%

13%

3%

34. The school-wide portion of the CPIP encourages me to help
other teachers in my school.

57%

50%

7%

16. I believe the CPIP has improved the educational outcomes for
students in my school.

46%

42%

4%

17. Students at my school had higher levels of anxiety and stress
because of the CPIP’s focus on testing (R)

47%

39%

8%

25. Students at my school have learned more as a result of the CPIP.

42%

40%

2%

Construct/Questions

33. The CPIP has encouraged teachers at my school to adopt new
teaching strategies.
Interactions Construct (Chronbach’s alpha = .661)

Student Benefits Construct (Chronbach’s alpha = .657)

Changes in teacher responses.
Teacher responses from the March survey administration appear to indicate that the CPIP
did not have a positive impact on approach to teaching, interactions with other teachers, or on the
students of Fountain Lake. The teachers also did not report being supportive of merit pay in
general, and did not believe the CPIP was fair. However, at the time this March survey was
administered, teachers did not know what their end-of-year ratings would be, and as a result, did
not know whether or not they would receive a bonus or how large their bonus might be. Thus, in
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this section, I explore how teacher attitudes and perceptions changed after they had experienced
a full year of the CPIP (including receiving their merit pay bonuses).
Presented in Table 13 are the mean construct scores from the Spring and Fall surveys for
those teachers who participated in both rounds of survey administration. Here again, construct
scores are weighted to account for factors that might have impacted whether or not a teacher
participated in the second survey administration. I used a paired samples t-test to determine if the
difference in average responses from Spring to Fall were statistically significant, and have
included in this Table the difference in construct scores from Spring to Fall, and the p-values that
correspond to my significance tests.
The results of these analyses indicate that even after receiving a bonus, teacher attitudes
and perceptions remained unchanged, as there were no statistically significant differences in
mean construct scores from March to October. Teachers did not become more supportive of the
use of merit pay, and they did not change their opinions of the fairness of the CPIP. There also
did not appear to be any changes in perceptions of the impact of the CPIP on teaching approach,
interactions with other teachers, or the benefits for students. The mean construct score for the
Fairness Construct actually decreased by 0.2 points, and while this difference was nonsignificant, it does perhaps indicate that simply receiving a bonus does not necessarily equate
with the perception of the fairness of a merit pay program. That is, even though all of the
teachers that participated in both rounds of survey administration received a bonus, the
perception was still that the program was unfair. This may be a result of teachers receiving
bonuses that were less than what was expected, or some of the teachers simply received a bonus
lower than what other teachers received.
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Table 13
Summary of Mean Construct Scores, Teacher Survey, Spring 2011to Fall 2011
Construct

N

Mean Construct Mean Construct
Score: Spring (SD) Score: Fall (SD)

Diff.

p-value

Supportive Construct

58

2.6 (0.5)

2.7 (0.5)

0.1

.189

Fairness Construct

58

2.3 (0.6)

2.1 (0.8)

-0.2

.667

Teaching Construct

58

2.4 (0.5)

2.4 (0.5)

0.0

.989

Interactions Construct

58

2.6 (0.5)

2.5 (0.5)

-0.1

.289

Student Benefits Construct

58

2.4 (0.6)

2.3 (0.6)

-0.1

.083

At the individual item level (see Table 14), the decrease in mean score for the Fairness
Construct is apparent; in March, 45% of teachers thought the CPIP was fair, and in October that
percentage decreased to 20%.49 There was also a decrease in the percentage of teachers who
thought the bonus amount for which they were eligible was fair, from 67% agreement in March
to 59% in October. Oddly, the percent agreement increased for the survey item that addressed
whether the end-of-year rating that a teacher received would accurately reflect a teacher’s
effectiveness, with 17% of teachers agreeing in March, and 49% of teachers agreeing in October.
There are also interesting response patterns for items in the Supportive Construct. For
example, the percent of teachers who agreed that more “effective” teachers should be paid more
than less “effective” teachers increased, from 83% to 93%. However, the percentage of teachers
who thought that teachers should be financially rewarded for these improvements in student
49

Because non-core teachers were eligible for a lower maximum bonus ($6,000) than core
teachers ($10,000), it is possible that the overall perception that the CPIP was unfair was largely
driven by the responses of non-core teachers. Based on these survey responses, that very likely
was the case. For example, in March, 50% of core teachers thought the CPIP was fair, compared
to 23% in October. In contrast, 35% of non-core teachers thought the CPIP was fair in March,
with that percentage dropping to 15% in October. Thus, it does appear that overall, non-core
teachers generally viewed this program as being less fair than did core teachers.
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achievement actually decreased, with 84% of teachers agreeing with this item in the Spring, and
only 77% agreeing in the Fall.
Regarding the impact the CPIP had on teaching approach and interactions with other
teachers, there was a decrease or no change in the percent agreement for the majority of items
included in each construct, though in most areas the decrease was not substantial. For example, a
smaller percentage of teachers reported that they had sought out additional training (24% to
21%), thought the CPIP had led to an increased focus on student achievement (67% to 62%), and
thought that teachers worked harder (53% to 48%). The only areas for which the percent
agreement increased was more teachers noticed an increased focus on lesson planning (50% to
51%), and more teachers discussed pedagogical practices with other teachers (44% to 50%).
Fewer teachers also reported that the CPIP had resulted in teachers competing with each other,
from 64% in March to 57% in October.50
Finally, and perhaps somewhat concerning, are the changes in perceptions of teachers
with regard to the impact of the CPIP on Fountain Lake students. There was a notable decrease
in the percentage of teachers who thought the CPIP improved educational outcomes for students,
from 49% agreement in March to 37% agreement in October. This response pattern was
consistent with responses regarding whether students learned more as a result of the CPIP, with
the percent agreement decreasing from 40% in March to 35% in October. Additionally, more
teachers thought the CPIP led to higher levels of anxiety and stress for Fountain Lake students;
the percent agreement increased to 58% in October (from 54% in March) after teachers had
experienced a full year of the program.

50

It should be noted that despite this decrease, over half of the teachers did still say that they had
observed teachers competing with each other as a direct result of the CPIP.
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Table 14
Summary of Teacher Survey Item Percent Agreement, Spring 2011 to Fall 2011
Construct/Questions

Percent
Percent
Agreement Agreement
(Spring)
(Fall)

Supportive Construct
1. Teachers who are more “effective” should be paid more than teachers
who are less “effective.”

83%

93%

9. The effectiveness of a teacher is reflected in improvements in the test
scores of his/her students

41%

43%

12. Teachers with the same level of educational training who have worked
the same amount of time should be paid the same (R).

48%

52%

13. Teachers should be financially rewarded for improving student
achievement.

84%

77%

6. The bonus I receive will be based more on my effectiveness as a teacher
than on the abilities of my students.

25%

27%

14. The current bonus amount for which I am eligible is an appropriate
reward for my work.

67%

59%

36. The CPIP is fair.

45%

20%

39. The CPIP merit rating I receive on my end-of-year report card will
accurately reflect my effectiveness as a teacher.

17%

49%

18. Because of the CPIP, I have sought out additional training (education,
professional development, etc.) to improve my teaching.

24%

21%

23. Teachers at my school have become more focused on raising student
achievement as a result of the CPIP.

67%

62%

27. Teachers at my school have investigated new teaching practices in order
to improve their CPIP bonuses.

48%

48%

30. I have witnessed other teachers working harder as a result of the CPIP.

53%

48%

31. I have noticed an increased focus on lesson planning at my school as a
result of the CPIP.

50%

51%

33. The CPIP has encouraged teachers at my school to adopt new teaching
strategies.

54%

53%

Fairness Construct

Teaching Construct
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Construct/Questions

Percent
Percent
Agreement Agreement
(Spring)
(Fall)

Interactions Construct
21. Teachers now compete with each other instead of working together as a
result of the CPIP (R).

64%

57%

22. I have noticed more teachers at my school working together because of
the CPIP.

39%

37%

29. The CPIP has encouraged me to discuss various pedagogical practices
with other teachers at my school.

44%

50%

32. I’ve noticed that teachers are not as likely to share ideas with each other
as a result of the CPIP (R)

84%

84%

34. The school-wide portion of the CPIP encourages me to help other
teachers in my school.

57%

52%

16. I believe the CPIP has improved the educational outcomes for students
in my school.

49%

37%

17. Students at my school had higher levels of anxiety and stress because of
the CPIP’s focus on testing (R)

54%

58%

25. Students at my school have learned more as a result of the CPIP.

40%

35%

Student Benefits Construct

High performers vs. low performers.
For my final set of analyses, I sought to determine if there were differences in teacher
attitudes and perceptions about the impact of the CPIP based on how well they performed under
the program. It is likely true that those teachers who received the higher end-of-year ratings or
the higher bonuses would view the CPIP more favorably than those teachers who performed less
well, since the higher-performing teachers received greater rewards and perhaps greater
recognition, and thus received the most benefits from the program. It may also be true that the
higher performing teachers would be more supportive of merit pay in general, and would be
more likely to believe that the program had influenced their approach to teaching and their
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interactions with their fellow teachers. With these analyses, I could determine if that was in fact
the case.
For these purposes, I conducted two separate sets of analyses; one where I compared the
responses of the teachers who received the higher end-of-year ratings to those teachers who
received the lower ratings, and one where I compared the responses of the teachers who received
the larger bonuses to those teachers who received the smaller ones. This consideration is
important, as the teachers who received the higher ratings are not necessarily the teachers who
received the larger bonuses. This is because non-core personnel also participated in these
surveys, and those personnel were only eligible for a maximum bonus of $6,000 (compared to
core teachers who were eligible for a maximum bonus of $10,000). In other words, even if noncore teachers received the higher ratings among all teachers, their bonuses could still be less than
core teachers who received a lower performance rating.
In total, there were 58 teachers who responded to the survey at both administration
periods. For these comparisons, I have simply divided the total sample of teachers into two equal
groups; those teachers with the higher end-of-year ratings (29 teachers) compared to those
teachers with the lower ratings (29 teachers), and similarly, those teachers with the higher
bonuses compared to those teachers with the lower bonuses. To provide some meaning for how
these groups differed, the average performance rating for the higher performing teachers was
89.6 points (out of a total of 100), compared to an average rating of 69.0 for the lower
performing teachers. The average bonus for the group of high performing teachers was $8,497,
compared to an average bonus of $4,936 for teachers in the lower-performing group. Of the 29
teachers who received the largest bonuses, all 29 were core teachers, compared to the lower
performing group which was comprised of 21 non-core personnel and 8 core teachers (there were

120
no notable differences in the core/non-core distribution for the high and low end-of-year
performance rating groups). Based on the distribution of personnel in the bonus groups, this
comparison is largely a comparison of the attitudes and perceptions of non-core personnel to core
teachers.
Presented in Tables 15 and 16, respectively, are the differences in mean construct scores
for teachers in the high and low performance ratings and bonuses group. Within these tables I
have included the change in mean construct scores from March to October for each group of
teachers, and then computed a difference in differences for the two teacher groups. This allows
me to show if there are notable differences in the survey response patterns for teachers in the low
versus high groups. For each comparison, I used an independent samples t-test to determine if
differences between teachers in the low and high performance groups were statistically
significant; the corresponding p-values for these analyses are also included in the tables.
The results of these analyses show that no significant differences exist in the attitudes and
perceptions of teachers in the low and high performance groups, with the exception of one key
area. Those teachers who received the higher end-of-year ratings viewed the CPIP as being more
fair from March to October (an increase of mean Fairness Construct score from 2.3 to 2.4);
whereas those teachers who received the lower ratings viewed the CPIP as being less fair from
March to October (a decrease from 2.3 to 2.0); this difference in teacher perceptions was
statistically significant at the p = .05 level.51 Interestingly, this difference in perceptions of the
fairness of the CPIP was not evident in the comparison of those teachers with the higher bonuses

51

While those teachers who received the highest ratings viewed the program as being more fair,
it is still worth noting that their mean construct score of 2.4 in October still indicates general
disagreement with the overall fairness of the CPIP (since the mean construct score is below the
midpoint of 2.5). Put differently, these teachers simply disagree less about the CPIP being fair.
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to those teachers with the lower bonuses; teachers in both groups viewed the CPIP as being less
fair.52

52

In a separate analysis, I compared changes in mean Fairness Construct scores for only the core
teachers who received the higher bonuses to the mean scores for only the core teachers with the
lower bonuses. Core teachers who received the higher bonuses had a mean construct score of 2.4
in March and a mean score of 2.5 in October. In contrast, those core teachers with the lower
bonuses also had a mean score of 2.4 in March, but had a mean construct score of 2.1 in October.
Thus, there may be a difference in perceptions of fairness of the CPIP if I just isolate this
comparison to core teachers, and remove non-core teachers from the analysis. There were no
differences in trends for non-core teachers.

Table 15
Mean Construct Scores, Teacher Survey, High Ratings vs. Low Ratings, Spring 2011to Fall 2011
Mean Construct
Score-Spring (SD):
High Ratings

Mean Construct
Score-Fall (SD):
High Ratings

Diff.
High
Ratings

Mean Construct
Score-Spring (SD):
Low Ratings

Mean Construct
Score-Fall (SD):
Low Ratings

Diff.
Low
Ratings

Diff.
In
Diff.

pvalue

Supportive Construct

2.8 (0.4)

2.8 (0.5)

0.0

2.7 (0.5)

2.7 (0.6)

0.0

0.0

.611

Fairness Construct

2.3 (0.6)

2.4 (0.7)

0.1

2.3 (0.6)

2.0 (0.7)

-0.3

0.4

.045

Teaching Construct

2.5 (0.5)

2.5 (0.5)

0.0

2.3 (0.6)

2.3 (0.5)

0.0

0.0

.935

Interactions Construct

2.6 (0.5)

2.6 (0.5)

0.0

2.6 (0.5)

2.5 (0.5)

-0.1

0.1

.287

Student Benefits
Construct

2.5 (0.5)

2.4 (0.6)

-0.1

2.4 (0.6)

2.2 (0.6)

-0.2

0.1

.462

Construct

Table 16
Mean Construct Scores, Teacher Survey, High Bonuses vs. Low Bonuses, Spring 2011to Fall 2011
Mean Construct
Score-Fall (SD):
High Bonuses

Diff.
High
Bonuses

Mean Construct
Score-Spring (SD):
Low Bonuses

Mean Construct
Score-Fall (SD):
Low Bonuses

Diff.
Low
Bonuses

Diff.
In
Diff.

pvalue

Supportive Construct

2.7 (0.5)

2.8 (0.6)

0.1

2.8 (0.5)

2.7 (0.6)

-0.1

0.2

.338

Fairness Construct

2.4 (0.6)

2.3 (0.7)

-0.1

2.2 (0.7)

2.0 (0.7)

-0.2

0.1

.591

Teaching Construct

2.4 (0.5)

2.4 (0.5)

0.0

2.4 (0.6)

2.5 (0.5)

0.1

-0.1

.063

Interactions Construct

2.6 (0.4)

2.5 (0.5)

-0.1

2.7 (0.5)

2.6 (0.5)

-0.1

0.0

.920

Student Benefits
Construct

2.4 (0.5)

2.3 (0.6)

-0.1

2.5 (0.5)

2.3 (0.6)

-0.2

0.1

.462
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Mean Construct
Score-Spring (SD):
High Bonuses

Construct
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Summary of teacher results.
Based on survey responses in March 2011 (prior to receiving an end-of-year rating or a
merit pay bonus), most teachers appeared to view the CPIP as being unfair, and most teachers
did not support the use of merit pay in general. There also did not appear to be support for the
idea that the CPIP would positively impact teaching approach or interactions with other teachers,
and teachers did not think the CPIP would be beneficial for Fountain Lake students.
Further, after receiving their end-of-year ratings and merit pay bonuses, teachers still did
not think CPIP was fair or support the use of merit pay, with no significant differences in mean
constructs for any of the five constructs. The percent agreement for individual items indicate that
teachers actually thought the CPIP was less fair than they did in March, and based on their
responses, teachers also appeared to think the program was less beneficial for students after
experiencing a full year of the program.
There were also no differences in the survey responses, based on mean construct scores,
between teachers who received the higher and lower end-of-year performance ratings, and
between the teachers who received the higher and lower merit pay bonuses, with the exception of
one key area. Those teachers who received the higher performance ratings viewed the CPIP as
being more fair than those teachers who received the lower ratings, though teachers in both
groups still viewed the program, in general, as being unfair.
The results of these analyses on teacher views of the CPIP provide little support for the
use of merit pay, in that the majority of teachers did not like the specific program or the
compensation approach, did not believe the program had resulted in changes to their teaching
approach or interactions with their fellow teachers (the motivational effects often associated with
merit pay), and did not think the program was beneficial for Fountain Lake students. In general
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then, it does not appear that the use of merit pay at Fountain Lake was successful, at least from
the perspective of the teachers who were most directly impacted by this compensation strategy.
This point is perhaps best summarized with the following quote from a teacher, who noted, “I do
not believe it is fair. I have very little control over what the CPIP reflects,” or from another
teacher, who simply stated “I liked the bonus, but I don’t feel the CPIP made a positive impact
overall. The good didn’t outweigh the bad.”
That is not to say that all teachers were opposed to the CPIP; in fact, there were a number
of teachers who supported this approach. For example, one teacher noted that the CPIP was “a
great way to reward teachers for their extra hard work.” Other teachers also voiced their support
for the CPIP, saying “I love my job and I am good at it, so it’s nice to get rewarded with a bonus
I would not otherwise be given for my work,” and the CPIP “encourages teachers to go above
and beyond, and it rewards our hard work.” However, overall, based on the survey responses
from teachers, it does not appear that the CPIP had a positive impact on the teachers or students
at Fountain Lake.
Research Question #3: Student Impacts
To determine the extent to which the implementation of the CPIP impacted student
achievement, I evaluated Fountain Lake student performance in two ways. First, I compared the
amount of student growth observed on the NWEA math, reading, and language assessments to
the amount of growth that might be expected based on a student’s grade and RIT score in the Fall
(at the start of the school year). The difference between the amount of observed growth and the
expected growth target (referred to as the growth norms) is expressed as the growth norm index.
This index provides information about how Fountain Lake student performance compared to the
national growth norms; positive growth norm indices indicate Fountain Lake performance that
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exceeded that of the growth norms, whereas negative indices are indicative of Fountain Lake
performance below that of the norms. A growth norm index score of zero represents Fountain
Lake performance consistent with that of the national growth norms.
These comparisons are useful, as they provide a general understanding of how well
Fountain Lake students performed on a nationally administered standardized assessment.
Further, because the NWEA assessments were featured prominently in the bonus structure of the
CPIP, it may be that large gains on these assessments relative to the national norms are a result
of a greater focus on raising student achievement on these tests (so that teachers were able to
attain a greater bonus at the end of the year). However, while these comparisons do provide
information, in general, about the overall performance of Fountain Lake students, they do not
provide an understanding of whether or not the performance was a direct result of the
implementation of the CPIP (because of the lack of an appropriate counterfactual standard, such
as a randomly assigned group of students who serve as a comparison group, from which I could
estimate the specific impact the CPIP has on student achievement).53
Thus, in order to quantify what impact, if any, the implementation of this bonus system
had on student achievement, I also compared the performance of Fountain Lake students on the
ACTAAP assessments to that of a demographically and academically matched comparison
group. For these purposes, I identified students in neighboring school districts who were as
similar as possible to students at Fountain Lake, and then matched one Fountain Lake student to
a comparison student on such characteristics as grade, prior achievement from the past two years,
ethnicity, free and reduced lunch status, and gender. The resulting Fountain Lake Comparison
53

Nonetheless, this comparison does still provide valuable information about the amount of
growth observed by Fountain Lake students over the course of the 2010-11 school year, and is
useful in evaluating the overall academic performance of these students.
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Group, or FLCG, represents a group of students that were nearly identical to the group of
Fountain Lake students prior to the implementation of the CPIP, with the only significant
difference being that Fountain Lake students were in a school with a merit pay program in place,
while the FLCG students were not. Because of this, any differences in student achievement at the
end of the implementation year between the students in the two groups can likely be attributed to
the impact of the CPIP.
NWEA performance.
Presented in Tables 17, 18, and 19 are summaries of Fountain Lake student performance
on the NWEA assessments, organized by subject (math, reading, and language respectively) and
disaggregated by grade. In these Tables, I show the average RIT score for each grade in the Fall
and Spring, as well as the average amount of growth shown for these students from the
beginning of the school year to the end. I have also included in these Tables the average growth
norm for each grade, as well as the corresponding growth norm indices. To provide some context
for the amount of growth these indices represent, I have included the percentile ranks associated
with each growth norm index score based on guidelines provided by NWEA (2009); in this way,
I can show how the amount of growth observed relative to the growth norms compared to other
similar students across the nation.54
Overall, Fountain Lake students met or exceeded the growth norms in nearly every grade
and subject area. And, in most grade/subject areas, the raw growth observed for Fountain Lake
students was extremely large relative to the growth norms (as indicated by large growth norm
indices) and compared to other students across the nation (as indicated by the high percentile
rankings associated with the growth norm indices). For example, of the 25 subject and grade
54

Percentile rankings for growth norm indices were only provided for students in grades 2-10.
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areas in which percentile rankings were available, Fountain Lake student growth was at the 80th
percentile or higher in 17 areas, including 6 areas where Fountain Lake student growth was at the
99th percentile (two grades in reading and four grades in language).
Aggregated at the school level, students at all three schools had average growth levels
that exceeded their respective growth norms.55 In other words, on average, students at each
school showed growth from the start of the year to the end that exceeded the level of growth that
might be expected from these students, based on their grade and starting achievement level. The
magnitude of growth for all three schools was significant, but perhaps most notably for students
at the high school. High school students did not test on the NWEA math assessment, so we
cannot see how their performance compared to the national norms in that specific subject area.
However, students in the 9th and 10th grade did test in both reading and language, and at both
grade levels and in both subjects, the amount of growth demonstrated by these students was
equivalent to growth at the 99th percentile. Or, put differently, the growth shown by the high
school students was greater than that of 99% of the national population of similar students.
The only grade or subject area with a negative growth norm index score, indicating
growth less than the national growth norms, occurred in math for students in 8th grade. These
students grew 4.3 RIT points over the course of the school year, which was 0.5 RIT points less
than what was expected based on the national norms. The amount of growth shown by these
students equates to performance at approximately the 22nd percentile. This same group of
students also had a growth norm index score of 0.1 in language, essentially the same level of
growth as the growth norms, which would equate to growth at the 42nd percentile. Fountain Lake
8th graders were also among the lowest performing in reading compared to students in other
55

At Fountain Lake, the elementary school serves grades K-4, the middle school serves 5-8, and
the high school serves students in grades 9-12.
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grades, though they still showed high levels of growth in this subject area (at approximately the
77th percentile).
Table 17
NWEA Results, Math, 2010-11
Grade

# of
Tests

Avg.
Fall ’10
RIT

Avg.
Spring ’11
RIT

Avg.
Obs.
Growth

Avg.
Growth
Norm

Avg.
Index
Growth Percentile
Norm
Rank
Index

K

70

139.6

167.9

28.3

13.4

14.9

1st

74

166.6

188.2

21.7

14.9

6.8

2nd

78

181.8

198.9

17.1

13.1

4.0

84

3rd

85

194.2

210.5

16.3

10.7

5.7

97

4th

87

207.4

221.2

13.8

9.0

4.8

97

5th

82

214.8

223.8

9.1

7.4

1.7

43

6th

78

218.6

227.3

8.7

6.8

1.9

67

7th

79

223.4

232.9

9.4

6.1

3.4

92

8th

93

226.6

230.9

4.3

4.8

-0.5

22

Elementary

394

179.8

198.8

19.1

12.1

7.0

Middle

332

221.0

228.8

7.7

6.2

1.5

Overall

726

198.7

212.5

13.9

9.4

4.5
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Table 18
NWEA Results, Reading, 2010-11
Grade

# of
Tests

Avg.
Avg.
Avg.
Avg.
Fall ’10 Spring ’11
Obs. Growth
RIT
RIT Growth
Norm

Avg.
Growth
Norm
Index

Index
Percentile
Rank

K

70

142.2

164.9

22.7

11.3

11.4

1st

74

166.0

182.0

16.0

12.3

3.7

2nd

78

176.9

192.5

15.7

13.7

2.0

44

3rd

85

190.9

202.6

11.8

9.2

2.6

77

4th

87

200.8

209.4

8.6

6.6

2.0

75

5th

82

203.8

212.4

8.6

5.6

3.0

90

6th

79

208.0

216.9

8.8

5.1

3.7

98

7th

82

212.9

220.5

7.5

4.6

2.9

97

8th

93

216.5

221.4

4.9

4.0

0.9

77

9th

70

218.7

228.9

10.1

2.8

7.3

99

10th

52

215.6

223.1

7.5

2.9

4.6

99

Elementary

394

177.0

191.5

14.6

10.5

4.1

Middle

336

210.5

217.9

7.4

4.8

2.6

High

122

217.4

226.4

9.0

2.8

6.1

Overall

852

196.0

206.9

10.9

7.1

3.8
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Table 19
NWEA Results, Language, 2010-11
Grade

# of
Tests

Avg.
Fall ’10
RIT

Avg.
Spring ’11
RIT

Avg.
Obs.
Growth

Avg.
Growth
Norm

Avg.
Growth
Norm
Index

Index
Percentile
Rank

2nd

77

176.0

195.9

19.9

14.4

5.4

82

3rd

82

191.1

204.8

13.7

9.2

4.5

92

4th

85

199.6

211.7

12.1

6.8

5.3

99

5th

82

204.8

215.9

11.1

5.4

5.7

99

6th

78

209.4

218.1

8.7

4.4

4.3

97

7th

82

215.8

221.9

6.0

3.5

2.6

96

8th

93

217.6

220.7

3.1

3.0

0.1

42

9th

73

216.6

226.1

9.6

3.0

6.5

99

10th

69

218.0

224.4

6.4

2.3

4.1

99

Elementary

244

189.3

204.4

15.1

10.0

5.1

Middle

335

212.1

219.2

7.1

4.0

3.1

High

142

217.3

225.3

8.0

2.7

5.3

Overall

721

205.4

215.4

10.0

5.8

4.2

Overall, other than a few select grade and subject areas, Fountain Lake students showed
significantly high levels of growth on the NWEA assessments relative to the growth norms. In
the next section, I evaluate Fountain Lake performance on the ACTAAP assessments, to see if
the substantial gains made on the NWEA assessments are evident in Fountain Lake student
performance on the state assessments as well.

131
ACTAAP performance.
To determine how Fountain Lake students performed on the ACTAAP assessments
relative to the academically and demographically similar FLCG, I used multiple regression
analyses to quantify the overall impact that the implementation of the CPIP had on Fountain
Lake student achievement. The parameters of the model are specified in Chapter 4, but for these
purposes, the key coefficient of interest was the Fountain Lake (CPIP) variable, a binary variable
that indicated whether or not a student attended Fountain Lake (1) or was a member of the FLCG
(0). My regression model estimates 2011 achievement on the ACTAAP assessments while
controlling for variables such as prior achievement, grade, gender, and FRL and minority status.
Thus, the Fountain Lake (CPIP) coefficient provides information about the magnitude and
direction of the difference between students in these two groups, and whether or not the
difference in performance was statistically significant.
My first set of analyses focus on student performance on the norm-referenced Arkansas
assessment. Recall, the State switched tests for the 2010-11 school year, so our outcome
measures in these analyses are NCE points on the ITBS, whereas my control variables for prior
achievement are NCE points on the SAT-10. Summarized in Table 20 are the raw end-of-year
NCE points for both groups of students, in both math and literacy, over the previous three year
period (with test scores for the outcome year, 2010-11, shaded in gray). In math, Fountain Lake
student performance remained nearly identical to the performance of FLCG students, whereas in
literacy, the performance was similar for the two years of prior achievement, with Fountain Lake
students showing a 2.1 NCE point decrease from 2009-10 to 2010-11. Over that same time
period, FLCG students only declined by 0.6 NCE points. While these unadjusted results suggest
that students did not benefit from the implementation of the CPIP, I conducted regression
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analyses as a more powerful way of determining if real differences in achievement did exist
between Fountain Lake and FLCG students.
Table 20
Fountain Lake and FLCG Performance on the SAT-10 and ITBS, 2008-09 to 2010-11
Math
NCE,
2008-09

Math
NCE,
2009-10

Math
NCE,
2010-11

Literacy
NCE,
2008-09

Literacy
NCE,
2009-10

Literacy
NCE,
2010-11

Fountain Lake

60.7

60.5

56.4

49.8

51.6

49.5

FLCG

60.8

60.5

56.4

49.6

51.6

51.0

The estimated regression coefficients and standard errors for all of the variables included
in my norm-referenced regression analyses are presented in Table 21. The combination of
predictor variables for the math analysis was significantly related to my outcome variable (NCE
points on the ITBS), adjusted R2 = .602, F(11,927) = 129.77, p < .001. The combination of
predictor variables for the literacy analysis, also predicting NCE points on the ITBS, was also
significantly related to the outcome variable, adjusted R2 = .630, F(11,927) = 146.08, p < .001.
The results of these analyses show that there were no significant differences observed on
the Math portion of the ITBS in the outcome year (2010-11) between Fountain Lake and FLCG
students. The coefficient differentiating students in the two groups, Fountain Lake (CPIP), was 0.22, and was not statistically significant. This small and non-significant coefficient is consistent
with the minimal differences that were observed in raw average NCE points for students in both
groups that were presented in Table 20.
However, the difference in performance on the Literacy portion of the ITBS in the
outcome year was statistically significant. In this analysis, the predicted difference between
students in both groups was -1.56, indicating that Fountain Lake students were likely to score
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1.56 points below their FLCG counterparts. This difference was statistically significant, and was
again consistent with the differences in Literacy NCE points presented in Table 20, where the
difference between Fountain Lake and FLCG students in Spring 2011 was 1.5 NCE points.
Expressed in terms of an effect size, the predicted difference in performance for students in the
two groups, based on my regression analysis, was d = -.09, which represents a relatively small
effect size difference (Cohen, 1988).
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Table 21
ITBS Results in Math and Literacy, 2010-11
ITBS
Math
NCE

ITBS
Literacy
NCE

Fountain Lake (CPIP)

-0.22
(0.79)

-1.56*
(0.73)

2009-10 NCE

0.44**
(0.03)

0.47**
(0.04)

2008-09 NCE

0.32**
(0.03)

0.30**
(0.04)

2010-11 Grade 5 Dummy

-4.28**
(1.39)

-2.37
(1.33)

2010-11 Grade 6 Dummy

-7.08**
(1.39)

-3.47*
(1.29)

2010-11 Grade 7 Dummy

-7.48**
(1.37)

-5.00**
(1.27)

2010-11 Grade 8 Dummy

-7.01**
(1.35)

-5.26**
(1.25)

2010-11 Grade 9 Dummy

-4.37**
(1.37)

-0.41
(1.28)

2010-11 FRL Status

-1.27
(0.83)

-1.67*
(0.80)

Minority

-2.02
(1.22)

1.37
(1.12)

Female

-0.46
(0.79)

2.20**
(0.74)

Constant

16.79

14.01

Comparison Group Outcome Mean

56.44

51.05

Comparison Group SD

19.29

18.04

Adjusted R-squared

.602

.630

Regression N

939

939

Omitted Variables: FLCG, Non-FRL Eligible, Male, Grade 4
*p < .05, ** p < .01 (standard errors in parentheses)
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I also conducted similar analyses on the criterion-referenced Arkansas Benchmark
assessment. While the Benchmark is administered to students in fewer grades (3-8) than the
ITBS (1-9), this test has been the primary assessment used in measuring Adequate Yearly
Progress (AYP) in Arkansas, and provides data on a consistent assessment over the previous
three academic years. Because of this, the results of these analyses may provide a more stable
assessment of the impact of the CPIP of Fountain Lake students than my analyses of
performance on the norm-referenced ITBS and SAT-10 assessments.
I have provided in Table 22 a summary of the average scale scores for both groups of
students in math and literacy for each of the previous three years. In both subjects, in the two
years prior to the implementation of the CPIP (2008-09 and 2009-10) we see similar levels of
performance between Fountain Lake and FLCG students. This pattern continues in 2010-11, with
no notable differences between the two groups of students in the outcome year.
Table 22
Fountain Lake and FLCG Performance on the SAT-10 and ITBS, 2008-09 to 2010-11
Math
Scale
Score,
2008-09

Math
Scale
Score,
2009-10

Math
Scale
Score,
2010-11

Literacy
Scale
Score,
2008-09

Literacy
Scale
Score,
2009-10

Literacy
Scale
Score,
2010-11

Fountain Lake

677.8

697.4

706.1

680.0

716.7

749.3

FLCG

676.8

695.6

710.6

673.2

714.7

745.5

The coefficients and standard errors for the predictor variables included in the Arkansas
Benchmark regression models are shown in Table 23. The same predictors were used in these
models as the ITBS/SAT-10 models, with the exception of the Grade 5 and Grade 9 dummy
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variables (since the Benchmark analyses were restricted to students in grades 5-8 in the outcome
year, whereas the ITBS/SAT-10 analyses included students in grade 4-9 in the outcome year).
The combination of variables used in the prediction of 2010-11 Arkansas Benchmark
scale scores on the math portion of the assessment was significant, adjusted R2 = .742, F(9,623)
= 202.60, p < .001., as was the combination of variables used in the prediction of literacy scale
scores, adjusted R2 = .703, F(9,621) = 166.49, p < .001. The results of these analyses show
different subject-specific impacts of the CPIP on student achievement compared to the results of
the norm-referenced analyses. Here, the difference in student achievement on the math portion of
the Benchmark was negative and statistically significant, with a Fountain Lake (CPIP)
coefficient of -10.26 scale score points. Recall, the norm-referenced analyses showed no
significant differences in math performance. The 10 point difference, expressed in terms of an
effect size, is d = -.11, which also represents a relatively small effect size difference (Cohen,
1988). By comparison, while I did find a significant difference on the literacy portion of the
ITBS between Fountain Lake and FLCG students, there was not a statistically significant
predicted difference on the Benchmark literacy assessment. Here, the coefficient indicating the
difference between the two student groups was -1.80.
For both the math and literacy analyses, the differences follow the pattern in direction
and magnitude of the differences in average scale scores presented in Table 22. For example, in
math, Fountain Lake students had a 28.3 point increase from 2008-09 to 2010-11; over that same
time period, FLCG students had a 33.8 point increase, for a difference of 5.5 points in favor of
the FLCG. While not as large as the regression-adjusted difference of 10.26 points (likely due to
students in the two groups not being perfectly matched on all observable characteristics), the raw
averages and predicted differences are consistent in showing that the FLCG outperformed their
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Fountain Lake counterparts. In literacy, the difference in performance from 2008-09 to 2010-11
was 3.0, with FLCG slightly outperforming Fountain Lake students; this difference is consistent
with the -1.8 regression-adjusted difference.
Descriptive statistics and correlation tables for all of the variables included in all of the
regression models can be found in Appendix F.

138
Table 23
Arkansas Benchmark Results in Math and Literacy, 2010-11
Benchmark
Math
Scale Score

Benchmark
Literacy
Scale Score

Fountain Lake (CPIP)

-10.26**
(3.77)

2009-10 Scale Score

0.57**
(0.04)

0.47**
(0.04)

2008-09 Scale Score

0.31**
(0.03)

0.33**
(0.03)

2010-11 Grade 6 Dummy

1.18
(5.54)

-30.29**
(9.69)

2010-11 Grade 7 Dummy

-22.07**
(5.56)

-37.52**
(9.76)

2010-11 Grade 8 Dummy

-52.98**
(5.72)

0.40
(9.56)

-4.11
(3.99)

-12.68
(7.23)

-11.62*
(5.68)

14.13
(9.90)

2.81
(3.80)

10.86
(6.77)

2010-11 FRL Status
Minority
Female
Constant

144.56

-1.80
(6.65)

218.03

Comparison Group Outcome Mean

721.25

753.61

Comparison Group SD

93.65

146.39

Adjusted R-squared

.742

.703

Overall N

633

631

Omitted Variables: FLCG, Non-FRL Eligible, Male, Grade 5
*p < .05, ** p < .01 (standard errors in parentheses)

Summary of student results.
In summary, while Fountain Lake performance on the NWEA assessments relative to the
national growth norms was exceptional in most grade and subject areas (as well as overall), those
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same findings were not present in my analyses of Fountain Lake performance on the ACTAAP
assessments. While performance on the NWEA assessments does provide general information
about the amount of growth observed for Fountain Lake students in comparison to a reasonable
(though imperfect) counterfactual standard (in this case, a national norming group), these
positive findings cannot be directly attributed to the impact of the CPIP. However, because I
utilized a matched comparison group in my ACTAAP analyses, where the only difference
between the two groups of students was the use of merit pay in the Fountain Lake schools, it is
reasonable to conclude that the implementation of the CPIP did not have a positive impact on
student achievement. In fact, it may be that the use of this type of compensation strategy actually
had a negative impact on student achievement in some areas, as evidenced by negative and
statistically significant differences in literacy on the ITBS and in math on the Arkansas
Benchmark. Potential explanations for these findings will be discussed in the following chapter.
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Chapter 6 – Discussion
Starting in the 2010-11 school, the Fountain Lake School District implemented the Cobra
Pride Incentive Program (CPIP), a merit pay program aimed at recognizing and financially
rewarding highly effective teachers. A teacher’s “merit” was based primarily on the impact he or
she had on the standardized test scores of his or her students, but also included a measure of
school-wide achievement and a subjective principal evaluation. Ultimately, the goal of this
program was fourfold: 1) Incentivize teachers to focus more energy, creativity, and effort raising
student achievement; 2) Provide rewards to teachers who positively impacted student
achievement (and performed well in the other measures used in this program); 3) Attract new
teachers to Fountain Lake who want to earn extra money as a reward for their hard work; and 4)
Retain those teachers who, based on the merit ratings they received, were deemed the most
“effective.” While not a primary goal, the structure of this program also allowed Fountain Lake
administrators to identify those teachers with the lowest performance ratings, which perhaps
could provide valuable information about which teachers should be retained, and which teachers
should not be encouraged to return to teach within the district.
Under the CPIP, all Fountain Lake employees were eligible for a bonus, not just teachers
of core subjects. The maximum bonus for which core teachers were eligible was $10,000, with
non-core teachers and specialists (such as art or music teachers, or school counselors) eligible for
a maximum bonus of $6,000. Principals and administrators were eligible for a $15,000 bonus,
and classified staff, such as custodians, bus drivers, or secretaries, could receive a maximum
bonus of $1,000. The bonus amounts for which employees were eligible were based largely on
how closely or directly the employee worked with students in an instructional capacity, and the
employee’s overall level of responsibility and accountability for raising student achievement; the
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more directly the employee worked with students, or the greater his or her level of responsibility,
the greater the bonus for which that employee was eligible.
The reason for providing incentives to all employees was because all employees, in some
fashion, contribute to the overall learning experience for students; because everyone contributes,
everyone should be rewarded. This structure was also intentionally done to promote
collaboration among all employees and to foster a more positive school environment, with the
idea being that if everyone was financially rewarded, then everyone would work towards the
common goal of raising student achievement and be more satisfied and positive in doing so.
However, while the aim of this approach was sound, it was not without cost; the total cost for
rewarding all employees was $874,836, which represented a total investment of $721 per
Fountain Lake student. Because of the substantial financial cost, in addition to all of the time and
energy spent in the development and implementation of this program, it was extremely important
to determine to what extent, if any, the CPIP impacted the teachers, school employees, and
students at Fountain Lake.
Thus, this dissertation represents an evaluation of how student achievement changed as a
result of the CPIP, and how teachers and school counselors responded to and were affected by
the use of this new accountability system. For these purposes, my evaluation of the impact of the
CPIP focused on three central questions:
1) How did the roles and responsibilities of school counselors change as a result of the
CPIP, and was there a shift in the level of support from teachers and administrators
for school counseling activities because of the increased emphasis on accountability
(i.e. raising student achievement)?
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2) How did teachers view, support, and respond to the CPIP, including to what extent
did the program impact their approach to teaching and their interactions with other
teachers?
3) Based on the emphasis on student achievement in the structure of the CPIP, how was
student achievement impacted by the implementation of this compensation scheme?
When taken together, the results from these three research questions should provide a strong
understanding of how the CPIP affected students and school personnel at Fountain Lake, to
begin to determine if the costs associated with this program resulted in the aforementioned
benefits or goals of such a program.
Counselor Summary
Based on interview responses from four school counselors, it appears that there were
some areas that were affected for school counselors, and other areas that remained relatively
unchanged as a result of the adoption of the CPIP. For example, the focus on raising student
achievement did not appear to have impacted the roles and responsibilities of school counselors,
and there were no reports of counselors being asked to take a more central role in the
standardized testing process since the CPIP was implemented. However, a fairly consistent
response from school counselors was that they now had less time with students, and that teachers
had become more protective of classroom time with students (because the teachers do not want
students to miss out on the lessons being taught). Further, while the school counselors reported
no change in the level of support from teacher and administrators for school counseling
activities, this was because the school counselors were now more cognizant of not removing
students from core class time (as there were some reports of complaints from teachers when this
occurred). School counselors were mixed on their views of how the CPIP had affected Fountain
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Lake students; most thought that the CPIP had a positive impact on student learning, but
responses were mixed on whether or not the program had resulted in students experiencing
additional anxiety and stress.
The results from my analysis on counselor impacts add to the small but growing body of
literature on how the work of school counselors is affected in such an accountability system.
There was no evidence of counselors switching roles to serve as testing coordinators or assisting
in the administration of standardized tests, which runs counter to what some research suggests
may occur in schools with a high focus on raising student achievement (Burnham & Jackson,
2000; Dollarhide & Lemberger, 2006). However, my results do support previous findings
(Brown, Galassi, & Akos, 2004; Dollarhide & Lemberger, 2006) that teachers are less likely to
cede class time with students, and as a result, counselors have less time to engage in counseling
activities with students. Overall, the Fountain Lake school counselors also did not report that the
implementation of the CPIP had shifted the focus of their roles or responsibilities outside of what
is recommended in the American School Counselor Association National Model (2005).
More research is certainly needed in this area, but these results at least appear to suggest
that the primary impact of the implementation of a merit pay program is that counselors have to
be much more flexible in their work with students, as teachers become much more protective of
their time working with their students. Depending on one’s perspective, this could be viewed as a
positive or negative finding; positive, since teachers are now much more focused on their work
with students, but negative, in that this focus comes at the expense of school counseling
activities. Future research on how counselors respond to the use of a merit pay program should
certainly assess if these results are unique to the CPIP, or if this is a common occurrence in all
types of accountability systems.
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Teacher Summary
To assess the impact of the CPIP on teachers, I administered surveys at two different time
periods; first, in March prior to the teachers receiving their end-of-year ratings or bonuses, and
again in October after they had received their ratings and bonuses. After the first survey
administration, there was no real strong indication that the CPIP had a positive effect on
teachers; that is, teachers did not report that the CPIP had influenced their approach to teaching
or their interactions with their peers, and the use of merit pay in general was not particularly
popular among teachers. The teachers also generally viewed the CPIP as being unfair, and
appeared to think that the program was not beneficial for Fountain Lake students. In fact, other
than perceptions of the program being unfair, there was no real strong indication that the
program had a notable positive or negative effect at all for Fountain Lake teachers.
After the second round of surveys, and after receiving their end-of-year ratings and
bonuses, there was almost no change in teacher attitudes and perceptions about the CPIP. The
level of support for the program did not change, and teachers still did not report that the program
impacted their work or their interactions with other teachers. And while there were no statistical
differences in teacher responses, a review of individual item responses showed that teachers
thought the program was considerably less fair (even after all teachers received a bonus), and
teachers were slightly less inclined to think that the program was beneficial for students (and
slightly more inclined to say the program resulted in more anxiety and stress for students).
One of the benefits of the format of these surveys was that I could match individual
teacher responses to measures of teacher performance, specifically their end-of-year merit ratings
and their bonus amount. This allowed me to assess whether or not the teachers who received the
higher ratings or bonuses had different perceptions of the CPIP then those teachers who received

145
the lower ratings or bonuses. In nearly every area evaluated, there was no difference in the
responses of these two groups of teachers. However, the one area where there was a significant
difference was in the perceptions of the fairness of the CPIP; those teachers who received the
higher ratings (not the higher bonuses) thought the program was fairer than those teachers with
the lower ratings. That said, the teachers with the higher ratings were still not overwhelmingly in
support of the CPIP; the mean score for that particular construct was still slightly below average,
in the range of “Disagree” for if the CPIP was fair.
While there is not a substantial amount of prior research on how teachers respond to the
use of merit pay, the existing research base suggests that, in general, teachers respond to this type
of program positively. That is, teachers in schools with merit pay programs tend to report an
increased focus on student achievement and improved collegiality among teachers (Community
Training and Assistance Center, 2004). These programs also tend to have a positive impact on
the climate of the school, though they do not appear to have motivating effects for teachers
(Springer et al., 2009a; Springer et al., 2009b; Springer et al., 2010b).
The findings of this particular evaluation appear to run counter to previous research on
this topic, as there was no substantial evidence that the CPIP improved teacher collegiality, and
no reports of the school climate improving as a result of the implementation of this program (in
fact, these findings could be interpreted as having a negative impact on school climate). In
general, from the teachers’ perspective, there did not appear to be any positive outcomes as a
result of the CPIP, even though teachers (and all employees) received substantial end-of-year
bonuses. Future evaluations of this and other similar merit pay programs should certainly focus
significant attention on trying to understand why it is that teachers responded in this way, as it
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would seem that, at the very least, teachers would support a program in which all employees
were rewarded for their work.
Student Summary
Perhaps the most important piece of this evaluation was determining how student
achievement was affected as a result of the CPIP. To accomplish this, I analyzed student
performance in two different ways. First, I compared Fountain Lake growth on the NWEA
assessments to NWEA’s national growth norms, as a way of understanding how much these
students improved over the course of the year on a series of assessments that were prominently
featured in CPIP bonus calculations. While performance on these assessments does provide
useful information about Fountain Lake student growth, it is difficult to determine how much of
that growth was a direct result of the implementation of the CPIP. Thus, I also evaluated the
performance of Fountain Lake students on the ACTAAP assessments, and compared this
performance to that of a matched comparison group. This comparison group, or FLCG, was
comprised of students in neighboring school districts who were matched to Fountain Lake
students based on observable demographic and academic characteristics. By using this matched
group of students as the counterfactual condition, I could determine the extent to which the CPIP
impacted student achievement, since the only real observable difference between these two
groups of students was that Fountain Lake students attended a school with a merit pay program
in place, whereas FLCG students did not.
The results of my analyses of student achievement revealed two different and opposing
trends. On the NWEA assessments, Fountain Lake students showed remarkable growth over the
2010-11 school year, exceeding the national growth norms in nearly every grade and subject
area. In many areas, Fountain Lake growth was well above average, with growth in 17 of the 25
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grade/subject areas that was at or above the 80th percentile. However, on the ACTAAP
assessments, Fountain Lake student performance was no different than the FLCG in two
test/subject areas (ITBS math and Benchmark literacy), and significantly below the FLCG in two
other areas (ITBS literacy and Benchmark math). Thus, whereas student performance on the
NWEA assessments was exceptional, performance on the ACTAAP assessments was not.
Because I could make causal conclusions about the impact of the CPIP based on the ACTAAP
analyses (and not the NWEA analyses), a reasonable conclusion from these analyses is that the
CPIP did not have a positive impact on student achievement at Fountain Lake.
In general, these finding are consistent with other evaluations of the impact of merit pay
programs on student achievement. In my literature review, I identified six previous evaluations
in which there was no impact on student learning after a merit pay program was implemented
(ex. Bacolod, DiNardo, & Jacobson, 2009; Springer & Winters, 2009), and one evaluation where
there was actually a negative impact (Fryer, 2011). My analyses of student performance on the
ACTAAP assessments appears to support these findings, as Fountain Lake students were no
different than FLCG students in two tested areas, and showed less growth than FLCG students in
two other areas.
Limitations
When taken together, the results from this evaluation do not suggest that the
implementation of the CPIP was a particularly effective intervention, at least in its first year of
implementation. Counselors reported less time with students because of the CPIP, teachers in
general did not support the program, think it was fair, or alter their approach to teaching, and
student achievement was not positively impacted (and in some areas, appeared to have been
negatively impacted). These results are particularly discouraging, especially when paired with
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the substantial cost of the program, as none of the potential benefits of such a program were
realized at Fountain Lake during the 2010-11 school year.
However, the results from this evaluation should by no means be interpreted as definitive
evidence that merit pay did not work at Fountain Lake, as there were several factors that may
have impacted the overall results of this evaluation that should be considered. For example, one
of the key findings from this evaluation was that teachers, in general, did not seem to be
particularly receptive to the use of merit pay and did not think the CPIP was fair, and that having
the opportunity to earn a bonus did not motivate teachers to alter their teaching approach.
Perhaps most importantly, teacher attitudes and perceptions did not change after receiving a
bonus. This is interesting, because after teachers saw how they benefitted from the CPIP in terms
of bonus amount, it might be expected that teachers would at the very least have positive views
of merit pay and/or the CPIP (since every teacher earned a bonus, and for many teachers, these
bonuses represented a significant percentage of their base salary). And while these results may
be representative of the overall views of teachers at Fountain Lake, there are two factors that
may have had a significant influence on these findings.
First, recall that there were a large number of teachers who did not respond to the second
survey in October. In March, 94 of 100 teachers responded to the first survey, but of those
original 94 initial responders, only 58 responded to the second survey. In other words, only 62%
of the original sample of teachers participated in the second round of surveys, which represents a
fairly substantial attrition rate. I attempted to account for the loss of these teachers by weighting
survey responses to consider certain factors that might have impacted whether or not a teacher
participated in the second survey administration (such as bonus amount, end-of-year rating, etc.).
Nevertheless, it is certainly possible that by not having survey responses from 36 of the original
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teachers, the overall conclusions derived from the teacher surveys could have been significantly
impacted. Put differently, it may be that the lack of change in teacher attitudes from March to
October (and the lack of differences in attitudes and perceptions between low and high
performing teachers) was simply a function of which teachers chose to respond to the second
survey. It could be that those 36 teachers were very supportive of the CPIP, or it could be that
those 36 teachers hated the program; without their survey responses, it is difficult to say with
certainty that the results of these analyses are a true representation of teacher attitudes and
perceptions.
Further, and perhaps more importantly, the survey results may have been impacted by
when the surveys were administered. Ultimately, the goal of these analyses was to gauge teacher
attitudes and perceptions prior to and after they received a bonus, so that I could see how
receiving a bonus (and completing a full year of the program) affected teacher attitudes. In this
way, I could begin to quantify the impact of the CPIP based on the format and structure of the
program during the 2010-11. However, when I administered the surveys in October, discussions
were already underway about how the program would be structured during the 2011-12 school
year, and much of these discussions were centered on adjusting the program to ensure that only
exceptional work was being rewarded.56
Based on the comments of a number of teachers, the perception of why changes were
being made, as well as how the justification for these changes was being communicated by
administrators and school board members, may have had a significantly negative impact on
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During the first year of the program, there were a number of instances where, based on the
format of the CPIP, teachers received a substantial bonus for work that likely did not justify a
bonus at all. Thus, there were a number of discussions at the start of the 2011-12 school year
about how the program could be restructured to ensure that bonuses were only given to teachers
whose work merited such a reward.
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teacher perceptions of the CPIP in October. For example, one teacher, when asked whether the
CPIP should continue, said “No, I think I would rather have a raise on my base salary. Also, even
though we have seen some improvement, some of our leaders still don’t acknowledge this and
still say that they are disappointed in us.” This sentiment was echoed by several other teachers,
including one teacher who noted the following: “Do you value the education teachers provide
your children? If so, they should be rewarded, as our salary is barely above poverty level. Just a
thought, our board basically commented we are failures and they paid us too much, but we
showed AWESOME GROWTH last year.” Finally, one teacher, in his/her response to the
question of if the CPIP should be used in the following year, very explicitly stated “No, it has
demoralized the faculty. There is very little trust in the administration.” Clearly, the way these
changes were communicated had an effect on teacher perceptions of the CPIP, and likely had a
significant negative impact on the overall findings from my evaluation of teacher attitudes about
the program. Combined with the notable attrition rate, it may be that the results on teacher
impacts I have presented in this dissertation are not a true representation of the teachers’
thoughts and perceptions about the CPIP.
The inconsistent findings from my evaluation of how student achievement was impacted
by the CPIP also merits further scrutiny, as student performance on the NWEA assessments was
exceptional, whereas Fountain Lake student performance on the ACTAAP assessments was
equal to or worse than the performance of the FLCG. Which set of results is the true
representation of how student achievement was impacted at Fountain Lake? The research design
for my ACTAAP analyses allowed me to draw causal conclusions about the impact of the CPIP,
since the only observable difference between the two student groups (Fountain Lake students and
FLCG students) was that the Fountain Lake students attended a school with a merit pay program
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in place. Thus, while the research design was not ideal,57 it still does provide evidence that on
this particular set of assessments, Fountain Lake student achievement was no better than the
FLCG, and in some areas was actually worse.
However, one of the problems with this set of analyses was the actual test instruments
themselves. The Arkansas Benchmark has been consistently used for a number of years,
including all three years of this evaluation. This was not the case for the ITBS assessment, which
was one of my key outcome measures, but in its first year of implementation in 2010-11 (prior to
that year, the SAT-10 was the norm-referenced assessment used in Arkansas). It is unclear what
impact this could have had on the interpretation of student achievement results, but it is certainly
worth mentioning again as one possible explanation for these inconsistent findings.
Further, it may be that the psychometric properties of the ITBS and Benchmark
assessments were not ideal for measuring changes in student achievement. These two
assessments are grade-level proficiency assessments, which means that students in a particular
grade respond to a series of test items that are not designed to measure growth, but rather are
designed to measure whether or not a student meets the proficiency standards for that particular
grade. The design of assessments such as this necessitates items that are at or around the same
difficulty level as the proficiency standard; because of this, growth for students well above or
well below this proficiency standard would not be accurately captured in these analyses.
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The best way to evaluate the impact of the CPIP on student achievement would have been to
use a randomized control trial, in which some students were randomly assigned to a merit pay
classroom, and other students were randomly assigned to a non-merit pay classroom. It was not
possible to use this design at Fountain Lake, so I chose to employ a quasi-experimental matched
group design. While this design does still allow me to make causal conclusions, I would be much
more confident that my results were a true representation of the impact of the CPIP if I had been
able to use a random assignment design for this dissertation.
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By comparison, the properties of the NWEA assessments are ideal for capturing
improvements in student achievement, as these tests are designed with the expressed purpose of
measuring student growth over the course of an academic year. Further, because of the
computer-adaptive nature of these assessments, growth can be measured for students at all points
on the achievement distribution, not just those students who are at or near a grade-level
proficiency standard. The problem, however, with the NWEA analyses was that there was not an
appropriate counterfactual standard to serve as a comparison for Fountain Lake students. That is,
with the ACTAAP analyses I was able to use a matched comparison group to make causal
conclusions about the impact of the CPIP, but with my NWEA analyses, the comparison I used
(national growth norms) did not allow for causal conclusions to be made. The results from the
NWEA analyses simply provide descriptive information about the growth observed for Fountain
Lake students in 2010-11; what they do not provide is information about how much of this
performance was a direct result of the CPIP.
Thus, in my analyses of student achievement, I have a set of analyses with a sound
research design and a sub-par set of assessments for measuring changes in student performance
(the ACTAAP analyses). I also have a set of analyses with an unsatisfactory research design (for
the purpose of generating causal conclusions) in which I used an instrument with strong
psychometric properties ideal for measuring changes in student performance (the NWEA
analyses). For these purposes then, it is difficult to discount the findings from my ACTAAP
analyses, despite the limitations of the tests that were used, which showed that the CPIP had a
null to negative impact on student achievement at Fountain Lake. Along those lines, despite the
limitations of the research design, it is also difficult to discount the findings from my NWEA
analyses, which showed exceptionally high levels of growth in nearly all subject and grade areas.
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In other words, while it is likely true that there was no positive impact on student achievement as
a result of the implementation of the CPIP, the results from the NWEA assessments suggest that
there were considerable achievement gains made by Fountain Lake students that may or may not
be directly related to the CPIP’s focus on raising student achievement.
Recommendations & Conclusions
The results of this evaluation revealed several areas in which additional research would
be beneficial to provide further clarity about how students and school personnel are impacted by
the use of merit pay. For example, one primary finding from my literature review was that there
was a notable lack of research on how school counselors are affected by the increased
accountability and focus on assessments inherent in these types of programs. In general, there is
little research on how anyone other than teachers and students are impacted by such programs.
This is not particularly surprising, as teachers are the most directly impacted in a merit pay
scheme (since their work is under the greatest scrutiny for determination of merit pay bonuses).
Further, the primary goal of most merit pay programs, if not all of them, is to raise student
achievement, so it makes sense that much of the research on this topic is focused on evaluating
how students are affected in schools that use merit pay. However, all school personnel, including
school counselors, principals, teachers of non-core subjects, etc., are likely impacted by these
programs, be it positively or negatively, and as such, more research could be useful in
understanding how these other personnel groups respond to and are affected by the use of merit
pay.
During the literature review process, I also identified only a small number of evaluations
that specifically addressed how student achievement is impacted in schools with merit pay
programs, and of those evaluations, only a small number were able to evaluate these programs
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using an ideal research design (i.e. randomized control trials). Additionally, of those evaluations,
many were focused on merit pay programs in their initial year of implementation (including this
evaluation), assessing the initial or short-term impacts of these programs on student
achievement; very few of these evaluations focused on programs that were firmly established in
a school/district and had been in use for multiple school years.
It is certainly reasonable to hypothesize that merit pay programs will not have a
significant motivational effect in the first year of the program, since teachers are not yet familiar
with the specific details of these programs (including how their “merit” will be determined), or
have not yet seen how large or small of a bonus they will receive (since bonuses are generally
distributed at the conclusion of the school year, after student testing has been completed).58
Combined with research designs that are less well-suited to accurately capture the impact of
these programs, it is possible that the actual impacts of merit pay programs are being missed in
some of the current evaluations of merit pay. Thus, more research evaluating the long-term
impacts of these programs—using an ideal research design—is certainly necessary to gain a
better understanding of how student achievement is impacted by the use of these programs.
Building upon the approach of this evaluation, one additional area of research that
warrants further attention is determining how certain types of teachers respond to the use of
merit pay. In this dissertation, I was able to compare the attitudes and perceptions of those
teachers who received the higher bonuses and performance ratings to those teachers with the
smaller bonuses/ratings. This research is particularly interesting, as we can see if the attitudes of
these types of teachers differ, with teachers who benefit the most having the most positive
58

It is also possible that, because of their significant financial cost, when these programs do not
have an immediate impact on student achievement they are less likely to be supported and more
likely to be discontinued, which would further limit the ability to measure the long-term impacts
of such programs.
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reactions to the use of these programs (i.e. are more supportive of merit pay, report working
harder, collaborating more with other teachers, etc.), and those teachers who benefit the least
having less favorable views or responses to these programs.
Despite some of the limitations of this evaluation, there were indications in this research
that these differences do exist between teachers. And because these programs are meant to
motivate teachers and impact the composition of the teaching force, it is plausible to expect the
attitudes and perceptions of teachers to differ, as this may be indicative of the program having
the desired outcome on the teaching force. If the teachers that perform the best under a merit pay
program are the most satisfied, report altering their approach to teaching, or are more supportive
of the use of merit pay, then the program may be providing incentives that are effective at
rewarding and retaining these high-performing teachers. Conversely, those teachers who do not
benefit in a merit pay system because they receive the lowest performance ratings may be more
likely to seek out other vocational opportunities. More research about the differential perceptions
of teachers would certainly be useful in understanding how teachers of varying levels of
“effectiveness” respond to the use of merit pay.
In the end, this evaluation revealed a great deal of information about how school
counselors and teachers responded to the adoption of this new compensation system, and as a
result, how the students of Fountain Lake were affected by the increased focus on testing and
accountability present in this program. And while it appears that the CPIP did not result in the
positive outcomes that Fountain Lake administrators were seeking when they first established
this program, it is worth repeating that this program was in its first year of operation at the time
of this evaluation. It may be that the true effects of such a program do not come to bear
immediately, and instead teachers and school personnel need more time in such a system before
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their teaching approach, collaboration with their peers, and work with students are affected. At
the very least, this evaluation has added to the growing yet still small body of literature on how
merit pay impacts a school environment, and as this program continues, a great deal of effort
should be made to understand the long-term impacts of this particular merit pay program.
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Appendix A – Literature Review Summary Tables
Teacher Performance Incentives and Student Outcomes (2002) – Eberts, R., Hollenbeck, K., & Stone, J.
Outcome Measure(s) Sample/Comparison Group
 Student retention  Students in an alternative
rates was the
education high school with a
primary outcome
merit pay system compared to
measure;
students in a similar high
however, the
school with a traditional
authors also
compensation model
assessed
 Students in the high school
differences in
with merit pay were students
class attendance,
who had not been successful
grade point
in a traditional school setting,
average, and
and had low attendance and
course passage
graduation rates relative to
rates
students in the traditional
school setting

Analytic Strategy
 The authors assessed the
impact of this merit pay
program using data from
two years prior and two
years after its
implementation
 The authors performed a
difference-in-difference
analysis on all outcome
measures, comparing
performance for students
at the school with merit
pay to student
performance at the
traditional high school

Findings/Limitations
 Course completion percentages in the school
with merit pay increased to 71.7%, compared
to 54.5% in the traditional high school
 No effect on attendance rate, which the
authors note was not surprising due to the fact
that this was not a focus of the merit pay
program
 There was a negative and significant
difference for GPA and course passing rates;
the authors noted that this was because the
incentive program resulted in the retention of
the lower-achieving students
 While the merit pay program did not
positively impact student achievement, it did
positively impact retention rates, which was
the primary goal of this program
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Description of Bonuses/Rewards
(Fixed or Continuous)




Teachers could earn a bonus of
up to 12.5% of their base salary
The bonus system was a fixed
system; teachers either earned
the full bonus or nothing
For a teacher with a bachelor’s
degree, his or her base salary
could increase from $22,848 to
$27,412 after earning a full
bonus

Employees
Eligible for
Merit Pay
Bonuses
 All
teachers

Individual or Group
Bonuses

Measures Used in the Merit Pay
Program

Years of Program
Operation









Bonuses were
distributed to
individual
teachers
There did not
appear to be a
cap on the
number of
teachers that
could earn a
bonus





Bonuses were given for high
retention rates in a teacher’s
class, and for high scores on
student evaluation.
The retention bonus was paid if
80% or more of a teacher’s
students were still enrolled in the
teacher’s class at the end of the
quarter.
For student evaluations, teachers
were rated on a 5-point scale in
15 areas; teachers that earned an
average rating of 4.65 or higher
in each quarter for four
consecutive quarters were
eligible for a performance bonus



Merit pay
program
established in
1995-96
The analysis runs
through the 199899 school year;
unclear if this
program is still in
operation, or if
not, when it
ended
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Catalyst for Change: Pay for Performance in Denver (2004) – Community Training and Assistance Center
Outcome Measure(s)




Student achievement
gains, expressed in
NCE scores,
measured on the
ITBS (math, reading,
and language) and
CSAP (math, reading,
and writing) from
spring to spring
Teacher attitudes
about the program
based on survey and
interview responses

Sample/Comparison
Group
 Students in
schools where
merit pay was
piloted (13% of
all Denver
schools),
compared to all
other Denver
students

Description of Bonuses/Rewards
(Fixed or Continuous)




Findings/Limitations









Students in pilot schools
were compared to control
students, with the primary
outcome measure being
changes in mean NCE
scores
Two-stage hierarchical
linear modeling was used to
adjust for differences in
school and student
characteristics (students
grouped within schools)
The survey responses for
teachers in pilot schools
were compared to
responses from teachers in
control schools

Employees Eligible
for Merit Pay
Bonuses
 Included all
teachers and
specialists
(nurses,
language
specialists, etc.)
in schools where
67% of the
faculty voted to
participate







Elementary pilot student test performance was lower
than that of the control students in 5 of 6 tested areas
Middle school pilot students performed significantly
higher than control students in 3 of 6 tested areas
In the high school, pilot students showed
significantly higher increases in 3 of 6 tested areas
For every year that a teacher participated in the
program, there were statistically significant increases
in student achievement across all three school levels
compared to students being taught by teachers with
only one year of experience in the program
Teachers reported better access to data, increased
focus on student achievement, and improved
collegiality among teachers, but did not report
changes in their instructional practices as a result of
the program

Individual or
Group Bonuses

Measures Used in the Merit Pay
Program





Bonuses
distributed to
teachers based
on the way the
objectives
were
designed;
could be either
individual or
group bonuses




Teacher-designed objectives (could
be individual or group objectives)
that were approved and evaluated
by the principal (and also rated on a
four-trait rubric to determine the
quality of the objectives)
Involved measuring student growth,
though the teacher set the growth
target and the measure(s) used
Teachers set two objectives per year

Years of
Program
Operation
 This pilot
merit pay
program
operated in
the Denver
Public
Schools
from 19992003.
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In the first year, teachers could
earn a $500 bonus for each
objective obtained
In the second year, that increased
to $750 for each objective met
Teachers either earned the full
bonus per objective, or did not
earn anything at all
89% to 93% of teachers met one
or more objective

Analytic Strategy

Performance Pay for Teachers: Determinants and Consequences (2007) – Belfield, C., & Heywood, J.
Outcome Measure(s)
 Teacher salary
satisfaction
 Teacher satisfaction that
the effort invested in
teaching (to earn a
bonus) is being
rewarded
 Overall satisfaction with
being a teacher as a
result of merit pay

Sample/Comparison Group
 The sample for these
analyses comes from the
Schools and Staffing
Survey (2000)
 Total sample included
56,354 teachers in the
public school sector, and
an additional 10,760 in
the private school sector

Description of
Employees Eligible for
Bonuses/Rewards
Merit Pay Bonuses
(Fixed or Continuous)
 The authors noted  Not explicitly
that merit pay
stated in this paper
earnings (in
addition to other
forms of
additional earning)
ranged from
$1,612 to $4,822
 It is not explicitly
stated whether or
not bonuses were
fixed or
continuous

Analytic Strategy
 The authors used a probit
estimation model to examine
the relationship between merit
pay and teacher satisfaction
(no additional details provided
on the methods employed in
these analyses)

Findings/Limitations
 Merit pay appeared to have no
influence on overall career satisfaction,
and had a negative impact on
satisfaction with salary
 The authors suggested that there is no
support for the notion that merit pay
raises teacher morale; rather, “merit
pay may put income at risk, involve
negative comparisons, and generate
peer pressure or extra effort” (p.250).

Individual or Group Bonuses

Measures Used in the
Merit Pay Program

Years of Program Operation







Not explicitly stated in
this paper

Not explicitly stated
in this paper

Not explicitly stated in this
paper
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Individual Teacher Incentives and Student Performance (2007) – Figlio, D., & Kenny, L.
Outcome
Measure(s)
 12th grade
student test
scores in
reading,
math,
science,
and history

Sample/Comparison
Group
 The sample for this
study included
schools in the
National Education
Longitudinal
Survey (NELS)
dataset
 Of the schools
surveyed by the
authors about their
compensation
practices (as well
as those schools
surveyed on the
Schools and
Staffing Survey
(SASS)), there
were 4,523 schools
that responded,
compared to a total
population of
schools of 12,830

Analytic Strategy

Findings/Limitations









The authors conduct a series of
education production functions, where
they estimate the impact of merit pay
programs on student achievement, using
12th grade test scores as the primary
outcome measure
The authors control for such things as
8th grade test scores, number of subjectspecific courses taken in high school,
number of days absent per year, student
characteristics, and school and teacher
characteristics (for example, percent of
teachers with a master’s degree). The
authors also control for school sector
(public or private) and teacher
unionization.
They also group schools into three
categories based on the incentives used
in the school: High, medium, and low
salary incentives; these indicate not
only the size of the bonuses, but also the
percentage of teachers that received a
bonus








The authors “find evidence that the use of
teacher salary incentives is associated with
higher levels of student performance, all else
equal” (p.910)
Having some type of salary incentive is
associated with a 1.3 to 2.1 point increase in test
performance.
The authors also note that bonus programs with
low levels of selectivity, where all teachers get a
bonus, are not associated with improvements in
student achievement
There was an eight year gap between schools
test scores and response to the authors survey;
however, the authors note that this is not a
significant limitation because of the high
correlation of the presence of merit pay
programs in schools at both time points
The authors also note that because this was not
an experimental design, that it is difficult to
attribute achievement gains to merit pay, as
these gains could just be a result of unobserved
school quality
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Description of
Bonuses/Rewards
(Fixed or
Continuous)
 Not explicitly
stated in this
paper

Employees
Eligible for Merit
Pay Bonuses

Individual or Group Bonuses

Measures Used in
the Merit Pay
Program

Years of Program
Operation









Not explicitly
stated in this
paper



In this sample, 36% of teachers received a bonus, and
43% of teachers received merit raises
The authors note that in some schools, bonuses were
distributed to individual teachers, and in others, the
bonuses were distributed to all teachers

Not explicitly
stated in this
paper

Not explicitly
stated in this
paper

167

Impact of the Teacher Advancement Program on Student Test Score Gains: Findings from an Independent Appraisal (2008) –
Springer, M, Ballou, D., & Peng, A.
Outcome
Measure(s)
 Fall-to-spring
mathematics
test score
gains on the
Northwest
Evaluation
Association
assessments
for students
in the 2nd
through 10th
grades

Sample/Comparison Group




Analytic Strategy

The authors used a panel 
dataset to estimate the
impact of the Teacher
Advancement Program
(TAP) by comparing test
score gains in TAP
schools to gains in nonTAP schools
The total sample
included 1,200 schools,
6 of which were TAP
schools in the initial year
(2002-03); the number
of TAP schools
increased to 28 in 200506

The authors conducted
multiple regression
analyses controlling for
school and student
characteristics
(including
race/ethnicity, FRL
status, average teacher
salary, student-teacher
ratio, etc.); the authors
also included a binary
variable that indicated
whether or not a
student attended a TAP
school

Findings/Limitations







“At all grade levels except 9th grade, there is a positive
association between TAP and a student’s fall-to-spring
test score gain. Although the positive coefficients for the
7th and 10th grade-level models fail to attain conventional
levels of statistical significance, the dominant impression
is positive” (p. 11)
Using the school fixed-effects model (to control for
school selection bias), the gains in elementary school
(grades 2-5) are still positive and significant, though the
coefficients in grades 6, 7, 9, and 10 switch to negative
and statistically significant
Positive effects for elementary grades but undetectable or
negative impacts in middle and high school
The authors acknowledge several limitations, including
the small number of TAP schools, sample
representativeness, and fewer testing data points for
students in 9th and 10th grade
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Description of
Bonuses/Rewards (Fixed
or Continuous)
 Recommended
bonuses ranged
anywhere from $0$12,000 per year
 Bonuses could vary
based on how well a
teacher did in each
of the components
of the TAP program
(though school-wide
achievement was the
same for all
teachers)

Employees Eligible
for Merit Pay
Bonuses
 Under the TAP
system, all
teachers were
eligible to
receive a bonus,
even those
teachers without
direct
instructional
responsibilities

Individual or Group Bonuses

Measures Used in the Merit Pay
Program

Years of Program
Operation











Bonuses were distributed to
individual teachers
The program was intentionally
designed to avoid competition;
teachers earned a bonus by
reaching a performance
threshold, that had no impact
on another teacher earning a
bonus
In other words, all teachers
were able to earn a bonus
under the TAP system





Classroom observations
(50%)
Value-added measurement of
gains that the teacher
produces with his/her
students (30%)
o If a teacher taught in
a non-tested subject
or grade, this
component shifted to
school-wide
achievement gains
School-wide achievement
gains (20%)

For this study,
the authors
evaluated the
impact of TAP
over the fouryear period
from 2002-03
to 2005-06 in
two unknown
states
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An Evaluation of Teacher Performance Pay in Arkansas (2008) – Winters, M., Ritter, G., Barnett, J., & Greene, J.
Outcome
Measure(s)
 Student math
performance,
measured in
Normal Curve
Equivalent
(NCE) points,
on the
Stanford
Achievement
Test, 9th
Edition (SAT9)

Sample/Comparison Group

Analytic Strategy

Findings/Limitations







Schools were not
randomly assigned to
participate in this
program; thus, three
schools in the Little
Rock School District,
similar in demographic
and achievement
characteristics, served
as comparison schools
for the two schools that
participated in the
Achievement
Challenge Pilot Project
(ACPP)

The authors conduct three separate
estimations to evaluate the impact
of merit pay on student math
performance:
o A simple differences-indifferences approach
(estimation across schools)
o An expansion of the first
model, including student
fixed-effects (estimation
across students)
o Same as the second model,
only including students
that were treated for two
years, as opposed to only
one as was the case in the
second model







First model: Students in the schools that used
merit pay had gains of 3.64 NCE points
relative to those students in schools without
merit pay (these gains were statistically
significant)
Second model: Students in the schools that
used merit pay had gains of 4.19 NCE points
relative to those students in schools without
merit pay (these gains were also statistically
significant)
Third model: Students in the schools that
used merit pay had gains of 4.63 NCE points
relative to those students in schools without
merit pay (these gains were also statistically
significant)
Primary limitations were a small N (only
implemented in very few schools, with a
small number of students) and a lack of
random assignment
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Description of
Bonuses/Rewards (Fixed or
Continuous)
 Teachers received per
student bonuses dependent
on average test score gains
in the class
 For example, if the
classroom grew between
0-4%, teachers received
$50 per student; if the
class grew 15% or above,
the teacher earned $400
per student
 Maximum bonus for
teachers was $11,200

Employees Eligible for
Merit Pay Bonuses

Individual or Group
Bonuses

Measures Used in the
Merit Pay Program

Years of Program
Operation









All employees were
eligible for bonuses,
not just teachers
(including custodians,
principals, secretaries,
etc.)



Bonuses were
distributed individually
There was no cap on
funding; therefore,
teachers and employees
were all able to earn the
maximum bonus for
which they were
eligible

Individual
classroom and
school-wide
improvements in
math performance
on the SAT-9

The ACPP was
implemented in
one school in
Little Rock,
Arkansas in 200304, and continued
within five
schools in the
district for three
years
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Beyond Incentives: Do Schools Use Accountability Rewards Productively (2009) – Bacolod, M., DiNardo, J., & Jacobson, M.
Sample/Comparison Group
 The sample in this analysis
included schools that were
directly above and below a
performance threshold
 Those schools directly
below the performance
threshold (control schools)
were not eligible for
bonuses, whereas those
schools just above the
threshold (treatment
schools) were eligible

Description of
Bonuses/Rewards
(Fixed or
Continuous)
 The average
amount given to
qualifying
schools was
$287,000, which
translates to
approximately
$1,900 for each
teacher
 All employees
received the
same bonus
amount

Employees
Eligible for
Merit Pay
Bonuses
 Bonuses
were given
to all
teachers
and staff
within a
qualifying
school

Analytic Strategy
 The authors employed a
regression discontinuity
design, where schools
that just barely met or
exceeded the
performance threshold
(and therefore were
awarded bonuses) were
compared to those
schools just below the
performance threshold
that just missed
receiving a bonus

Findings/Limitations
 “Little measurable improvement in standard metrics
of achievement, such as exam performance, for
those schools that received the award compared to
those schools that did not” (p. 5)
 The authors noted that the incentives offered in this
program were quite weak for a number of reasons;
the size of the bonuses were generally fairly small,
and because they were given to groups of employees
(not to individual teachers based on their unique
contributions), there was little incentive to alter
teaching behavior
 Eligibility requirements were also not clear, and
changed over the two years this program was in
operation

Individual or Group Measures Used in the Merit Pay Program
Bonuses

Years of Program Operation





Bonuses were
allocated to all
employees, and
were based on
group
performance






The state-created Academic Performance
Index (API), which is “essentially a
(noisy) weighted average of the
proportion of students scoring in each
quintile in a set of nationally normreferenced exams and/or content areas”
(p. 7)
For these purposes, the API was based on
student performance on the Stanford 9
exam
The growth targets for schools under the
API was 5% growth from the prior year or
a pre-determined minimum growth score

The program was in
operation during the twoyear period from 2000-01
to 2001-02
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Outcome Measure(s)
 Academic
Performance
Index growth
scores for
schools as well
as for significant
student
subgroups

Texas Educator Excellence Grant (TEEG) Program: Year Three Evaluation Report (2009) – Springer, M., Lewis, J., Podgursky, M.,
Ehlert, M., Gronberg, T., Hamilton, L., Jansen, D., Stecher, B., Taylor, L., Lopez, O., & Peng, A.
Outcome
Measure(s)
 Student
achievement
results in
math and
reading from
the Academic
Excellence
Indicator
System
(AEIS)
 The survey
responses of
61,000 school
personnel

Sample/Comparison Group

Analytic Strategy

Findings/Limitations











The Texas Educator Excellence Grant
(TEEG) program was implemented in
approximately 927 high poverty,
high performing public schools in
Texas (a total of 141,423 TEEG
students)
In order to qualify for the TEEG,
schools had to be in the top half of
schools in percentage of low-income
students, and be rated as Exemplary
or Recognized (or in the top quartile
of schools rated Academically
Acceptable)
For all analyses (both student
achievement and teacher attitudes),
TEEG schools were compared to nonTEEG schools

The authors use
regression analyses,
in which they
controlled for
various background
characteristics of
students and
schools, to
determine the extent
to which TEEG
plans impacted
student achievement





There did not appear to be any statistically
significant impacts on student achievement as a
result of the implementation of the TEEG
Teachers did not believe the TEEG resulted in
less teacher collaboration or decreased
collegiality; teachers also believed the program
contributed to a positive school environment
There was also a relationship between teacher
turnover and bonus size – the larger the bonus,
the lower the probability of teacher turnover
(though the authors note that most bonuses
were so small that the program likely did not
have a significant impact on teacher turnover)
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Description of
Bonuses/Rewards
(Fixed or Continuous)
 Most schools
proposed a
minimum bonus
amount of less than
$3,000;
additionally, most
schools also
proposed a
maximum bonus of
less than $3,000
 The average bonus
was $1,982 in the
first year and
$2,094 in the
second year

Employees Eligible
for Merit Pay
Bonuses
 The majority of
funding under
the TEEG was
allocated for
teacher bonuses;
however, funds
were also
available to
provide bonus
awards to
principals,
teacher aides
custodians, etc.

Individual or Group Bonuses

Measures Used in the Merit
Pay Program

Years of Program
Operation









Teacher eligible for bonuses was
typically determined by
individual teacher performance,
as opposed to the performance of
teams of teachers or the school
as a whole
There was a limited pool of
funds available to each school,
so there was the potential for
competition among teachers (a
concern cited by schools as a
reason for declining to
participate)



TEEG plans relied
heavily on measures of
student achievement on
state standardized
assessments
However, measures
varied by
school/district, as
TEEG funding was
given to districts to
implement locally
designed incentive pay
plans

The TEEG program
provided annual
grants to schools to
design and
implement
performance pay
programs from
2006-07 to 2009-10
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Governor’s Educator Excellence Grant (GEEG) Program: Year Three Evaluation Report (2009) – Springer, M., Lewis, J., Podgursky,
M., Ehlert, Taylor, L., Lopez, O., & Peng, A.
Outcome
Measure(s)
 Student
performance
on the Texas
Assessment of
Knowledge
and Skills
(TAKS)
 The survey
responses
from the
spring of 2008
of over 3,700
teachers

Sample/Comparison Group

Analytic Strategy

Findings/Limitations











The Governor’s Educator
Excellence Grant (GEEG)
program was implemented
in approximately 99 high
poverty, high performing
public schools in Texas
In order to qualify for the
GEEG, schools had to be in
the top third of schools in
percentage of low-income
students, and be rated as
Exemplary or Recognized
(or in the top quartile of
schools rated Academically
Acceptable)
For all analyses (both
student achievement and
teacher attitudes), GEEG
schools were compared to
non-GEEG schools



Simple descriptive
comparisons of Texas
Assessment of
Knowledge and Skills
(TAKS) performance
in GEEG vs. nonGEEG schools
The authors also use a
series of modeling
strategies to estimate
the impact of the
GEEG on student
achievement,
including a student
fixed-effects model, a
time trend analysis,
and a model that
included both student
and school fixed
effects







“The evidence regarding GEEG program impacts on
student achievement is inconclusive. Depending on
the specification, the analysis indicates that GEEG
has a weakly positive, negative, or negligible effect
on student achievement gains” (p. 107)
Teachers and school personnel did not believe the
program resulted in less collaboration or a decrease
in workplace collegiality; most personnel said the
GEEG had a positive impact on the school
environment
However, most teachers also reported that the GEEG
did not affect their instructional practices, or how
they approached the teaching process
Teacher turnover was also consistently lower in
GEEG schools
The identification of an adequate control group for
measuring student achievement impacts was difficult,
due to selection criteria to get into the program (only
offered to high poverty/high achieving schools) and
because there was another merit pay program in
place in over 1,000 schools in Texas
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Description of Bonuses/Rewards
(Fixed or Continuous)
 Schools applied for grants to
fund teacher bonus
programs; these grants
ranged from $60,000 to
$220,000 per school (size of
grants based on number of
students)
 The average teacher bonus
in the three years of the
GEEG was $2,469, $2,261,
and $2,249 respectively;
most teachers who received
a bonus got between $1,000
and $3,000

Employees Eligible for
Merit Pay Bonuses
 The majority of
funding under the
TEEG was
allocated for
teacher bonuses;
however, funds
were also available
to provide bonus
awards to
principals, teacher
aides custodians,
etc.

Individual or Group
Bonuses
 Bonuses were
distributed to
individual teachers
 There was a limited
pool of resources
for each school, so
not every
teacher/employee
was able to earn a
bonus

Measures Used in the Merit Pay
Program
 Teacher bonuses were
typically based on the
impact that individual
teachers had on student
achievement (for students in
their classrooms)
 School-level performance
measures were also
frequently used in the GEEG
 Measures varied, as
schools/districts were able to
create and implement their
own local merit pay program

Years of Program
Operation
 The Governor’s
Educator
Excellence
Grant (GEEG)
program was in
operation in
Texas schools
from 2005-06
to 2007-08
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New York City’s School-Wide Bonus Pay Program: Early Evidence from a Randomized Trial (2009) – Springer, M, & Winters, M.
Outcome
Measure(s)
 Student
achievement
gains in
mathematics
for students
in grades 3-8

Sample/Comparison Group

Analytic Strategy

Findings/Limitations









The sample for this
study includes 186
elementary, K-8, and
middle schools
randomly assigned to
the treatment group (i.e.
eligible for bonuses),
and 137 schools
randomly assigned to
the control-condition
(i.e. no bonuses)
All of the schools in the
sample were identified
as high-need schools





The authors estimate the impact of the
SPBP on student achievement using a
series of cross-sectional regression models
In these models, the authors control for
treatment status, and in the simplest model
also only controlled for student grade,
whereas in the most comprehensive model
they also included student- and schoollevel covariates (such as race indicators)
The authors also tested for differential
SPBP treatment effects by student and
school characteristics by incorporating
interaction terms into subsequent
regression models



“The SPBP had no discernible effect on
overall student achievement in
mathematics during the first year of the
program’s implementation. The sign on
the SPBP coefficient is negative in
virtually all models, though the average
treatment effect is always insignificant
at any conventional level” (p.8)
The authors note that this impact
evaluation was conducted only three
months after the program was
implemented
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Description of
Bonuses/Rewards (Fixed or
Continuous)
 Schools eligible for
bonuses could earn $3,000
for every staff member
(who was a union member)
if the schools met their
annual performance targets
 Schools that met 75% of
their annual performance
targets could earn $1,500
per staff member
 The SPBP set expected
incentive payments using
fixed performance
standards
 Bonuses could be
distributed at the discretion
of four-person
compensation committees
at individual schools; all
staff within a school could
earn the same amount, or
the bonuses could be
differentiated
 93% of schools received at
least a $1,500 bonus (65%
received $3,000), for a total
payout of $14.25 million
(an average of
$160,000/school)

Employees
Eligible for Merit
Pay Bonuses
 All members
of the United
Federation of
Teachers
union were
eligible for a
bonus

Individual or Group Bonuses

Measures Used in the Merit Pay
Program

Years of Program
Operation











Schools received a flat
amount of money for each
staff member ($3,000 if a
school met the
performance target)
These funds could then be
distributed at the
discretion of the school; so
in theory, some teachers or
staff could be excluded
from the bonus pool
All employees were
eligible for a bonus; the
SPBP was not designed to
be a rank-ordered
tournament, where only
the top teachers received a
bonus





Bonuses were earned by
meeting school
performance targets
established by the Progress
Report Card (PRC) system,
the primary accountability
system in the school district
The PRC system evaluates
schools on three factors: 1)
student attendance and
student/parent/teacher
perceptions of the school
learning environment
(15%); 2) student
performance on high-stakes
tests (30%); 3) student
progress on high-stakes
tests (55%)
Performance targets are set
based on school
performance from the prior
year

The SchoolWide
Performance
Bonus Program
(SPBP) was
implemented
midway into
the 2007-08
school year in
New York City
schools
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An Evaluation of the Teacher Advancement Program (TAP) in Chicago: Year Two Impact Report (2010) – Glazerman, S., &
Seifullah, A.
Outcome
Measure(s)
 Student test
scores on state
assessments in
math and
reading for
students in
grades 3-8

Sample/Comparison Group





Analytic Strategy

Chicago schools had to apply to become a

TAP school; initially, 16 elementary schools
applied that were selected as finalists
Of those 16 schools, 8 were randomly
assigned to begin implementing TAP in
2007-08 (cohort 1), with the other 8 schools
serving as the control group (these cohort 2
schools became TAP schools the following
year)
The authors also used propensity score
matching to identify other similar Chicago
schools to serve as comparisons for both the
cohort 1 and 2 TAP schools

The authors
utilized a series of
regression models
in which they
controlled for a
range of teacher
and student
characteristics







There were no statistically significant
differences in achievement between
schools in cohort 1 or 2 (the experimental
analysis); there were also no significant
cumulative impacts of TAP (being in a
TAP school for a longer period of time)
There were also no statistically significant
differences between TAP schools (cohort
1 and 2) and non-TAP schools (the quasiexperimental analysis)
A limitation of the experimental design is
the reliance on only 16 schools, 8 in each
treatment condition

Employees Eligible for
Merit Pay Bonuses

Individual or Group
Bonuses

Measures Used in the Merit Pay
Program

Years of Program
Operation









The Chicago TAP
model provides
financial rewards to
teachers, as well as
to principals and
other school staff



Bonuses are
distributed to
individual teachers
The TAP program is
intentionally
structured to avoid
competition, such that
everyone is eligible to
receive a bonus
instead of having
teachers compete for a
finite pool of bonus
dollars

The TAP system provides
rewards to teachers based
on performance in three
areas:
o Classroom
observations
o Teacher valueadded impact on
students in his/her
classroom
o School-wide
achievement gains

This evaluation
focuses on the
impact of TAP in
the Chicago
Public Schools in
2007-08 school
year through its
second year in
2008-09
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Description of
Bonuses/Rewards (Fixed or
Continuous)
 In the first year, the
average teacher bonus
ranged from $0 to
$2,045; after that, the
average bonus was
$2,653, with a
maximum of $6,320
 Principals could earn
up to $5,000 per year,
and other school staff
could earn up to $1,000
($500 in the first year)

Findings/Limitations

Teacher Pay for Performance: Experimental Evidence from the Project on Incentives in Teaching (2010) – Springer, M., Ballou, D.,
Hamilton, L., Le, V., Lockwood, J., McCaffrey, D., Pepper, M., & Stecher, B.
Outcome
Measure(s)
 Growth in math
achievement as
measured by
criterion
referenced test
scores on the
state test, the
Tennessee
Comprehensive
Assessment
Program
(TCAP)

Sample/Comparison
Group
 The initial sample
consisted of 296
middle school math
teachers, with 143
randomly assigned
to the treatment
group, and 153
assigned to the
control group
 By the third year of
the program, only
148 teachers
remained in the
program (84 in the
treatment group)

Analytic Strategy

Findings/Limitations








Schools were stratified into ten
groups based on TCAP
performance to ensure balance in
the performance of schools
assigned to the treatment and
control groups
Clusters of teachers within each
school were then assigned to the
treatment or control group
To estimate treatment effects, the
authors used “lineal mixed models
designed to account for features of
the experimental design and
randomization into treatment and
control groups” (p. 21), in which
they controlled for observable
differences between the treatment
and control groups





The authors found no overall treatments effects
across all years and grades (effect size of 0.04)
However, they did find positive and significant
effects for students in grade 5 in the second
two years, equal to effect sizes of 0.18 and 0.20
(the authors note that most grade 5 classes are
self-contained)
The authors note some threats to validity,
including an imbalance between treatment and
control teachers on observable characteristics
(by grade level), non-random assignment of
students to teachers (also by grade level), and
differential and overall attrition by teachers
from the treatment and control groups;
however, the authors do not consider these
factors to have influenced the overall results
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Description of Bonuses/Rewards
(Fixed or Continuous)






There were three fixed reward
levels:
o $5,000 for teachers at
the 80th percentile of the
performance threshold
o $10,000 for teachers at
the 85th percentile
o $15,000 for teachers at
the 95th percentile
The average bonus distributed in
each of the three years, starting
in the 2006-07 school year, was
$9,639, $11,370, and $9,623
respectively
Over the three years, $1.27
million was distributed in
bonuses, with 33.6% of teachers
in the initial treatment group
receiving a year-end bonus at
least once

Employees Eligible
for Merit Pay
Bonuses
 Middle school
math teachers
who taught ten
or more students

Individual or Group
Bonuses

Measures Used in the Merit Pay
Program

Years of Program
Operation











Teachers were not
forced to compete
against each other
for a limited bonus
pool
Bonuses were given
to individual
teachers, not to
teams of teachers or
entire schools
In principle, all
teachers could earn
the maximum bonus
if they reached the
performance
thresholds



The authors used a simple
value-added measure to
determine which teachers
would be eligible for
bonuses
In short, each student’s
performance in a classroom
was compared to the
performance of similar
students (with the same prior
year test score) statewide;
the difference for all
students between actual
performance and state
performance was then
averaged, resulting in an
overall value-added score
that indicated how a
teacher’s students performed
compared to other similar
students

The POINT
experiment
was open to
middle
school
mathematics
teachers
during the
2006-07
school year,
and
continued
within the
Nashville
School
System for
three
academic
years
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District Awards for Teacher Excellence (D.A.T.E.) Program: Final Evaluation Report (2010) – Springer, M., Lewis, J., Ehlert, M.,
Podgursky, M., Crader, G., Taylor, L., Gronberg, T., Jansen, D., Lopez, O., & Stuit, D.
Outcome
Measure(s)
 Student
performance
on the Texas
Assessment
of
Knowledge
and Skills
(TAKS)
 Teacher
survey
responses

Sample/Comparison
Group
 In Year 1, there
were 203 districts
that participated in
the DATE
program (191 of
which continued
into Year 2),
compared to
approximately
1,000 districts that
declined the
opportunity to
participate

Analytic Strategy

Findings/Limitations







Simple descriptive
comparisons of
Texas Assessment
of Knowledge and
Skills (TAKS)
performance in
DATE vs. nonDATE schools
Regression analyses
in which the authors
controlled for
several background
characteristics of
students and schools






Student passing rates on the TAKS were lower in DATE schools,
though the difference between DATE and non-DATE schools
decreased
Students in DATE schools had greater TAKS gains than students in
non-DATE schools
Teacher turnover was related to receiving a DATE award; teachers
that received an award were more likely to stay at their school, and
teachers that did not were more likely to leave
Teachers reported improved school climate and did not perceive
negative effects; teachers also indicated that the incentive plans did
not really contribute to school improvements
“More often than not, participants in the DATE program had a
positive experience, student achievement gains and teacher
turnover moved in a generally desirable direction, and teacher
attitudes were favorable towards DATE” (p. xiii)
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Description of
Bonuses/Rewards (Fixed or
Continuous)
 Teachers in districts with
district-wide plans
received an average
bonus of $1,361 (with
70% of teachers receiving
a bonus of at least $1,000)
 Teachers in districts with
select school plans
received an average
bonus of $3,344 (with
96% of teachers receiving
a bonus of at least $1,000)

Employees Eligible
for Merit Pay
Bonuses
 DATE funds
were primarily
used to give
bonuses to
teachers;
however, these
funds were also
used to give
bonuses to
principals and
other school
personnel

Individual or Group Bonuses

Measures Used in the
Merit Pay Program

Years of Program
Operation












Most districts implemented plans
in which all teachers were not
eligible; 21% of districts in Year
1 and 6% in Year 2 provided
awards to 90% of teachers
During Year 1, the awards were
a combination of individual and
group based performance; in
Year 2, there was a greater
tendency towards individual
teacher performance
Districts were not required to
include all teachers
There was a limited pool of
funds for each school

Varied by
school/district, as
DATE funding
was given to
districts to
implement locally
designed incentive
pay plans

The program was
initially
implemented
statewide in Texas
in 2008-09, and
was still in
operation during
2010-11 school
year (though this
evaluation only
focuses on
outcomes for
districts
participating in the
program for the
first two years)
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Teacher Incentives and Student Achievement: Evidence from New York City Public Schools (2011) – Fryer, R.
Outcome Measure(s)
 Primary outcome
measure was
student
achievement gains
in math and
English/language
arts
 The author also
assessed how
merit pay
impacted student
attendance, course
grades, high
school graduation
rates, etc.

Sample/Comparison Group
 Total sample was 396
high-need schools, each
of which was selected
based on a school’s
proficiency ratings,
poverty rates,
percentage of English
Language Learners and
special education
students
 Of the 396 schools in
the experimental
sample, 233 schools
were randomly
assigned to take part in
the merit pay initiative,
with 163 schools
serving as control
schools

Analytic Strategy
 Student-level
regression analyses
were used to
determine the impact
of the merit pay
initiative
 In his regression
model, the author
controlled for prior
achievement levels,
race, free and reduced
lunch eligibility,
special education
status, English
language learner
status, as well as
controls for teacher
and school
characteristics

Findings/Limitations
 “Providing incentives to teachers based on school’s
performance on metrics involving student
achievement, improvement, and the learning
environment did not increase student achievement in
any statistically meaningful way. If anything, student
achievement declined” (p.5)
 The estimates for the effect of incentives on student
achievement were all negative, and statistically
significant in the middle school
 There were also no statistically significant impacts,
positive or negative, on any of the other outcome
measures
 The author also found no impact on teacher retention
or on the number of teacher absences
 The author suggested that the lack of an impact could
have been the result of small incentives, an incentive
scheme that was too complex and not easy to
understand, and focused too heavily on group
incentives
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Description of Bonuses/Rewards
(Fixed or Continuous)









Schools eligible for bonuses
could earn $3,000 for every staff
member (who was a union
member) if the schools met their
annual performance targets
Schools that met 75% of their
annual performance targets
could earn $1,500 per staff
member
Bonuses could be distributed at
the discretion of compensation
committees at individual
schools; all staff within a school
could earn the same amount, or
the bonuses could be
differentiated.
The only caveat was that
bonuses could not be based on
seniority
Total payout for the two years of
the program was $22 million in
the first year and $31 million in
the second year

Employees Eligible
for Merit Pay
Bonuses
 All members of
the United
Federation of
Teachers union
were eligible for
a bonus

Individual or Group
Bonuses

Measures Used in the Merit
Pay Program

Years of Program
Operation











Schools received a flat
amount of money for
each staff member
($3,000 if a school met
the performance target)
These funds could then
be distributed at the
discretion of the school;
so in theory, some
teachers or staff could
be excluded from the
bonus pool
The majority of schools
(80%) gave everyone
the same bonus
amount, with the only
differentiation based on
the position held in the
school



Bonus money was
distributed to schools if
annual performance
targets were met
These performance
targets were based on
student performance on
state exams for
elementary and middle
school students, Regents
exam results and
graduation rates for high
schools, student
attendance, and a
learning environment
survey administered to
teachers, parents, and
schools

The New
York merit
pay initiative
was
established as
a two-year
pilot program
that was
implemented
in the 2007-08
school year
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Appendix B – CPIP Report Cards

187

188

189

190

191

192

193

194

195

196

197

198

199
Appendix C – School Counselor Interview Questions
Thank you for taking the time to respond to these questions about how the Cobra Pride Incentive
Program (CPIP) has impacted your job and your students. Please feel free to respond openly and
honestly, as I will not share your individual responses with anyone. I may use quotes from your
responses in my research; however, your name will not be attached to any of the quotes I use.
Please take as much time as you need to respond to these questions, and if you have additional
thoughts about the CPIP not covered in these questions, please feel free to include them at the
end.
As a thank you for your time, I will provide lunch to all of the school counselors! Thank you for
your work and your time!
1. Current vs. Previous Job Responsibilities
a. Since the CPIP was implemented, have your job responsibilities changed in any way?
b. Do you now spend more time assisting with testing-related activities than you
previously did? Examples might include:
i. Coordinating test administrations
ii. Helping prepare students for taking test
iii. Watching classes while teachers focus on test preparation
iv. Proctoring test administrations
2. Time with Students
a. How has your time with students been impacted by the CPIP – do you spend less time
now with students providing direct counseling services? Or has the amount of time
spent not changed?
b. Are teachers less willing now, as a result of the CPIP’s emphasis on testing, to allow
students to be removed from class time to participate in school counseling activities?
3. Support from Teachers/Administrators
a. Because of the CPIP, are teachers now less supportive of school counseling
activities?
b. What are your perceptions of the level of support from administrators for school
counselors now that the CPIP has been implemented? Has the importance of school
counseling been minimized because of the focus of the CPIP? Or has the level of
support from administrators remained unchanged?
4. Impact on students
a. From your perspective, what impact has the CPIP had on student learning at Fountain
Lake?
b. Has the CPIP resulted in extra anxiety or stress for students?
c. What other changes, if any, have you seen in students (from a counseling perspective)
that may have been a direct result of the CPIP?
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Appendix D – Core and Non-Core Teacher Surveys
The Fountain Lake School District and the Office for Education Policy are interested in
knowing what teachers think of the Cobra Pride Incentive Program (CPIP). The attached
survey is intended to gauge your thoughts on the CPIP performance pay program at your
school, including what impact you think the program has had on the culture of the school and
on student achievement (among other things). Please feel free to answer openly and honestly,
as your individual answers will be kept completely confidential. Thank you for your time! (and
remember, you are eligible for one of four $25 gift cards if you complete the survey!)

1.
2.
3.

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

For the statements below, please check the
circle that accurately reflects your
attitudes.
Teachers who are more “effective” should be
paid more than teachers who are less
“effective.”
The NWEA assessments provide more useful
information than Arkansas-specific
assessments (i.e. Arkansas Benchmark)
I have altered my approach to teaching this
year based on feedback from other teachers
on how I could improve my classroom
practices.
I am an “effective” teacher.
The NWEA assessments are a valuable use of
instructional time.
The bonus I receive will be based more on
my effectiveness as a teacher than on the
abilities of my students.
I am more likely to have a larger
performance pay bonus if I work with the
higher performing students.
If another teacher receives a large bonus, it
will be harder for me to get a large bonus.
The effectiveness of a teacher is reflected in
improvements in the test scores of his/her
students.
The NWEA assessments have been useful in
improving student achievement across the
school/district.
The NWEA assessments provide an accurate
measure of my students’ actual learning.
Teachers with the same level of educational
training who have worked for the same
amount of time should be paid the same.
Teachers should be financially rewarded for
improving student achievement.

Strongly
Disagree

Disagree

Agree

Strongly
Agree
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14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

25.
26.

27.
28.
29.
30.

The current CPIP bonus amount for which I
am eligible is an appropriate reward for my
hard work.
Standardized assessments used in the CPIP
are comprehensive measures of what
students should be learning.
I believe the CPIP has improved the
educational outcomes for students in my
school.
Students at my school had higher levels of
anxiety and stress because of the CPIP’s focus
on testing.
Because of the CPIP, I have sought out
additional training (education, professional
development, etc.) to improve my teaching.
If the CPIP performance pay program
remains in place at my school, I may seek out
other teaching opportunities.
Without the CPIP performance pay program,
I would not stay at my current school.
Teachers now compete with each other
instead of working together as a result of the
CPIP.
I have noticed more teachers at my school
working together because of the CPIP.
Teachers at my school have become more
focused on raising student achievement as a
result of the CPIP.
The content covered on the standardized
assessments used in the CPIP is
representative of what students should be
learning.
Students at my school have learned more as a
result of the CPIP.
My CPIP bonus will be larger if I work with
the lowest performing students, since these
are the students that could show the greatest
amount of growth.
Teachers at my school have investigated new
teaching practices in order to improve their
CPIP bonuses.
The CPIP has led to “teaching to the test” at
my school.
The CPIP has encouraged me to discuss
various pedagogical practices with other
teachers at my school.
I have witnessed other teachers working
harder as a result of the CPIP.
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31.

I have noticed an increased focus on lesson
planning at my school as a result of the CPIP.

32.

I’ve noticed that teachers are not as likely to
share ideas with each other as a result of the
CPIP.
The CPIP has encouraged teachers at my
school to adopt new teaching strategies.
The school-wide portion of the CPIP
encourages me to help other teachers in my
school.
The CPIP has resulted in teachers only
focusing on content covered on standardized
tests.
The CPIP is fair.

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

The CPIP encourages teachers to work with
the highest performing students.
The CPIP has resulted in anxiety and stress
for teachers.
The CPIP merit rating I receive on my end-ofyear report card will accurately reflect my
effectiveness as a teacher.

Please provide any additional comments you might have about the Cobra Pride Incentive
Program:
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Thank you for completing our survey! If you have any additional questions, please
contact Nathan Jensen at (479) 575-3773, or njensen@uark.edu

203
The Fountain Lake School District and the Office for Education Policy are interested in
knowing what teachers think of the Cobra Pride Incentive Program (CPIP). The attached
survey is intended to gauge your thoughts on the CPIP performance pay program at your
school, including what impact you think the program has had on the culture of the school and
on student achievement (among other things). Please feel free to answer openly and honestly,
as your individual answers will be kept completely confidential. Thank you for your time! (and
remember, you are eligible for one of four $25 gift cards if you complete the survey!)

1.
2.

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

For the statements below, please check the
circle that accurately reflects your
attitudes.
Teachers who are more “effective” should be
paid more than teachers who are less
“effective.”
I have altered my approach to teaching this
year based on feedback from other teachers
on how I could improve my classroom
practices.
I am an “effective” teacher.
If another teacher receives a large bonus, it
will be harder for me to get a large bonus.
The effectiveness of a teacher is reflected in
improvements in the test scores of his/her
students.
Without the CPIP performance pay program,
I would not stay at my current school.
The NWEA assessments have been useful in
improving student achievement across the
school/district.
Teachers with the same level of educational
training who have worked for the same
amount of time should be paid the same.
Teachers should be financially rewarded for
improving student achievement.
The current CPIP bonus amount for which I
am eligible is an appropriate reward for my
hard work.
I believe the CPIP has improved the
educational outcomes for students in my
school.
Students at my school had higher levels of
anxiety and stress because of the CPIP’s focus
on testing.
Because of the CPIP, I have sought out
additional training (education, professional
development, etc.) to improve my teaching.

Strongly
Disagree

Disagree

Agree

Strongly
Agree
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14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

If the CPIP performance pay program
remains in place at my school, I may seek out
other teaching opportunities.
Without the CPIP performance pay program,
I would not stay at my current school.
Teachers now compete with each other
instead of working together as a result of the
CPIP.
I have noticed more teachers at my school
working together because of the CPIP.
Teachers at my school have become more
focused on raising student achievement as a
result of the CPIP.
Students at my school have learned more as a
result of the CPIP.
Teachers at my school have investigated new
teaching practices in order to improve their
CPIP bonuses.
The CPIP has led to “teaching to the test” at
my school.
The CPIP has encouraged me to discuss
various pedagogical practices with other
teachers at my school.
I have witnessed other teachers working
harder as a result of the CPIP.
I have noticed an increased focus on lesson
planning at my school as a result of the CPIP.
I’ve noticed that teachers are not as likely to
share ideas with each other as a result of the
CPIP.
The CPIP has encouraged teachers at my
school to adopt new teaching strategies.
The school-wide portion of the CPIP
encourages me to help other teachers in my
school.
The CPIP has resulted in teachers only
focusing on content covered on standardized
tests.
The CPIP is fair.
The CPIP encourages teachers to work with
the highest performing students.
The CPIP has resulted in anxiety and stress
for teachers.
The CPIP merit rating I receive on my end-ofyear report card will accurately reflect my
effectiveness as a teacher.
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Please provide any additional comments you might have about the Cobra Pride Incentive
Program:
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Thank you for completing our survey! If you have any additional questions, please
contact Nathan Jensen at (479) 575-3773, or njensen@uark.edu
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Appendix E – Summary of Teacher Survey Responses, Spring & Fall 2011
Fountain Lake Teacher Survey: Spring 2011
Cobra Pride Incentive Program (CPIP)

1.
2. *
3.

4.
5.*
6.*
7.*
8.
9.
10.
11.*
12.
13.
14.
15.*

For the statements below, please check the
circle that accurately reflects your
attitudes.
Teachers who are more “effective” should be
paid more than teachers who are less
“effective.”
The NWEA assessments provide more useful
information than Arkansas-specific
assessments (i.e. Arkansas Benchmark)
I have altered my approach to teaching this
year based on feedback from other teachers
on how I could improve my classroom
practices.
I am an “effective” teacher.

Strongly
Disagree

Disagree

Agree Strongly
Agree

8%

20%

44%

27%

8%

24%

60%

8%

12%

42%

37%

9%

0%

0%

48%

52%

The NWEA assessments are a valuable use of
instructional time.
The bonus I receive will be based more on
my effectiveness as a teacher than on the
abilities of my students.
I am more likely to have a larger
performance pay bonus if I work with the
higher performing students.
If another teacher receives a large bonus, it
will be harder for me to get a large bonus.
The effectiveness of a teacher is reflected in
improvements in the test scores of his/her
students.
The NWEA assessments have been useful in
improving student achievement across the
school/district.
The NWEA assessments provide an accurate
measure of my students’ actual learning.
Teachers with the same level of educational
training who have worked for the same
amount of time should be paid the same.
Teachers should be financially rewarded for
improving student achievement.
The current CPIP bonus amount for which I
am eligible is an appropriate reward for my
hard work.
Standardized assessments used in the CPIP
are comprehensive measures of what
students should be learning.

12%

22%

56%

10%

25%

56%

15%

4%

20%

51%

22%

8%

24%

73%

2%

1%

13%

54%

30%

2%

19%

26%

52%

3%

17%

48%

33%

2%

9%

39%

40%

13%

8%

17%

56%

19%

12%

25%

45%

18%

6%

23%

67%

4%

207
16.

I believe the CPIP has improved the
educational outcomes for students in my
school.
17.
Students at my school had higher levels of
anxiety and stress because of the CPIP’s focus
on testing.
18.
Because of the CPIP, I have sought out
additional training (education, professional
development, etc.) to improve my teaching.
19.
If the CPIP performance pay program
remains in place at my school, I may seek out
other teaching opportunities.
20.
Without the CPIP performance pay program,
I would not stay at my current school.
21.
Teachers now compete with each other
instead of working together as a result of the
CPIP.
22.
I have noticed more teachers at my school
working together because of the CPIP.
23.
Teachers at my school have become more
focused on raising student achievement as a
result of the CPIP.
24. * The content covered on the standardized
assessments used in the CPIP is
representative of what students should be
learning.
25.
Students at my school have learned more as a
result of the CPIP.
26. * My CPIP bonus will be larger if I work with
the lowest performing students, since these
are the students that could show the greatest
amount of growth.
27.
Teachers at my school have investigated new
teaching practices in order to improve their
CPIP bonuses.
28.
The CPIP has led to “teaching to the test” at
my school.
29.
The CPIP has encouraged me to discuss
various pedagogical practices with other
teachers at my school.
30.
I have witnessed other teachers working
harder as a result of the CPIP.
31.
I have noticed an increased focus on lesson
planning at my school as a result of the CPIP.
32.
I’ve noticed that teachers are not as likely to
share ideas with each other as a result of the
CPIP.
33.
The CPIP has encouraged teachers at my
school to adopt new teaching strategies.

18%

36%

42%

4%

10%

43%

39%

8%

21%

52%

22%

4%

30%

54%

14%

1%

46%

53%

1%

0%

14%

49%

32%

5%

12%

49%

33%

5%

7%

20%

58%

15%

4%

27%

65%

4%

14%

44%

40%

2%

6%

40%

43%

11%

9%

44%

44%

2%

2%

28%

48%

22%

11%

47%

38%

3%

8%

40%

44%

8%

11%

43%

42%

3%

15%

69%

13%

3%

7%

42%

49%

2%
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34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

The school-wide portion of the CPIP
encourages me to help other teachers in my
school.
The CPIP has resulted in teachers only
focusing on content covered on standardized
tests.
The CPIP is fair.
The CPIP encourages teachers to work with
the highest performing students.
The CPIP has resulted in anxiety and stress
for teachers.
The CPIP merit rating I receive on my end-ofyear report card will accurately reflect my
effectiveness as a teacher.

6%

38%

50%

7%

0%

38%

50%

12%

23%

40%

33%

4%

14%

74%

10%

2%

4%

16%

45%

35%

24%

60%

15%

0%

*Indicates questions were only answered by core-teachers
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Fountain Lake Teacher Survey: Fall 2011
Cobra Pride Incentive Program (CPIP)

1.
2. *
3.

4.
5.*
6.*

7.*
8.
9.
10.
11.*
12.
13.
14.
15.*

For the statements below, please check the
circle that accurately reflects your
attitudes.
Teachers who are more “effective” should be
paid more than teachers who are less
“effective.”
The NWEA assessments provide more useful
information than Arkansas-specific
assessments (i.e. Arkansas Benchmark)
I have altered my approach to teaching this
year based on feedback from other teachers
on how I could improve my classroom
practices.
I am an “effective” teacher.

Strongly
Disagree

Disagree

Agree Strongly
Agree

2%

8%

66%

24%

13%

30%

43%

15%

17%

38%

40%

5%

3%

0%

44%

53%

The NWEA assessments are a valuable use of
instructional time.
The bonus I received in 2010-11 was
based more on my effectiveness as a
teacher than on the abilities of my
students.
I am more likely to have a larger
performance pay bonus if I work with the
higher performing students.
If another teacher receives a large bonus, it
will be harder for me to get a large bonus.
The effectiveness of a teacher is reflected in
improvements in the test scores of his/her
students.
The NWEA assessments have been useful in
improving student achievement across the
school/district.
The NWEA assessments provide an accurate
measure of my students’ actual learning.
Teachers with the same level of educational
training who have worked for the same
amount of time should be paid the same.
Teachers should be financially rewarded for
improving student achievement.
The current CPIP bonus amount for which I
am eligible is an appropriate reward for my
hard work.
Standardized assessments used in the CPIP
are comprehensive measures of what
students should be learning.

10%

35%

43%

13%

17%

55%

29%

0%

8%

41%

23%

28%

22%

53%

20%

5%

17%

41%

38%

5%

10%

30%

56%

5%

13%

46%

41%

0%

16%

36%

38%

10%

3%

19%

56%

22%

13%

25%

48%

13%

10%

29%

59%

2%

210
16.

I believe the CPIP has improved the
educational outcomes for students in my
school.
17.
Students at my school had higher levels of
anxiety and stress because of the CPIP’s focus
on testing.
18.
Because of the CPIP, I have sought out
additional training (education, professional
development, etc.) to improve my teaching.
19.
If the CPIP performance pay program
remains in place at my school, I may seek out
other teaching opportunities.
20.
The CPIP performance pay program is one of
the main reasons why I stay at my current
school.
21.
Teachers now compete with each other
instead of working together as a result of the
CPIP.
22.
I have noticed more teachers at my school
working together because of the CPIP.
23.
Teachers at my school have become more
focused on raising student achievement as a
result of the CPIP.
24. * The content covered on the standardized
assessments used in the CPIP is
representative of what students should be
learning.
25.
Students at my school have learned more as a
result of the CPIP.
26. * My CPIP bonus will be larger if I work with
the lowest performing students, since these
are the students that could show the greatest
amount of growth.
27.
Teachers at my school have investigated new
teaching practices in order to improve their
CPIP bonuses.
28.
The CPIP has led to “teaching to the test” at
my school.
29.
The CPIP has encouraged me to discuss
various pedagogical practices with other
teachers at my school.
30.
I have witnessed other teachers working
harder as a result of the CPIP.
31.
I have noticed an increased focus on lesson
planning at my school as a result of the CPIP.
32.
I’ve noticed that teachers are not as likely to
share ideas with each other as a result of the
CPIP.

15%

43%

38%

3%

13%

47%

29%

11%

13%

63%

24%

0%

34%

49%

11%

5%

44%

45%

9%

2%

13%

47%

28%

13%

11%

50%

32%

6%

7%

28%

59%

7%

5%

28%

67%

0%

13%

49%

37%

2%

25%

58%

18%

0%

6%

41%

51%

2%

2%

25%

49%

25%

6%

48%

43%

3%

8%

39%

50%

3%

5%

43%

51%

2%

11%

73%

14%

2%
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33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

The CPIP has encouraged teachers at my
school to adopt new teaching strategies.
The school-wide portion of the CPIP
encourages me to help other teachers in my
school.
The CPIP has resulted in teachers only
focusing on content covered on standardized
tests.
The CPIP is fair.
The CPIP encourages teachers to work with
the highest performing students.
The CPIP has resulted in anxiety and stress
for teachers.
The CPIP merit rating I received on my
end-of-year report card (from 2010-11)
accurately reflected my effectiveness as a
teacher.

3%

38%

54%

5%

5%

43%

44%

8%

2%

27%

56%

15%

35%

41%

17%

6%

7%

62%

28%

3%

3%

11%

39%

47%

21%

33%

37%

9%

*Indicates questions were only answered by core-teachers
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Appendix F – Descriptive Statistics and Correlations: ITBS and Benchmark Regressions
Table 24
Descriptive Statistics of Selected Variables Used in ITBS Regression Analysis-Math
Variable

Mean

Min

Max

SD

N

Fountain Lake (Treat)

0.50

0

1

0.50

998

ITBS Math NCE ‘11

56.22

1

99

19.34

998

SAT-10 Math NCE ‘10

60.53

6.7

99

19.90

998

SAT-10 Math NCE ’09

60.75

1

99

20.03

965

Grade 5

0.16

0

1

0.36

998

Grade 6

0.16

0

1

0.37

998

Grade 7

0.17

0

1

0.37

998

Grade 8

0.18

0

1

0.39

998

Grade 9

0.17

0

1

0.38

998

FRL

0.56

0

1

0.50

991

Minority

0.13

0

1

0.33

979

Female

0.47

0

1

0.50

991
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Table 25
Descriptive Statistics of Selected Variables Used in ITBS Regression Analysis-Literacy
Variable

Mean

Min

Max

SD

N

0.50

0

1

0.50

998

ITBS Literacy NCE ‘11

50.26

1

99

18.32

998

SAT-10 Literacy NCE ‘10

51.61

1

99

18.26

998

SAT-10 Literacy NCE ’09

49.68

1

99

18.91

961

Grade 5

0.16

0

1

0.36

998

Grade 6

0.16

0

1

0.37

998

Grade 7

0.17

0

1

0.37

998

Grade 8

0.19

0

1

0.39

998

Grade 9

0.17

0

1

0.38

998

FRL

0.56

0

1

0.50

996

Minority

0.13

0

1

0.34

978

Female

0.48

0

1

0.50

996

Fountain Lake (Treat)

Table 26
Correlation Matrix of Selected Variables Used in ITBS Regression Analysis-Math
Variable

Fountain Lake (Treat)
ITBS ‘11

Fountain
Lake
(Treat)

ITBS
‘11

SAT-10
‘10

SAT-10
‘09

Grade
5

Grade
6

Grade
7

Grade
8

Grade
9

FRL

Minority

1.00
-.011

1.00

SAT-10 ‘10

.000

.742

1.00

SAT-10 ‘09

-.004

.694

.756

1.00

Grade 5

-.003

.024

.040

-.013

1.00

Grade 6

.003

.012

.050

.109

-.189

1.00

Grade 7

-.005

-.073

-.043

-.035

-.194

-.197

1.00

Grade 8

.005

-.140

-.139

-.060

-.204

-.207

-.212

1.00

Grade 9

.000

.057

.071

.009

-.197

-.200

-.205

-.216

1.00

FRL

-.054

-.243

-.265

-.243

.012

-.014

.047

.010

-.089

1.00

Minority

-.110

-.179

-.163

-.179

.009

.017

.045

-.013

-.050

.202

1.00

.030

-.003

.012

.025

-.039

.086

-.031

-.022

.029

-.060

-.030

Female

Female

1.00
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Table 27
Correlation Matrix of Selected Variables Used in ITBS Regression Analysis-Literacy
Variable

Fountain Lake (Treat)
ITBS ‘11

Fountain
Lake
(Treat)

ITBS
‘11

SAT-10
‘10

SAT-10
‘09

Grade
5

Grade
6

Grade
7

Grade
8

Grade
9

FRL

Minority

1.00
-.043

1.00

SAT-10 ‘10

.000

.756

1.00

SAT-10 ‘09

.005

.738

.821

1.00

Grade 5

.000

.010

.072

-.078

1.00

Grade 6

.003

.015

.050

.025

-.189

1.00

Grade 7

.000

-.049

-.011

.004

-.192

-.196

1.00

Grade 8

-.003

-.124

-.064

-.072

-.205

-.209

-.213

1.00

Grade 9

.000

.114

.011

.132

-.196

-.200

-.204

-.218

1.00

FRL

-.063

-.325

-.340

-.334

.034

.005

.052

.007

-.096

1.00

Minority

-.129

-.127

-.181

-.172

.024

.016

-.021

.022

-.083

.236

1.00

.006

.219

.181

.192

-.013

-.007

-.017

-.009

.032

-.067

-.006

Female

Female

1.00
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Table 28
Descriptive Statistics of Selected Variables Used in Benchmark Regression Analysis-Math
Variable

Mean

Min

Max

SD

N

0.50

0

1

0.50

668

Scale Score ‘11

718.09

437

969

93.59

668

Scale Score ‘10

698.97

395

959

95.53

667

Scale Score ‘09

657.96

85

962

105.57

650

Grade 6

0.24

0

1

0.43

668

Grade 7

0.25

0

1

0.43

668

Grade 8

0.27

0

1

0.45

668

FRL

0.57

0

1

0.50

665

Minority

0.14

0

1

0.34

654

Female

0.46

0

1

0.50

665

Fountain Lake (Treat)

Table 29
Descriptive Statistics of Selected Variables Used in Benchmark Regression Analysis-Literacy
Variable

Mean

Min

Max

SD

N

0.50

0

1

0.50

668

Scale Score ‘11

754.53

222

990

152.56

668

Scale Score ‘10

715.75

132

972

157.92

666

Scale Score ’09

661.18

21

967

171.52

649

Grade 6

0.24

0

1

0.43

668

Grade 7

0.25

0

1

0.43

668

Grade 8

0.28

0

1

0.45

668

FRL

0.59

0

1

0.49

666

Minority

0.14

0

1

0.35

653

Female

0.46

0

1

0.50

666

Fountain Lake (Treat)

Table 30
Correlation Matrix of Selected Variables Used in Benchmark Regression Analysis-Math
Variable

Fountain Lake (Treat)

Fountain
Lake
(Treat)

Scale
Score
‘11

Scale
Score
‘10

Scale Grade Grade Grade
Score
6
7
8
‘09

FRL Minority

1.00

Scale Score ‘11

-.034

1.00

Scale Score ‘10

.022

.821

1.00

Scale Score ‘09

.013

.755

.815

1.00

Grade 6

.004

.076

-.064

-.030

1.00

Grade 7

-.007

.057

.103

.018

-.327

1.00

Grade 8

.007

.003

.196

.306

-.345

-.355

1.00

FRL

-.026

-.243

-.223

-.229

-.035

.043

-.007

1.00

Minority

-.114

-.177

-.148

-.158

.004

.038

-.035

.192

1.00

.029

.058

.018

.051

.112

-.037

-.026 -.097

-.029

Female

Female

1.00
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Table 31
Correlation Matrix of Selected Variables Used in Benchmark Regression Analysis-Literacy
Variable

Fountain
Lake
(Treat)

Scale
Score
‘11

Scale
Score
‘10

Scale Grade Grade Grade
Score
6
7
8
‘09

FRL Minority

Fountain Lake (Treat)

1.00

Scale Score ‘11

.006

1.00

Scale Score ‘10

-.009

.794

1.00

Scale Score ‘09

.025

.771

.802

1.00

Grade 6

.004

-.041

.009

.010

1.00

Grade 7

.000

-.024

.039

.087

-.324

1.00

Grade 8

-.003

.109

.010

.085

-.349

-.356

1.00

FRL

-.058

-.305

-.296

-.309

-.024

.036

-.024

1.00

Minority

-.126

-.097

-.132

-.138

.008

-.039

.013

.239

1.00

.027

.218

.213

.185

.005

-.007

.004 -.076

-.006

Female

Female

1.00
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